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I. INTRODUCTION
The -first components o-f the Ground Launched Cruise Missile
(GLCM) scheduled -for deployment in Europe arrived in England on
November 14, 1933. These were followed shortly thereafter by the
arrival of the first Pershing II's in the Federal Republic of
Germany. In all, a total of about 41 long range theater nuclear
weapons were added to the inventory of NATO by year's end. This
was not an inconsiderable number, but when viewed within the
framework of the total number of NATO and WTO theater nuclear
systems the size of the deployment certainly paled in comparison.
Yet plans for this deployment provoked mass demonstrations in
Europe, both East and West, and brought forth a massive Soviet
diplomatic offensive to counter it. Ultimately the Soviets used
the deployment as a pretext for leaving the INF and START talks.
The question must be asked as to how such a seemingly small
modernization program could provoke such an extraordinary chain
of events.
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one examines,
within a historical framework, the development of U.S. And Soviet
theater nuclear warfighting doctrine, force structure, and its
relation to strategic nuclear and conventional warfighting
doctrine through the present. Included in this section is a
survey of attempts to curb the proliferation of these forces
16
through arms control measures. A critical summary on nuclear
doctrine closes this part, providing a transition to part two.
Part two begins by examining the present situation
technologically and guanti tati vel y today in Europe. This
"balance" is then examined in terms of the security concerns o-f
the Soviets and of NATO. Finally, a range of strategies or
options ^r& offered for both immediate implementation and future
goals.
The reason for the historical approach lies in the fact that
only a solid grounding in the events of the past 35 years yields
clarity of understanding of the problem of theater nuclear
weapons in Europe. Far too much of the contemporary literature
takes an unhistorical approach in favor of a Quantitative one
with emphasis on the present. The result is a body of material
that ignores non-quantitative influences and developments, and,
as a result, covers only part of the problem.
B. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
One of the sources of ambiguity and thereby controversy has
been the question of what constitutes theater nuclear weapons.
By mutual agreement, these (also known as "grey area") systems
have been excluded from past strategic arms control negotiations
for reasons stemming from this definitional controversy.
For our purposes nuclear weapons systems (warheads and
delivery vehicles) will be classified as strategic nuclear,
theater-strategic, and theater-tactical. Strategic nuclear
17
weapons svstems are those that have been clearly identified as
such in recognized forums such as the SALT and START process.
These include land based ICBM's, long range bombers (including
cruise missile carriers), and SLBM's. While recognizing these
systems could have a theater role (as shall be seen later), their
express purpose is ensuring strategic nuclear deterrence between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Specific examples
include the B—52 Superfortress, Hinuteaan II and III, and Trident
C-4 for the U.S., and the Bear, SS-18 (RS-20) , and SS-N-13 for the
Sovi ets.
Theater—tactical (also referred to as tactical) nuclear
weapons are defined to be those weapons designed for battlefield
use, and with ranges, yields and deployments that correspond to
such use. These weapons generally reside at the opposite end o+
the spectrum from strategic nuclear systems by virtue of their
sub—megaton (and sometimes sub—kiloton) yield; their typical
employment is against specific battlefield targets, e.g., tank
formations. These weapons therefore have as their rationale more
of a warfighting purpose rather than strict deterrence. Specific
examples include the Lance SRBM and so—called Atomic Demolition
Munitions (ADM's) for the U.S., the Frog or Scad tactical missile
series for the Soviets, and nuclear capable artillery for both
sides.
Theater-strategic weapons reside between the clearly defined
nodes of strategic and theater-tactical nuclear weapons. These
18
weapons may be employed tor war-fighting and deterrence purposes
under any number o-f schemes. In the past, these systems were
intended -for strategic nuclear purposes and became theater-
strategic by default. Technology, being the double—edged sword
that it is, has permitted some theater-tactical systems to have a
strategic mission as well. The list o-f theater—strategic weapons
is rife with ambiguity. Perhaps one of the best examples is that
of nuclear capable aircraft. These have a clear conventional
role (close air support, air superiority, etc.) and a variety of
nuclear roles up to and including theater-strategic. Other
theater-strategic forces include the so—called independent
nuclear forces of France and Britain.
For clarity's sake, U.S. and allied country weapons systems
will be given in their popularly known form (e.g., FB-lil,
Pershing II, etc.). Soviet weapons systems will use either their
U.S. designation, especially for missiles (e.g., SS-20) or their
NATO codeword (Backfire) . Figures for force balances unless
otherwise noted ar& drawn from those published bv the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Mil itary
Balance. A glossary of acronyms (e.g., ADM, SLCM, etc.) is
located in Appendix A and various figures, photos, and other






II. NATO AND EMERGING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
Democratic nations care but little for what has been, but
they are haunted bv visions of what Mill be.
—Alexis deTocquevi 1 le
The past thirty-nine years have seen an extraordinary growth
in nuclear weapons in Europe. In NATO alone, the numbers o-f
warheads have grown -from in 1945 to a peak of 7,300 by 1967,
declining somewhat in recent years. Growth on the Soviet side
has been greater in both equivalent megatonage and numbers. The
result is that in terms of offensive weaponry, both sides now
have over 1,000 equivalent megatons of destructive potential when
their forces are summed (with a 5: 1 advantage for the Soviets).
In comparison, during the Second World War, the Western Allies,
Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan expended about 4 megatons
worth of explosive power over a six -year period.
A. 1945-1952: POST-WAR DOCTRINE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
During the period immediately following the Second World viae ,
debate raged in many quarters over the utility of the atomic bomb
as the U.S. possessed an absolute monopoly. Predictions in the
West on Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons ranged into the mid-
1950's inspite of earlier warnings that it could be as little as
two to five years away.
The immediate post-war debate over future force structure and
doctrine was colored by unrealistic expectations arising from
over optimistic assessments of strategic bombing during the
recently completed war. That more power -ful means of destruction
(viz. atomic weapons) were available but were only able to be
carried on long range bombers (B-29's) was all the more
-fortuitous. This is best enunciated by General Arnold, the Chief
of Air Staff on November 1945 in his Final Report to the
Secretary of War, wherein he stated:
The influence of atomic energy on air power can be
stated very simply. It has made air power all important
... CThe3 only known effective means of delivering
atomic bombs in their present state of development is
the very heavy bomber ....
This country ... must recognize that real
security ... in the visible future will rest on our
ability to take immediate offensive action with
overwhelming force. It must be apparent to a potential
aggressor that an attack on the United States would be
followed by an immensely devastating air attack
(emphasis added) on him. CRef. 13
U.S. nuclear capabilities in the immediate post-war
environment however, did not match intent. A 1947 Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) report under David E. Lilienthal reported that
the U.S. had no assembled nuclear weapons in its stockpile (as
opposed to those being used for a series of tests at the time).
Shortly afterward production was stepped up such that by 194S
there were 50 atomic weapons in the national stockpile ERef. 23.
By the time NATO came into being in April 1949, the stockpile
had increased to 133 weapons. However, only 30 B-29's were
modified to carry these devices, the Mark IV, which were similar
to the "Fat Nan" CPhoto 13 atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
These in turn were shortly followed by the improved Mark VI
CPhoto 23 atomic bomb in 1949. These B-29's were based in the
U.S. at Roswell, N.M. with the 509th Bomb Group CRef. 33. Plans
to utilize U.S. nuclear -forces, such as they were, involved
deploying the B—29' s to bases overseas, close to the periphery of
the Soviet Union, as a result of range limitations.
Until May 1949, the newly formed Strategic Air Command <SAC)
was concerned chiefly with penetrating Soviet airspace and
conducting a conventional and nuclear campaign similar to that of
World War Two, but with greater intensity. However, concern ower
the size of the (then) present stockpile and perceptions of
Soviet capabilities to overrun Western Europe in a veritable "red
sea" led to SAC being assigned a theater mission in Europe, the
goal of which would be curtailing the advancement of Soviet
forces. A major problem not entirely overlooked was that the
force structure present proved incapable of attacking true
tactical targets, e.g., troop concentrations, transportation
choke points, etc. This was a function of too small a stockpile
with large yield weapons (24+ KT) that were extraordinarily
difficult to handle, arrayed against a very large target base.
In the mean time, U.S. research and development in nuclear
weapons technology continued to press ahead. One of the goals
was reducing the size and weight of atomic weapons (thermonuclear
weapons were still a few years away) to make their handling
easier and broaden the platforms available to carry them. The
Mark 5 "tactical" nuclear weapon (3,000 lb. with a yield of ^40
KT) and the Mk. 7 CPhoto 33 (1,500 lb. and able to be carried by
smaller -fighter bombers) both entered the stockpile in 1952 CRef. 4
B. 1952-1960: THE RISE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
When Dwight Eisenhower entered the Presidency in January
1953, he brought with him a certain experience and knowledge
about nuclear weapons that his predecessor lacked. While
Eisenhower was serving as the -first NATO Supreme Allied Commander
(1950—52), the JCS authorized him in January 1952 to begin using
atomic bombs in NATO war planning. One month later, the final
report o-f Project VISTA, a study conducted by J. Robert
Oppenheimer and the California Institute o-f Technology, concluded
that employment of tactical nuclear weapons held "outstanding
promise" in the defense of Western Europe CRef. 53. It made no
mention of SAC, stressed that development of weapons with yields
of 1-50 KT were possible
,
and that they should be deployed by a
separate Tactical Atomic Air Force. Eisenhower was not sanguine
about the use of nuclear weapons, noting:
It is cold comfort for any citizen of Western Europe to be
assured that—after his country is overrun and he is pushing up
daisies—someone still alive will drop a bomb on the Kremlin
CRef. 63.
Just the same, the Eisenhower Administration was concerned
that trying to build up conventional forces in support of the
Smaller weapons and yields resulting from smaller
amounts of nuclear material being used came about through
the fusion process known as "boosting," which greatly
improves efficiency in fission weapons.
}A
Lisbon Conference decision would lead the country into social
and economic chaos. Our European allies were in the midst o-f re-
building their economic base, destroyed in the last war. and
would be even more susceptible to this problem. Nuclear weapons,
particularly the smaller, "tactical" weapons, became an
attractive alternative to conventional defense schemes. The
central role o-f nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy was enshrined in
the doctrine o-f "massive retaliation"—the declared use o-f a
broad range of retaliatory measures to counter Communist inspired
aggression anywhere in the world, up to and including the use of
strategic nuclear forces.
In June 1955 Operation "Carte Blanche" took place. For the
first time, an exercise was held with the employment of
(simulated) tactical nuclear weapons. The scenario involved
turning back a WTO armored assault across the Central Front.
Some 335 air—dropped weapons were employed in a corridor running
from Hamburg to Munich (although the exercise itself spread into
portions of France and the Low Countries—a total of nearly
13.4 megatons. The collateral effects (judged later by neutral
observers) were staggering. German civilian casualties were
estimated to be over 1.7 million dead and another 3.5 million
calculated, nor were military casualties (friendly forces;
Member nations of NATO agreed at the 1952 Lisbon
Conference that 96 divisions would be sufficient to meet the 175
smaller divisions the Soviets could be expected to muster.
wounded. Casualties or long term effects from -fallout were not
included CRef. 73 . Although rigorously suppressed, these
results were leaked, causing enormous consternation among the
German populace and contributing directly to the anti-nuclear
campaign that peaked in 1957-58 Uia&pf dem Atomtod, literally
"Struggle Against Atomic Death"). It also tremendously
complicated the rearmament program of the Adenauer government.
During this same period (1945-57) the British and French were
working on development of their own nuclear capability. During
the war, the British had collaborated with the U.S. on the
Manhattan Project (under the code name of the "Tube Alloys
Project") and as a result had a considerable lead over France
such that the first British device was exploded on October 3,
1952. In 1950, the U.S. gave the British their first nuclear-
capable platform in the form of 70 B—29' s (renamed Washington
Mk. l's)"*" which were capable of reaching Soviet territory. By
1956—57, they were testing thermonuclear weapons with the Val i ant
B flkl strategic bomber, a delivery system that had a secondary or
European theater delivery role as well. Additionally, the
British began IRBM development in 1954 with the Blue Streak.
This was intended to be a silo-based, second strike weapon, but
was eventually canceled due to a combination of
Similar results were noted in exercises held in the U.S.
(e.g.. Sagebrush)
.
^These were not sent configured to carry nuclear weapons though,
technical /strategi c obsolescence and economic -factors. The
predominance though o-f U.S. nuclear capability and doctrine was
formalized in 1956 when NATO adopted the doctrine o-f massive
retaliation in MC 14/2 CRef. 83.
Yet the Atlantic Alliance was far from untroubled towards the
close of the decade. In Germany the fallout from "Carte Blanche"
was felt in the wrath of the Social Democrats and some military
experts who charged that German rearmament and participation in
NATO would not provide protection from invasion. Rather, they
claimed that even with 500,000 German soldiers, NATO strategy
guaranteed Germany would become a battlefield, and the battle
would not remain conventional CRef. 93. Therefore, the argument
continued, German units in NATO would be useless for defending
Germany since they would only collaborate in a strategy that
would ring down the curtain of nuclear catastrophe on the
European stage. Reinforcing this view were public opinion polls
which showed the European public preoccupied with the fear that
NATO might turn Soviet aggression into nuclear war.
Following the controversy in the press (after "Carte
Blanche") and public apprehension about NATO strategy, the
Adenauer government contradicted the deterrence theory underlying
massive retaliation (viz., that the threat of escalation to all
out nuclear war would deter Soviet aggression). It stated that
eventual Soviet—U.S. nuclear parity would make conventional war
all the more inevitable and thus give greater import to
conventional forces in the balance of power CRef. 103.
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Another a-f-F spring of the nuclear debate in Germany that
gained momentum following "Carte Blanche" was the nascent peace
movement. The nuclear issue, while having its roots roughly in
mid— 1954, peaked during the five-month Kaapf dem fitomtod, when
hundreds of thousands of West Germans took to the streets in
anti—nuclear demonstrations CRef. 113. This followed the passage
of Adenauer's armaments program by the Christian Democratic
dominated Bundestag in March 1958. Support of the movement
within the government resided with the Social Democrats (SPD)
.
The Social Democrats had opposed Adenauer's measures the year
before, and subsequently suffered defeat in the November
elections. Following the Kampf den> Qtomtod, SPD support for the
movement (which had begun to decrease) withered away following
sweeping Christian Democrat victories in North Rhine—Westphal i a,
a traditional stronghold for the SPD CRef. 123.
Naturally this set of nuclear problems went hand-in-hand with
the others of the day facing NATO—Suez, the uprisings in
Poland and Hungary, etc. Certainly these were very deep and
troubling problems, but one event in 1957 did more to change
perceptions of troubles within NATO than anything else. That
event was the launch and successful orbiting of Sputnik 1 on
October 4, 1957. The perception (though later recognized as
hardly justified) was that the strategic equation had changed in
favor of the Soviets since the advent of Soviet ICBM's placed the
U.S. homeland at direct risk. Given this situation, the U.S.
>8
would be less inclined to use nuclear weapons in deterring war in
Europe and thus served to renew -fears o-f the U.S. de-coupling its
nuclear guarantee (i.e., the U.S. would become unwilling to trade
New York for Paris). In fact though, the opposite seemed to be
the case because the U.S. built it's nuclear capabilities in
Europe, both as a means to counter the strategic threat
presumably posed by Soviet ICBM capability, and to bolster its
warfighting capabilities in Europe.
C . SUMMARY
By the close of the decade, the nuclear capability of NATO in
general, and the U.S. in particular expanded dramatically. For
the U.S. alone, the national stockpile grew from 450 warheads in
1950, to over 18,500 in I960 CRef. 13 J, an increase of more than
4,0007.. Delivery systems grew in like manner. In 1950 the Navy
began deploying the AJ Savage off Midway class carriers in the
Mediterranean, a move which gave the Navy a strategic nuclear
strike mission against the south-western regions of the Soviet
Union. With deployment of Forrestal class attack carriers and
the A—3 Skywarr ior beginning in 1955, this capability was
significantly enhanced.
As previously mentioned, increasing numbers of fighter-
bombers coming on line were nuclear capable (including the entire
"Century—series" of fighters). The first ground launched cruise
missile, the Matador, became operational in 1951. The Strategic
Air Command counted 20 overseas bases, including bases in French
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Morocco, Spain, and Britain. The -first IRBM, the Thor, became
operational the summer o-f 1959 in England with the RAF. The RAF
supplied personnel, but SAC liaison officers controlled the
nuclear warheads. A second IRBM, the Jupiter 9 was being prepared
for its first deployment the following year in northern Italy.
As strategic weapons capability grew, so did tactical or
battlefield capabilities. The Army in particular was deploying a
wide range of battlefield missiles and nuclear capable artillery.
The better part of the nuclear weapons buildup by the end of the
decade stemmed from the emphasis on tactical weapons; bombs,
artillery shells, etc.
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III. EARLY SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
A. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AT WAR'S END
Soviet military doctrine on the Western front by the end of
the Great Patriotic War might well be characterized by one
quality—mass. Commenting after the war on one aspect of the
Soviet style of fighting. Major General F.W. von Mellenthin
wrote:
... Russian artillery is also employed in mass. Infantry
attacks without artillery preparation were rare, nor does Ivan
care much for short bombardments in order to gain surprise ...
The preliminary bombardment usually lasted two hours and their
gunners had standing orders to fire off the ammunition ration
for one to one and a half days during that period. Under such
concentrated fire the thin German lines were usually plowed
upside down in a very short time CRef . 143.
The Soviet preoccupation with mass is echoed as well by
General Herman Balck and Lieutenant General Heinz Gaedcke, other
German commanders serving on the Russian front. General Balck
stressed that mere numbers were not always guarantors of Soviet
victory. The Soviets lacked flexibility and innovation. Thev
(the Soviets) held to predetermined and extensively wargamed
plans such that when suddenly faced with an unpredicted or novel
situation on the battlefield they were prone to be either
paralyzed or to withdraw. General Balck cites as one example an
instance in Budapest wherein he successfully attacked 45 Soviet
divisions with 7 to 9 of his own (odds at best of 5:1) by taking
advantage of this characteristic of Soviet forces.
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Yet in the end Soviet -forces prevailed by virtue o-F sheer
numbers and the eventual opening of two -Fronts in the west by the
Western Alliance. At the end of the war, Soviet forces numbered
roughly 11.36 million men in arms CRef. 153 and the Soviet Union
was securing dominance in eastern Europe by virtue of its
occupation forces. To the Soviet people in April 1945, the
Soviet Union had won a great victory but at a staggering cost in
human and material losses. Barely three months later though it
would seem for naught with news of the atomic bomb dropped on by
the U.S. Writing after the war, Alexander Werth noted this
change in fortune:
... the significance of Hiroshima was not lost on the Russian
people. The news had an acutely depressing effect on
everybody. It was clearly realized that this was a New Fact in
the world's power politics, that the bomb constituted a threat
to Russia, and some Russian pessimists I talked to that day
dismally remarked that Russia's desperately hard won victory
over Germany was now "as good as wasted." CRef. 16J
B. STALIN'S EFFECT ON POST-WAR NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
The primary contribution of Stalin to military doctrine of
the period in question lies in his "Five Permanent Operative
Factors." Briefly, these were:
1) Stability of the rear,
2) Morale of the Army,
3) Quantity and quality of divisions,
4) Armament, and
5> Organizing ability of command personnel CRef. 17U
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These -factors were introduced in 1941 and in concert with
reverberations -from the purges, tended to dominate military
thought during and after the war. In -fact, Stalin's operative
factors became the be all and end all that would determine -future
wars—all else was subordinate. Stalin thereby made a virtue
of necessity and believed that in fulfilling these preparations,
victory would be predetermined CRef. 183.
Two elements were notable by their absence; the role of
surprise, especially that of strategic surprise, and the use of
nuclear weapons. In the case of the former, Stalin had been very
unpleasantly surprised when the Germans opened Operation
Barbarossa on 22 June 1941. This happened inspite of a multitude
of warnings from a variety of sources. The Soviet ambassador to
Japan had even passed along the date and time of the invasion.
In light of his failure to act on any of these warnings, it is
probable that Stalin refused to allow discussion of surprise in
warfare since this in turn would highlite his own failure.
The case of nuclear weapons is different. Soviet research
and development in the field of nuclear physics was well advanced
and nearly on par with that of the West in the late 1930' s. On
the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, Stalin had the State Defense
Committee issue a directive establishing an atomic program, with
v". I. Kurchatov in charge CRef. 191. Following the conference at
Potsdam during which Truman revealed the American achievement in
atomic weapons, Stalin pressed Kurchatov to speed up the program.
Yet nuclear weapons, especially in the theater role, were
deemed to be of secondary value. Principal reasons -for this
included politics, Marxist-Leninist thought, and practicality.
Nuclear weapons were not viewed as decisive weapons within the
framework of Marxist—Leninist thought. If they were, then
technology in the form of nuclear weapons would be supreme to the
dialectic insofar as their ability to determine the outcome of
some future war. This would also invalidate Stalin's operative
factors. Instead, they were viewed as weapons providing merely a
"bigger bang.
"
Stalin probably played down the role of nuclear weapons in
public as an important weapon in war based on the force
imbalances between the U.S. and themselves, particularly in
Europe. According to NSC-63 CRef. 203, the U.S. had projected
the Soviet stockpile to have 10—20 weapons by mid— 1950 and up to
200 by mid- 1954 CRef. 213. However, recent studies now seem to
indicate that outside of a small handful of experimental devices,
the Soviets had no weapons in their stockpile until 1953 LRef. 223
There were other, more practical reasons for the low degree
of emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons. Soviet commanders
and theoreticians were just as uncertain, if not more so, as
their American counterparts on the actual utilization of nuclear
weapons. Concerns over fallout effects in East Europe as well as
the western regions of the Soviet Union following use in Central
Europe were certainly present. Additionally there was the
problem of the delivery vehicle. The only means the Soviets had
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•for delivering atomic weapons were by means o-f copies made -from
impounded American B—29' s. This aircraft, the Tu-4 Bull, had the
same attendant problems as the B-29, namely range and an
unhealthy proclivity towards in-flight engine -fires.
It was able to reach the U.S. on one-way missions (although
questionable on the matter o-f mission success due to the U.S.
continental air defense capabilities). However, it most probably
would have been employed in a theater role against U.S. and
British -forces, or the strategic rear. Even then, the likelihood
o-f any degree o-f major success was significantly diminished as
long as this platform was the sole means of delivery. This
problem would soon be resolved with the convergence of two
events; development and deployment of medium range jet bombers
and long range missiles , and development of thermonuclear
weapons. The medium range (and later long range) jet bombers
increased the survivability expectations of air—del i vered
weapons. More important though was the quick, long range
employment of nuclear weapons offered by the synthesis of
2
missiles and thermonuclear warheads .
Rocket development had begun in 1945 using competing design
bureaus consisting of Russian and captured German scientists.
The first all Russian ballistic missile, the R-l, was built in
1947, and a prototype of a 7,000 km range missile already existed
by Stalin's death, according to Khrushchev who was surprised upon
learning of it.
^ Thermonuclear weapons allow the payload size and weight
requirements for missiles to be reduced without sacrificing
yield. Another advantage is that this made up to a certain
extent for the poor accuracies of the early missiles.
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However, the hub o-f military doctrine remained with the Army
and artillery, Everything else, including nuclear weapons and
their means o-f delivery, was in support o-f these branches.
Compare the -following statement by Colonel General of
Aviation Nikitin in Military Thought (1949) with the earlier
statements made by his American counterparts regarding air power
and nuclear weapons:
Soviet military science considers that the outcome o-f war
under contemporary conditions is decided on the field of battle
by means of annihilation of the armed forces of the enemy.
This definition of the fundamental mission of aviation is not
contradicted by the need to employ part of its forces to strike
the deep rear of the enemy, on his mi 1 i tary—industri al targets,
but our mi I i tar y science does not consider such blows an end in
themsel i/es 7 bat only a helpfal means of creating favorable
conditions for the success of the combat operations of ground
and naval forces -Cemphasis added> CRef. 23D.
C. SUMMARY
It is clearly seen that emphasis still lay with the battle on
the fronts, with the rear (in the case of the European theater,
the British Isles and the U.S.) ranking secondary in importance.
This in part stemmed from the position of the Soviet army as
first among equals, and the dim view the Soviets took of the
results from the strategic bombing campaign of the Western Allies
during the war. To a certain extent it may also be chalked up to
limited Soviet long range strike capabilities needed to carry out
such a strategy.
By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the technological
groundwork was fairly well in place for the instruments of
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theater nuclear -forces (TNF) . Yet the legacy o-f Stalin was such
that it wasn't until after his death that his operative -factors
began to be challenged and Soviet military considered
alternatives.
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IV. KHRUSHCHEV: THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE
A. 1953-55: POST-STALIN
There were two developments of note during the period
immediately following Stalin's death. One was a political debate
over the role nuclear weapons would play in a war with the
Western coalition and the other developed in the military over
the utility o-f Stalin's operative -factors.
In the case of the political debate, there were two camps,
one led by Malenkov, Chairman o-f the Ministers, the other by
Khrushchev. Malenkov argued -for the creation of a large
deterrent force based on thermonuclear weapons. He believed this
would force the West to realize the futility of nuclear war, and
thereby make war between the opposing systems impossible CRef. 243
It would seem Malenkov was pressing for a form of assured
destruction, directly contradicting tenets of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine on the inevitability of war between capitalism and
soci al i sm.
Standing in contrast to this was Khrushchev who held to the
more doctrinal ly orthodox view that the notion of a weapon that
could halt the inexorable march of history was contrary to
Marxi st—Leninist dictum. Rather, he held that through proper
planning by Soviet military science, the Soviet Union would be
able to fight a nuclear war and emerge victorious.
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The second development revolved around a growing split in the
Soviet military over Stalin's operative -factors. The debate was
not so much the -future utilization o-f the factors as it was over
their continued exclusi veness. Other elements began to be
discussed, chief of which was the element of surprise. The
advent of nuclear weapons had led some in the military to believe
that a massive surprise nuclear strike would cause such damage as
to make recovery impossible.
The process began with an article appearing in the September
1953 issue of Mil itary Thought by the magazine's editor, General
Major N.A. Talenskiy entitled "On the Question of the Laws of
Military Science." Talenskiy did not challenge Stalin's
operative factors, but rather implied these principals were not
basic CRef. 253. Talenskiy's article was a bit premature as the
debate was still raging, and the leadership succession hadn't
been consolidated- As such it wasn't ready to accept any changes
in doctrine just yet.
As far as theater planning went though, nuclear weapons were
still not considered to be decisive for a number of reasons. One
was still a matter of practicality, that is, continued reliance
on the manned bomber. Smaller "tactical" weapons were being
developed by the Soviets but were not yet deployable.
B. 1955-64: NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASCENDANT
In 1955 five nuclear explosions were detected in the Soviet
Union. The first two were air bursts with yields o-f about 5 and
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25 KT apiece and apparently used plutonium warheads o-F small and
medium size CRef. 263. The Tu-16 Badger and Mya-4 Bison jet
bombers were operational, and the SS-3 with a range of 1,000 km
entered service. According to Miller CRe-f. 273 these SS-3's may
have been what Marshall Krylov was referring to when he stated
that "by 1955 there were in the Soviet army several missile units
armed with medium-range missiles CRef. 283." The Soviet Union
finally entered the -Field o-f theater-tactical nuclear weapons.
The question arises that given a superficial examination of
the debate over the use of nuclear weapons during the previous 10
years, how is it that the Soviets seemed bent on acquiring
theater nuclear forces in quantity if they were not deemed
decisive, especially given the cost of diverting scarce research
and development resources ? The casual observer might be quick
to point out the Soviets were merely "mirroring" the U.S. and
NATO theater nuclear force deployments. In fact, they were not;
several factors bear this out.
Soviet nuclear and missile research developed independently
of American ef -Farts although they began at similar times.
Holloway CRef. 293 points out that while American efforts may
have provided some stimulus to Soviet efforts, particularly in
regard to early thermonuclear work, the decision to proceed to
development of the fusion bomb following the fission bomb was due
to internal dynamics. This is evidenced by their use of lithium
as a fuel source (vice deuterium or tritium) and the explosion of
a thermonuclear device barely 10 months after the U.S. "Mike"
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test in October 1952. Granted, it was not a "superbomb," but
unlike the U.S.'s purely experimental "Mike" device, it was in
warhead (i.e., deliverable) -form.
The U.S. was also engaged in missile research after 1945, but
by 1947 it was subordinated to manned bombers by the newly formed
Air Force and left to the Army. The Soviets though pressed on
with ballistic missile research. In part this stemmed from the
perceived lead the U.S. had in manned bombers and the dismal
failure of the Soviets to match the U.S. in this capability. In
a move that was characteristic of Soviet policy in this
situation, the decision was made initially by Stalin and later
fully implemented by Khrushchev that rather than compete with the
U.S. head-to-head in a field where the U.S. held a substantial
technological and quantitative lead, to leapfrog that field to
another and thus hopefully make the U.S. weapon system obsolete.
By going to missiles instead of bombers, intercontinental ranges
became (eventually) attainable and the concern over penetrating
air defenses, long flight times, and bombers hampered by poor in-
flight refueling capability or overseas bases to launch from was
obviated. At the same time it was important not to appear to
unilaterally concede a given field to the adversary, thereby
maintaining the justification for the mobilization of heavy
industry. Hence the reason to continue deployment of the
virtually useless Bison, and to develop and deploy the turboprop
Bear manned bombers in the mid—fifties. In spite of their dismal
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strategic role (i.e., attacks against the continental U.S.), the
Bear and Bison had a marginally effective theater role,
particularly when the former was armed with stand—off weapons.
It also becomes apparent which side was gaining the upper
hand in nuclear doctrine—namely the faction headed by
Khrushchev. Malenkov, who had argued for an assured destruction
form of strategy, was forced out of the government in 1955. For
the West, this bore a heavy portent. Khrushchev's reasoning lay
in the concept of damage limitation and the idea that not only
could a nuclear war be fought, but given the proper preparations,
the Soviet Union would emerge victorious.
Indicative of Khrushchev's influence was the Twentieth Party
Congress in 1956. It was during the gathering of this august
body that Khrushchev made his now famous "secret" speech
denouncing Stalin. During the course of this revelation,
Khrushchev called for a major reexamination of questions of
military science. The outcome of this was the establishment of a
conference in May 1957 and a series of seminars the following
year conducted in secret with participation by high—ranking
Soviet officers. The general conclusion reached was:
CT3he introduction and synthesis of nuclear weapons
and the long-range missile had brought about radical changes in
all aspects of warfare. As a result, major revisions in basic
concepts were mandated CRef. 303.
Khrushchev himself followed these proceedings along with
members of the Politburo. Their conclusions were essentially the
same, namely that the combination of nuclear weapons and long
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range missiles would be decisive -factors in any future war. The
basic objective by I960 was to "try to achieve victory with a
short war (by a lightning strike) but be prepared -for a prolonged
war." CRef. 313
A question may arise as to how this doctrine, oriented to
what appears to be strategic concerns, relates to theater nuclear
doctrine and -force structure. When one considers the fact that
U.S. strategic forces were deployed overseas along the periphery
of the Soviet Union and the fact that war in Europe would very
likely lead to general war with the U.S., then the distinction
between theater and strategic becomes very fuzzy. In this
conflict (European theater) it became important to neutralize as
quickly as possible the forward based systems (FBS) of the U.S.,
destroy the budding independent nuclear forces of Britain (and
later France) , destroy or at least wreak great havoc upon the
strategic rear areas of the Western coalition, and preserve the
better part of continental Europe for post—war exploitation.
Hence the need for large numbers of MR/IRBM's and other theater
nuclear forces combined with large numbers of conventional forces
for battle was established.
Indeed it would seem this policy was emplaced about 1958-59
and reached fruition by 1964, when 609 MR/IRBM's CRef. 323 were
in place and aimed at Europe—the "hostage Europe" doctrine. A
closer examination of this situation is warranted as the ongoing




The decision by Khrushchev to undertake this large scale
deployment of MR/IRBM's rested primarily on two -factors, one
materially related, the other oriented toward the balance o-f
strategic -forces. Materially, Khrushchev was faced with either
ordering full production and deployment of the first generation
ICBti, the SS—6 and thereby suffer its attendant drawbacks, or
deploy a limited number of SS—6's and a larger number of medium
range missiles, the SS—4 and SS—5 (Figure 1), while pressing
development of the second generation ICBM's (SS-7 and SS-S)
.
Khrushchev's decision was not made in a vacuum, exclusive of
the balance of Soviet strategic forces arrayed against those of
the U.S. and its allies. By following the latter path,
Khrushchev hoped to offset the forward based systems CFBS3 based
throughout Europe and North Africa. This course of action
provided a temporary remedy to a part of the strategic force
imbalance while awaiting development and deployment of the second
generation ICBM's which in turn would redress the gross strategic
balance.
The scenario that developed by the early— I960' s was a
miniaturized version of the by now infamous "missile gap" debate
of the 1959—60 period. Theoretically, Soviet superiority in
missile forces was such that the U.S. FBS could be effectively
removed in a first strike during the opening stages of conflict,
thereby removing a not inconsequential portion of the U.S.
nuclear strike capability against the Soviets. This was
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especially the case in Europe given the short flight times and
low probability o-f detection. Additionally, nuclear war would
entail large scale damage to the Europeans since a large
percentage of U.S. FBS were stationed there. Ultimately then,
the U.S. would be deterred from engaging the Soviet Union in
nuclear war, and Europe was held hostage to guarantee this
outcome.
A combination of factors soon emerged to put to question the
validity of this doctrine, which in and of itself was recognized
as a temporary fix. Many of the elements comprising U.S. FBS in
Europe were removed during this decade (see chapter V), and
hence, the original need for the emplacement of the SS—4 and SS-'
. . . . 1
was declining .
Yet they began to gain increasing significance as theater-
strategic weapons in their own right. However, this would not
become evident until the mid—late 1960's when the Soviets would
genuinely exploit their benefit.
C. SUMMARY
Before proceeding to the next chapter, it would be useful to
summarize the role of nuclear weapons in Soviet theater warfare
planning to this point (1962).
With the possible exceptions of the need to target the SSBN
bases in Holy Loch and Rota, the F-lll bases in England, and the
embryonic British and French independent nuclear forces by mid-
decade.
45
The importance of nuclear weapons evolved -from an almost
secondary role under Stalin to a position o-f being seen as
potentially valuable with combined arms, and by 1962, stood on
the threshold of being viewed as decisive. The main mission -for
Soviet TNF initially was the disruption o-f the enemy's strategic
rear. This grew in time to include destroying his long range air-
power and eventually included the destruction o-f the sum o-f his
TNF through early, preemptive use of nuclear weapons.
General nuclear war itself was seen as inevitable under
Stalin and as such, limited nuclear war (as thought of in the
West) was not even considered. Khrushchev eventually held that
while a general nuclear war was still possible, it was no longer
fatally inevitable. Here too though, limited nuclear war was
dismissed out of hand.
Nevertheless, Soviet efforts in developing and acquiring
nuclear weapons across a broad spectrum continued. The
underlying rationale was the concept of damage limitation, a
concept which required, at the very least, parity, if not
superiority in arms at all levels—offensive and defensive.
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V. CHANGES IN AMERICAN AND SOVIET DOCTRINE
The I960' s brought numerous changes in American and Soviet,
and by implication, in NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrine. France
joined the nuclear club in 1960 and Communist China -followed a
few years later. By 1962 the U.S. IRBM deployment in Europe was
complete with the Thor operational in England and the Jupiter in
Northern Italy (Figure 2). The Jupiter'^ deployed in Turkey
never reached full operational status. These events combined to
complicate Soviet theater nuclear war planning.
A. I960: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
Following the election o-f John F. Kennedy in 1960, renewed
emphasis was placed on improving conventional -forces in the
theater, and building strategic nuclear -forces. All this -fell
under the aegis of "flexible response." Flexible response is a
symetrical, proportional response to aggression. Ostensibly this
provides the President with options other than immediate
escalation to a general strategic nuclear exchange in the event
of aggression, as was the presumed case under massive
retaliation. In later years some revisionists have argued that
massive retaliation was in many respects similar to flexible
response , even calling it "flexible retaliation." However, that
was not the general perception when the Kennedy Administration
introduced flexible response in 1961-62. NATO adopted flexible
response formally in 1967 with MC 14/3.
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As mentioned, -Flexible response envisioned more of a role for
conventional forces than had massive retaliation. These forces
were sorely neglected in the aftermath of Korea, Sputnik and
emphasis on the "nuclear battlefield" which predominated the late
1950's. Army organization and training heavily emphasized
tactical nuclear warfare, with over 50% of the Command and
General Staff College curriculum devoted to atomic battlefield
tactics, and development of the "pentomic" division CRef. 33 1.
A massive building program for strategic nuclear arms was
underway which produced the Minutenan and Titan ICBM's, the
Polaris SLBM, and served to increase the numbers of manned
superiority over the Soviet Union which was having major problems
in the production and deployment of their ICBM's. Therefore, in
addition to enjoying this large margin of strategic superiority
(8,000 total equivalent megatons (EMT) for the U.S. vs. 800 total
EMT for the Soviet Union CRef. 34D), the U.S. also enjoyed a
strong measure of invulnerability to Soviet attack. The
combination of these factors was such that a preventive war
against the Soviet Union was presented to Kennedy (and quickly
dismissed) during the 1961 crisis over Berlin.
For all the planning with regards to conventional and
strategic forces though, little was done with theater nuclear
See Wells, S. "The Origins of Massive Retaliation,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 1 (Spring 1981): 31-5:
bombers for SAC.
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This e-f-fort yielded a wide margin o-f strategic forces—for
strategic deterrence purposes. Nevertheless, the stockpiling of
existing theater nuclear weapons, particularly tactical warheads,
continued and reached a peak of 7,300 under McNamara by 1966.
With the emphasis then on conventional forces in the European
theater, it would seem logical that some measure of relief would
have been in evidence among the West Europeans, and especially
the Germans who stood to have their territory turned into an
irradiated wasteland. This was not the case though. Concern in
Europe over de-coupling of the U.S. nuclear deterrent rose anew
with this very emphasis on conventional forces. The rationale
behind this concern was that as conventional forces gained a
larger mission, the Europeans would end up bearing more of the
burden for defense while the role of deterrence was lessened
through de—emphasis of U.S. nuclear forces.
The underlying element in this scheme of thought is two fold.
First, the Europeans prefer to think in terms of deterring war in
Europe rather than preparing a sufficient defense against war
should it occur. Another war would devastate Europe, even if it
remained conventional, which most believed (and still do) that it
would not. The successful defenders would be left with the
proverbial smoking, radiating ruin ai a phyrric victory.
Deterrence was also cheaper economically and in terms of
manpower. In addition, the Europeans harbored secret hopes that
in a future war they would be relegated to the role of bystanders
watching the missiles fly overhead on their respective journeys
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to Moscow and Washington, leaving Europe unscathed. This latter
thought is naive given the global devastation inherent in an
exchange o-F strategic nuclear -forces between the U.S. and
Soviets.
There were other events during the course o-f this decade that
gave the Europeans justi-fiable cause to question the commitment
o-f the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Among these were the multilateral
-force -fiasco, the aborted Skybolt missile project, and the
withdrawal o-f U.S. MR/IRBM's -from Europe.
As envisioned, the multilateral -force (MLF) , under one o-f its
many schemes, would have consisted o-f ships manned by
international crews carrying MR/IRBM's and cruise missiles with
joint decision making on nuclear weapons employment . This was
proposed in part to placate the Germans who were pressing -for a
greater role in the nuclear weapon employment decision process,
and in part to counter the burgeoning independent nuclear forces
o-f Britain and France. The Kennedy Administration was thoroughly
enamored with the concept and pressed the Europeans to accept it.
While the -force never -fully materialized, it nonetheless caused
problems, primarily with the Germans. Following intense lobbying
by the U.S., the Germans under Fritz Erhard signed on choosing to
-forgo better relations with France. As matters turned out
The nuclear powered cruiser Long Beach <CGN—9) was
originally intended to be fitted out with Regulus II cruise
missiles and eight Polaris missiles.
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though. President Johnson let the MLF die a quiet death which in
large measure, contributed to the downfall o-f the Erhard
government in October 1966 CRe-F. 353.
Skybolt was meant to be an +1,800 km, air—launched ballistic
missile designed to be carried by U.S. B-52" s and British Vulcan
and Victor bombers. The U.S. had strongarmed the British into
cooperation on the project only to unilaterally cancel it for
technical and economic reasons, leaving the British government in
the lurch. In an effort to compensate the British for their
losses, the U.S. first offered to turn over the plans to the
British government, and later offered to share development on the
Polaris SLBM. The French were later offered a similar
partnership but turned it down.
In the meantime, NATO's theater—strategic force structure
experienced many important changes that climaxed in the period
1967—68. These occurred as a result of the withdrawal and
retirement of the B—47 medium range bomber. Mace B cruise
missiles CPhoto 4 3, and Jupiter and Thor MR/IRBM's. The removal
of these systems placed the medium range burden on the Pershing 1
(and later 1A) missile with a range of 800 km as the sole medium
range weapon, and imposed additional burdens on long range
forces, such as "dual capable aircraft" (DCA's). To a certain
extent, SLBM's were figured in as the Poseidon was deployed, but
these were affected by other factors relating to political (e.g.,
SALT) and military (more of a counterval ue, second-strike weapon)
restrictions. Commenting on this in October 1979 when facing the
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question over what to do in upgrading NATO's theater nuclear
forces, Helmut Schmidt argued that instead of being unilaterally
retired, these weapons systems should have been modernized
instead CRef. 36U.
Here we see a dichotomy between U.S. force planning, where
these systems were viewed as mere stop gap measures until the
ICBM buildup was complete, and the European view which focused on
a more permanent role. Additionally, the perception (though
inaccurate) that the IRBM's were withdrawn as some part of a quid
pro quo reached between the U.S. and the Soviets following the
Cuban Missile Crisis, led to some deeply troubling implications
for European leaders. Namely, it appeared the U.S. might be all
too willing to trade a perceived guarantor of deterrence in
Europe for American security alone. This would be one of the
underlying issues between the U.S. and the European members of
NATO in the forthcoming SALT negotiations.
B. 1963: THE SOVIET "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS"
The revolution in military affairs is an accomplished
fact. It led to basic quantitative and qualitative changes in
the military-technology base of the Armed Farces and in its
structure. It marked a revolution in the methods of waging
war, revolution in the theory of military art and actual combat
training of the troops CRef. 373.
The "revolution in military affairs" began late in 1962 and
continued well through Khrushchev's fall from power. In essence,
this "revolution" was first of all, the education of the officer-
corps and other members of the Politburo, and eventually extended
to heightening the awareness of the troops and general populace
about nuclear war. In the latter case it took the -form of
conditioning to ensure quick reactions to ensure survival o-f
vital elements of the military and industry.
This "revolution" centered on general nuclear strategy, that
is, long—range nuclear missile attacks against the U.S. and the
decisive qualities inherent in them. The effect on theater
nuclear planning was more subtle, serving to ratify the decisive
nature of preemptive strikes against elements of the enemy's TNF
and strategic forces.
By 1968 a modification to Soviet doctrine had emerged. This
was the belief that the initial phase of the war (general or
global) would begin with conventional or nuclear strikes in
concert with combined arms, within the relevant theaters of
military operation (TVD's). In part this may have stemmed from
knowledge gained by the Soviets in their major series of nuclear
weapons tests running from 1961 through the signing of the
partial test ban treaty in 1963. This series of over one hundred
tests (including the test of the largest thermonuclear weapon to
date CRef. 383, reportedly 55+ MT ) served among other things to
give the Soviets a large database on the effects of
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and what battlefield employment of
nuclear weapons might entail. The results of these experiments
Khrushchev claimed the Soviets had in fact exploded a 57 MT
device with the destructive effects of a 100 MT device at the
time.
may have put questions in the minds of Soviet planners as to
their ability to manage a theater nuclear war.
There is a school o-f thought that argues this change in
doctrine merely copies the U.S. /NATO policy of "flexible
response." There are some attendant problems with this approach
though. NATO did not adopt flexible response until 1967
(although the U.S. had announced it in 1961-62). Additionally,
official Soviet statements condemned flexible response from its
inception under the Kennedy Administration. This same school
also tends to overlook the fact Soviet doctrine holds that the
initial, conventional phase will be brief and that it will
escalate to general nuclear war. The fact it may begin with a
conventional phase also does not exclude the possibility it could
still begin with massive nuclear strikes. Therefore, in
transforming what is most likely an adjustment of current
doctrine into an entirely new doctrine, this school of thought is
probably indulging in a form of wishful "mirror-imaging." It is
interesting to note this appeared at roughly the time when
limited nuclear war was beginning to be thought possible in the
West and it coincided with the opening of the SALT process, an
action in itself that would have a large impact on Soviet theater
nuclear force structure.
C. SUMMARY
By the end o-f the decade and on the eve of the SALT process
and the Nixon Doctrine, NATO found itself in something of a
quandary. After adopting flexible response in 1967, the force
structure was anything but flexible. Conventional forces never
came close to meeting the 96 divisions agreed to at the Lisbon
Conference. Conventional strategy became one of forward de-fense,
with the vast majority of ground forces concentrated in the
eastern regions of West Germany with hopes that these would
offset the numerical superiority enjoyed by WTO forces. Earlv
use of tactical nuclear weapons implied escalation to theater-
strategic weapons, yet here the force structure was woeful Iv
inadequate as a result of the previously mentioned unilateral
redeployments and retirements taken by NATO, more specifically,
by the U.S. The U.S. strategic force structure (insofar as the
true counterf orce weapon, the ICBM, was concerned) was just
beginning to lose ground to that of the Soviets quantitatively
and in some respects qualitatively (with the advent of the first
"heavy" ICBM, the SS-9) . U.S. strategic doctrine at this point
had experienced trans-formation from assured destruction to mutual
assured destruction (MAD), while Soviet strategic doctrine
focused on war-fighting ability and damage limitation.
Unfortunately, U.S. and NATO policymakers ignored this divergence
in views, instead projecting their beliefs on the Soviets and
thereby assuming they (the Soviets) held like-minded views.
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The result of all this, on the theater nuclear warfare level,
was rigidity instead o-f flexibility due to quantitative
superiority of Soviet theater—strategic forces. The nightmare of
Carte Blanche was magnified. Whereas NATO had previously been
assured that under massive retaliation the bulk of destruction
would be roughly limited to the enemy and its territory (which
was cold comfort to West Germans whose territory stood to be
overrun and occupied first); under these circumstances the West
could no longer be assured of such an outcome. At this point,
NATO's theater nuclear employment doctrine became obsolete.
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VI. SUFFICIENCY AND SALT
A. 1969: THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND SUFFICIENCY
The Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed in July 1969 and consisted
o-f three points:
1) The United States would keep all o-f its treaty agreements;
2) The U.S. would provide a shield i-f a nuclear power
threatened the freedom of a nation allied with
it or of a nation whose survival was considered vital
to the security of the U.S., and;
3) In cases involving other types of aggression, the U.S.
would furnish military and economic assistance
when requested in accordance with treaty commitments.
However, the nation directly threatened would assume
primary responsibility of providing manpower for its
defense CRef 393.
Ostensibly this was the justification for the "Vietnamization"
program, but extended to NATO it signaled a desire to reduce the
burden borne by the U.S.
The Nixon Doctrine combined with the policy of "detente" and
the SALT talks may be subsummed under the idea of strategic
sufficiency. Under this concept, the U.S. recognized the Soviet
buildup which had continued through the late 1960's and
acknowledged that a "rough parity" existed from about 1970
between the U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. There Brs four
criteria that may be applied to the sufficiency doctrine; the
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existence of "adequate" second strike -forces ; U.S. and NATO
2forces were postured to enhance "crisis stability" » the U.S.
should have or appear to have parity with the Soviets and be seen
to be equivalent with the Soviets in capability to inflict
damage; and, the U.S. must provide for defense against a "light"
attack". With this in mind, the U.S. entered into SALT
negotiations with the Soviet Union, a process that would hold
implications not only for strategic forces, but for NATO and WTO
theater nuclear forces as well.
B. IMPACT OF SALT—NATO
Until recently, there have been few European critics of SALT
since the process began in 1969. According to Rowen the
underlying factors to this apparent European indifference to the
role SALT played in European security is attributable to their
(the Europeans) commitment to detente, and traditional deference
to the U.S. on "strategic" nuclear matters CRef. 403. The
exception to this concerned the FBS issue. Primarily at stake
Adequate second strike forces were defined during the latter-
years of McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense as having
roughly 400 EMT left following a Soviet first strike. As the
policy developed, each leg of the strategic triad had the 400 EMT
eventually built into it. This figure was arbitrarily arrived at
as the amount necessary to inflict "grievous harm" on Soviet
society and thus threaten its existence. The basic principle it
operated under was mutual assured destruction.
""Crisis stability is where neither side has incentive to
escalate a crisis situation, i.e., avoid escalating regional
conflict to global.
This argument served primarily to justify the deployment of
the Safeguard ABM system to counter a potential Chinese ICBM attack
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were the dual capable aircraft, systems capable of striking the
Soviet Union from bases in Europe. The Soviets wanted these
forces counted in the U.S. strategic ceiling while naturally
refusing to include their own forces. The Soviets also argued
that French and British nuclear forces be included, something the
respective governments vehemently opposed. To Europeans, the FBS
elements constitute a visible, tangible symbol of the U.S.
nuclear guarantee to NATO. Removal or partial withdrawal of
these elements would lead to de-coupling the American nuclear
guarantee.
As far as the U.S. was concerned, the lack of European
advocacy in the SALT process was a blessing in disguise.
Consultations with our NATO allies increasingly took on the form
of sharing information between interested parties rather than
mutual discussions amongst affected partners CRef. 41 U .
A final note on the acceptance of SALT by the Europeans. In
an almost perverse line of reasoning, little attention was
addressed to the credibility of the U.S. guarantee based on the
operative assumptions it had negotiated under (i.e.. mutual
vulnerability). Instead, strategic stability was stressed. In
particular, the British and French forces came to be seen as more
credible, by their governments, with the signing of the ABM
treaty (part of the SALT I accords)
.
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C. IMPACT OF SALT—EFFECT ON SOVIET THEATER FORCES
To put 'disarmament' in the [Socialist} program is
tantamount to making the general declaration, 'We are opposed
to the use of arms. 7 There is as little Marxism here as there
would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence.
—V. I . Lenin
As mentioned, the Soviets had built and deployed substantial
numbers of the SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM. By the mid-late 1960's
the Soviets became concerned over the growing obsolescence of
these weapons (nearing their first decade of deployment) and
their vulnerability. In the case of the latter, it wasn't until
about 1964 that the SS-4/' -5 force had begun to be deployed in
hardened silos. Previous to that they had been in semi -hardened
sites, much as the early fitlas ICBM's had been in the U.S.
Development of replacements, the SS-X-14 and SS-X-15 IRBM's, was
well underway. These were two—stage, liguid fuel missiles based
on the aborted SS-13 ICBM. Both employed mobility to ensure
survivability. However, neither of these proved successful and
only a limited deployment of the SS— 14 was made, this to the Far
East theater .
In light of these failures, the SS-11 ICBM was modified to a
VRBM (Variable Range Ballistic Missile) and pressed into service
as a form of "gap-filler" in a limited deployment CRef. 423.
Joining the SS-11 later in this role was the SS-19 ICBM. By
1982-33 approximately 120 SS-ll's and 60 SS-19' s were reported
deployed at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, two former SS-4
and SS—5 fields in the western regions of the Soviet Union CRef. 4"
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In addition to the land based missiles, SLBM's were available
(Figure 3). The -first Soviet SLBM was the SS-N-4, a 650 km
missile with an IOC of 1959-60. It was soon replaced by the
longer range SS-N-5 (1,400 km) in 1964. The SS-N-5 is able to be
launched while submerged and carries a warhead estimated to be in
the 300 KT - 1 MT range CRef. 443. Deployed in the Golf II and
Hotel II class SSBN' s in the Baltic or North Atlantic, the SS-N-5
supplements Soviet theater nuclear -forces. Although the SS-N-6
MOD 1 was available in 1968 on the Yankee class SSBN's, it is
probable they were intended more tor the U.S. homeland and
carried a secondary theater role. Along with the SLBM's. the
Soviets had a land attack cruise missile with the SS-N-3c (450+
km; similar to the Regal as II missile envisioned -for the U.S.
Navy in the late 1950*5). This version had an IOC o-f I960 and
was deployed on the Whiskey Mod, Jul iett, and Echo II SSGN's
CRef. 453.
Finally, Soviet Long Range Aviation (Dal ' n yaya ftviatsiya)
,
Frontal Aviation (Frontova fiviatsi ya) and Naval Aviation
iftviatsiya Voyenno-Morskogo Flota) all had nuclear capable
aircra-ft ranging -from the Bear B/C armed with the AS-3 Kangaroo
(370 km; 1+ MT) , to Badger and Blinder medium range bombers, and
a host of tactical aircra-ft such as the Su-7 Fitter and MiG-21
F ishbed
.
The 1972 Interim Agreement (SALT I) concentrated on strategic
launchers. Excluded from consideration were the independent
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nuclear -forces of France and Britain, and American and Soviet
theater -forces (so-called "grey area" systems). The Soviets
accordingly viewed the Interim Agreement as not inhibiting the
deployment of some 300+ SS-11 VRBIi's as it was only a temporary
-freeze on existing numbers of launchers (i.e., silos).
As the SALT process moved forward, there were agreements that
directly impinged on the SS-11 (and later SS-19) VRBM
deployments. In the agreement reached at Vladivostok between
President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union agreed to an aggregate number or "ceiling" on strategic
delivery vehicles (SDV's), which included ICBM's and SLBM's CRef. 4
This agreement formed he basis for SALT II. Once again though,
grey area systems were not covered although concern was broached
on the U.S. side about the Backfire bomber— in a non—theater
but strategic sense (i.e., threat to the U.S.).
Nevertheless, these agreements still had a direct impact on
Soviet theater nuclear missile forces. The SS— 11 "s along with
the SS-N—4's and SS-N—5's were now included in the aggregate
totals (as were the Bear* ^ , but their theater role was secondary
to begin with). Some solution was required to maintain theater-
nuclear force levels. These forces were required even in the
face of the reduced numbers of U.S. medium and long range theater
systems since Soviet doctrine was essentially the same as in the
early 1960's insofar as the role envisioned for nuclear weapons
in theater conflict was concerned.
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A solution appeared in much the same manner that the SS— 15
and S3-14 IRBM's had evolved from the SS-13 ICBM. The SS-16 was
another attempt at a land—mobile ICBM that ran into problems with
its -first stage and was eventually prohibited under SALT. A
shorter range version was being developed at the same time using
the upper two stages and incorporating a 3 MIRV capability. The
result was a reliable, land mobile IRBM, the SS-20.
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VII. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER SALT
The f right-ful swamp that constitutes theater nuclear weapons
in Europe today can in large part be laid to loopholes and
inadequacies arising from SALT. In particular, SALT I limited
only launchers and there-fore channeled the arms race into MIRV'd
warheads and theater nuclear -forces. The parties to SALT agreed
to a "non—circumvention" clause whereby they would not try an end
around run and target the other sides' strategic forces with non-
limited theater forces. This is one of the charges leveled by
the Soviets against the Pershing II and GLCIi deployment, and
occasionally in an indirect manner by the U.S. against the
Backfire and SS-20.
A. BACKFIRE'S AND SS-20'
S
Coincident with the arrival of the SS—20 was that of the
Tu-22M Backfire. The Backfire i s an outgrowth of the Tu-22
Blinder CRef. 471 and marked its first flight in 1969. The
source of great controversy during the SALT II negotiations, the
Backfire was deemed a "peripheral" system (i.e., not a strategic
threat to the U.S. without long-range cruise missiles—cold
comfort to the European members of NATO) . The Back fi re marked a
qualitative and eventually a quantitative increase in Soviet TNF
capabilities. This characteristic, qualitative and quantitative
force upgrades, is indicative of Soviet actions during the period
following SALT I and continues through the present day. The
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Backfire -fits in this category by virtue of its range (2600 km in
a hi-lo—hi combat profile), Mach 2+ dash speed, and obvious
nuclear payload capability CRef. 431. This represents
substantial gains over the Badger and the newer but less reliable
Blinder medium range bombers. More important is the increased
sophistication evident in the electronics suite. The Backfire is
the first Soviet bomber without a glazed nose for the bombardier,
indicative of a substantial improvement in attack radar and all-
weather attack capability. It also incorporates substantial
improvements in electronic countermeasures (ECM) over its
predecessors. While the U.S. Navy correctly emphasizes the anti-
ship capabilities of this aircraft (armed with 2 AS—4 or AS-6
ASM's), the theater role of the Backfire should not be overlooked
in both its nuclear and conventional role (12,000 kg worth of
weapons may be carried internally).
The SS-20 represents yet another gualitative and quantitative
upgrade. It carries (in one of three mods) either three 150 KT
MIRV's or one 1.5 MT RV, with a CEP of 200-400 meters. Maximum
range is 5,000 km . The predecessors to the SS-20, the SS-4 and
SS-5 were single warhead weapons with megaton range warheads, and
CEP's of 2,300 meters and 1,100 meters respectively. Even the
SS-11 with a MRV capability (3 >; 100-300 KT MRV's) has a CEP of
1,100 meters. The accuracy of the MIRV'd SS-20 in combination
1 While others use 4,000 km, the IISS and DoD list it at 5,000 km,
with its range and mobility allows it to be deployed well within
Soviet territory, outside o-f the range of most of NATO's theater
nuclear -forces with the possible exception of the Poseidon' s
allocated to SACEUR, and still be employed as a first strike
weapon (Figure 4)
.
Like the Backfire, the SS-20 stands as a monument to the
rechanneling of the arms race by the SALT process into theater
nuclear weapons (as well as MIRV's). However the decision to
develop and deploy the SS-20 did not stem exclusively from arms
control rationale. There is genuine military utility in the
SS-20 as opposed to that found in less the flexible SS-4/SS-5
MR/IRBM force.
The capabilities of the SS-20 lend themselves considerably to
the concept of strategic maneuver (strategicheski y manevr) .
Traditionally, strategic maneuver was carried out by massed
concentrations of armed troops and artillery. With the enhanced
mobility of the S3—20, originally sought in the SS—X— 14 and
SS-X-15, Soviet planners are able to maximize their available
assets in the strategic maneuver, while MIRV capability reduces
coordination and C~ problems.
Strategicbeski y Manevr: The aggregate of the Supreme
Command's measures implemented in the course of an armed conflict
by regrouping forces and facilities and reinforcing friendly
strategic groupings, by their occupying an advantageous position
with respect to the enemy, by redirecting nuclear strikes and
shock groupings to secure the rapid and complete destruction of
major enemy groupings and achieve a significant strategic success,
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In relation to the first point, dependence on those portions
of the ICBM force (viz., SS-ll's and SS-19's) for "strategic"
theater operations is also correspondingly reduced. This again
increases the options available to Soviet planners. Use of
SS-ll's in a theater role might trigger a response from the U.S.
ICBM force as the NCA may believe a preemptive or "first strike"
on U.S. territory might be underway. Additionally, utilization
of these VRBM's in a theater role would reduce the overall Soviet
ICBM force by about 107.. According to Meyer CRef. 493, this
prospect in combination with their uncertainties (e.g., system
performance) might have led to strong incentives not to launch
Soviet TNF until the last clear chance to avoid doing so had
passed. Accordingly, the introduction of the SS—20 may now have
reduced or altogether eliminated these concerns.
The yield of the SS-20 warheads (in the MIRV'd configuration,
which most analysts hold makes up the majority of forces deployed
against Europe) demonstrates that reduction of collateral damage
to key industries and friendly troop formations has gained
greater importance in Soviet military planning. The three 150 KT
warheads of the SS-20 have only 50/i of the yield of the SS-ll's
three 300 KT MRV's (and an improvement of 5507. in accuracy), and
only 15/i of the SS-4/SS—5 force while improving accuracies on the
order of 550—1,1507.. A useful illustration might be served by
substituting SS-20' s for SS-ll's and LRA bombers in the theater
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strategic role to strike 50 key NATO hardened targets . In doing
so, residual -fallout is reduced by 907. (although the FRG still
comes out on the short end o-f the stick by suffering initial
fallout over some 15-407. o-f its territory) CRef. 50D. Finally,
the increased survivability of the SS-20 stemming from its
mobility and long range decreases the likelihood that Soviet
decision makers will be faced with a "use-i t-or-lose-i t
"
situation as their NATO counterparts are.
The SS-20 and Backfire were not the only improvements of
theater nuclear forces undertaken by the Soviets during the past
decade. Across the full breadth of theater forces confronting
NATO this upgrade has been marked by both quantitative and
qualitative improvements. The SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 SRBM's are
replacing the FROG-7, SS-12, and SS-lb/c Scud A/B respectively,
while nearly doubling the ranges of the systems they are
replacing. It is one of the contentions of this author that
excessive attention to the SS-20 threat has been to the exclusion
of the threat posed by these new systems. As an example, SS—22 's
based at a theoretical site in the center of East Germany have
sufficient range to cover every one of the Pershing II sites in
West Germany, and all but the Comiso (Sicily) based GLCM's
(Figure 5). Flight time of an SS-22 to these sites would be on
the order of 2-5 minutes, giving virtually no warning time after
For an illustration of the effects of an attack along
similar lines, see Appendix E, especially E-7 and E-8.
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launch detection, keeping the de-fenders -from employing e-ffective
counter-measures.
The air -force have received substantial upgrades with the
introduction o-f the Su-24 Fencer (all-weather, low altitude deep
strike aircraft, similar to the F-lll), the MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-27
Flanker, and MiG-31 Foxhound. Additionally, Soviet ground—,
sea—, and air—launched versions o-f the U.S. cruise missiles Are
entering the operational test phase and can be expected to be
deployed within a year CRef. 513, and Soviet artillery has become
nuclear capable along much the same lines though not to the same
extent as NATO -forces.
B. SUMMARY
It is plainly seen that during this period, the Soviet
theater nuclear -forces buildup was hardly met with self-
restraint. If anything, the restraints of SALT I and later
SALT II actually channeled increased effort into theater nuclear
weapons. The two prime examples cited were the Back f ire , a
weapon system with a clear potential strategic mission but one
that was explicitly excluded from consideration under SALT II.
The other was the SS-20, the outgrowth of a banned weapon, the
SS-16, and warhead technology (MIRV's) allowed under the
provisions of SALT I. The fact that the U.S. had unilaterally
removed a significant amount of medium and long range theater
systems by the end of the 1960's did nothing to slow this
process.
69
VIII. BEDLAM REVISITED: NATO TNF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS
While the buildup in Soviet theater nuclear -forces progressed
during the 1970' s, NATO's TNF received marginal upgrading,
confined mostly to improving safeguards in warhead arming. With
the exception of the Lance SRBM (125 km ) , there were no
significantly new systems deployed. Following in the pattern set
the previous decade, a number of systems were unilaterally
retired . Conventional forces fared worse in the wake of defense
budget cuts by alliance members stemming from welfare state
budgets, high inflation, and stagnating economies. Morale ebbed
as well in the wake of the Vietnam inspired paralysis. As a
result, a certain asymmetry was introduced and grew between
NATO's declaratory policy of flexible response and its
capabilities to credibly carry out this policy in the face of the
burgeoning Soviet TNF modernization program.
By 1977 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt openly expressed his
concern with the deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire systems and
his dissatisfaction with NATO's lack of response. Concern on the
other side of the Atlantic followed in 197S with the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees of the U.S. Congress holding
hearings on the modernization of U.S. /NATO long range theater
Among these were the Bullpup B (1976) and Halleye (1979)
ASM's, Corporal (1967), Davy Crockett (1971) CPhoto 53. Honest
John (1974), and Sargeant (1977) SSM's and Falcon (1972) AAM.
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nuclear forces as part of the FY 80 Department of Defense
appropriations authorization process CRef. 523.
Candidates for the modernization program were in various
stages of design and development, funded for the most part on
shoe-string budgets. Among the more promising systems were the
enhanced radiation weapon, or "neutron bomb" , a ground-launched
version of SAC's ALCM, and a longer range version of the
Pershing 1A with a unique terminal guidance system promising
accuracy measurable in tens of meters rather than hundreds.
Development was also well underway for an earth penetrator
warhead for the Pershing that would allow it to go as much as 30—
40 meters deep, putting hardened C facilities at risk.
A. THE NEUTRON BOMB DEBACLE
The neutron bomb was the first system considered for TNF
modernization based on its stage in development. The story of
the neutron bomb is indicative of European and American attitudes
towards nuclear weapons in NATO. Once again, Americans were
focusing on defense, specifically the "quick fix" made available
by the neutron bomb. The Europeans and in particular, the West
Germans wanted the U.S. to commit itself to development while
deferring on the issue of deployment.
The ERW is a thermonuclear device that maximizes the
biological lethality of high energy neutrons produced by the
fusion of deuterium and tritium, and seeks to minimize blast and
thermal damage. The lethal radius of a 1 KT neutron bomb is 700
meters, twice that of fission weapons with equivalent yields and
equal to that of weapons with ten times the yield.
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President Carter was increasingly ambivalent about the weapon
as well. Writing in his memoirs, former National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski noted the concerns o-f Carter that:
... he did not wish the world to think o-f him as an ogre and we
agreed that we would press the Europeans to show greater
interest in having the [neutron] bomb and there-fore willingness
to absorb some o-f the political -flak, or we would use European
disinterest as a basis -for a negative decision CRe-f. 533.
As debate mounted on both sides of the Atlantic, the
Americans insisted that without European willingness to have the
weapon, it would not justify the political or economic costs of
production. Under Schmidt, the West Germans (for once again it
was they who would bear the burden for deployment sites) insisted
that deployment could not be a mere bilateral pact between
themselves and the U.S. Rather, he argued it must be the result
of a collective alliance decision. The other major member of the
alliance, the British, were notably cool in their ardor towards
the weapon. In the meantime, a virulent debate was growing in
the public sector both on the Continent and in the U.S. over the
bomb that "kills people but not buildings." That the Soviets
were having a propaganda field day over what was seen as the
quinti ssenti al capitalist weapon goes without saying.
In October 1977, Schmidt made a speech emphasizing the threat
to the "Euro—strategic" balance posed by the SS—20 and criticized
SALT II for not addressing this matter. Following this, the U.S.
suggested to Schmidt that the neutron bomb be linked to arms
control. Specifically, the West would forego deployment of the
neutron bomb for similar guarantees from the Soviets on
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the SS-20. Schmidt -for his part was receptive to the idea, but
stressed that options on the neutron bomb be kept open- As
ultimately concluded following alliance consultations during the
winter of 1977-78, a three point proposal emerged in a form
similar to the November 1977 letter to Schmidt. Briefly, the
points were as follows:
1) The U.S. would decide to produce the weapon;
2) An offer to forego deployment would be made if the Soviets
would forego deployment of the SS—20, and;
3) The alliance would announce its intent to deploy the
neutron bomb in two years if arms control negotiations with
the Soviets were unsuccessful.
A meeting of the North Atlantic Council was set for 28 March 1978
to consider the final proposal, and according to Brzezinski CRef. 54]
it appeared compromise was near.
Yet on March 27, Carter announced his decision against
deployment, a decision reached primarily on moral grounds inspite
of the support given it by Brzezinski, Brown and others on his
staff . All told, this debacle sealed the animosity between
Schmidt and Carter insofar as other bilateral and alliance issues
were concerned, and set the tone for the growing LRTNF
modernization debate.
In an aside to Hodding Carter later, Brzezinski noted the
decision against the neutron bomb would "be the worst
Presidential decision of the first fourteen months." [Brzezinski,
p. 3053.
B. THE "TWO-TRACK DECISION"
The fact the neutron bomb was not deployed did not -faze the
Soviets. S3—20 and Back fire deployments continued unabated. In
spite of the debate engendered in Europe and the U.S. over the
2
neutron bomb, public opinion polls showed a clear majority
believing the Soviets held a lead over the West in power and
would substantially widen the margin over the next five years.
Under these conditions, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group""'
pledged in April 1979 to seek support from NATO governments and
the public for upgrading nuclear forces in Western Europe. In
August the Carter Administration announced its decision to begin
development and production of 572 Pershing II* s and GLCM's (10S
Pershing 1 1 * s and 464 GLCM's). Following this, defense and
foreign ministers of NATO (minus France) ratified the agreement
on 12 December 1979 to begin installing the 572 missiles in 1983
if there was no progress at the proposed intermediate nuclear
force (INF) talks. This was the so-called "Two-Track" decision.
The French subsequently built ERW's of their own. For a
while the U.S. continued development of the W82 enhanced
radiation warhead for the 155 mm gun. However, legislation
introduced by Senator Nunn in 1983 put a hold on further work,
leaving the project in Phase 3 (Full Scale Development).
^See Appendix D.
"The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is composed of the defense
ministers of Britain, Canada, Italy, West Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the U.S.
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The background to this decision bears many of the hallmarks
that distinguished the neutron bomb debate, with some exceptions.
The West Germans were even more insistent that other alliance
members bear some of the basing responsibilities along with
Germany. This differed from the case of the neutron bomb where
the delivery systems were fairly short ranged and mandated
forward deployment. With ranges of 1,800 km for the Pershing II
and 2,500 km for the GLCM (Figures 6a and 6b), basing- outside of
Germany in the case of the latter became tactically feasible and
politically imperative.
Like the neutron bomb though, the LRTNF modernization program
engendered intense debate on the continent, and whipped Soviet
wrath to new highs. While it is understandable that any
modernization of NATO nuclear forces would not be welcomed by the
Soviets, the source of the Soviet's wrath stemmed from their
espGused position that the strategic balance of forces would be
upset with the deployment of these particular weapons. In this
case, the concept of a balance of forces goes beyond the typical
perception of a numerical balance of equality. It becomes more
of a blend of differing systems whose aggregate advantages and
disadvantages balance those of the opponent.
During the period 1974-80, U.S. strategic doctrine went
through a series of transformations yielding plans centered on
the concept of damage limitation. The genesis of this period lay
in the "Schlessinger shift" and NSDM 242 during the Ford
Administration. When Carter came to office, it resurfaced in the
-Form o-f PD-59, and has continued under the Reagan Administration
as NSDD 13. As regards theater nuclear -forces, NSDD 13 and its
predecessors require the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSTPS)
to integrate all nuclear -forces, -from theater—tactical up to
strategic, enabling the NCA to exercise controlled response
options—so-called "limited nuclear options" (LNO) . In Soviet
eyes, deployment o-f the Pershing' s and GLCM's represented not a
NATO answer to the SS-20 deployment, but an attempt by the U.S.
to gain a qualitative margin in the strategic balance over the
Soviets.
The Soviets weren't the only ones who perceived a threat in
the LRTNF modernization issue. Many citizens and special
interest groups were concerned about the e-f-fect this deployment
would have on drawing the world (i.e.. West Europe) into nuclear
war between the superpowers. In particular, the anti—nuclear
movement on the Continent experienced a rebirth. Yet it was
different from the movement of the late— 1950' s, especially in
West Germany. In Germany the movement finds political
representation through the Green Party. The Green Party was
organized in the 1970' s as one of a plethora of single-issue
parties, choosing as its cause celehre the environment. The
Greens later turned their interests to nuclear arms and
disarmament when East-West relations deteriorated in the early
1930's. It has gained support from elements within both the
Protestant Church and the SPD, but it still continues to be
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dominated by activists -from outside o-f the political process.
This tendency and apparent Communist ties serves to hamper what
little effectiveness this minority party may have in the
Bundestag .
What characterizes the difference between this movement and
the Kampf de& Qtomtod of over two decades ago is the emergence of
two elements never before simultaneously present in postwar
German—U.S. relations. These are German uneasiness with American
society as a model to be emulated (stemming in part from the
Vietnam war) and questions on the course of American security
policy. U.S. doctrinal shifts from assured destruction to damage
limitation, or war fighting with emphasis on limited nuclear war,
caused many Europeans to be troubled with U.S. policy. This
latter factor was aggravated when members of the Reagan
Administration talked in public of fighting and winning a
"limited" nuclear war in Europe. A near decade of detente also
softened European perceptions of the Soviet threat. All this has
lead the peace movement to seek a "third path" between the
superpowers.
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IX. IMPLEMENTING THE "TWO-TRACK" DECISION
Under the present state of affairs, the Soviet intermediate-
range missiles in the European zone are merely a counter-
balance to the intermediate range nuclear systems of the NATO
countries in that zone. They are not aimed against the West
German armed forces. But if American missiles are deployed
on West German soil, the situation will change. The military
threat for West Germany will be multiplied many times over.
Relations between our countries will also inevitably suffer
certain complications. As for the Germans in the FRG and
GBR, they... Mould have to look at one another through
thick pal isades of xaissil es [emphasis added].
— Yu. V. Andropov
July 1983
The quote above indicates the seriousness with which the
Soviets viewed the impending Pershing and GLCM deployments by
mid-1933. It is also indicative of their growing frustration
over the absence of any gains from their efforts to thwart the
deployment either through the vehicle of the INF talks or "public
diplomacy." This chapter examines the INF proposals of the U.S.
and the Soviets from the first session in November 1981 until the
Soviet walkout in November 1983.
A. "ZERO-ZERO" AND OTHER U.S. PROFOSALS
Although the two—track decision was made in late 1979, the
U.S. did not begin earnest proposals until almost two years later
when round one of the INF talks opened in November 1981. This
was initially due to U.S. preoccupation with the Iranian hostage
situation, Soviet "fraternal assistance" in Afgahnistan, and
attendant problems in the Senate ratification of the SALT II
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agreement. Complicating the matter was o-f course the fact that
19Q0 was an election year and the incumbent was unseated.
Following the transition period inherent with any change of
administrations in Washington, the Reagan Administration offered
its first proposal for consideration at the INF talks.
The first Reagan initiative was the so-called "zero-zero"
proposal. Under this scheme, the U.S. would forgo the planned
deployment of the 572 Pershing I I ' s and GLCM's in exchange for a
Soviet commitment to dismantle over 500 SS—4, SS-5, and SS—20
missiles (a total of over 1,000 warheads) targeted against
Western Europe and Asia. Asia was included because of the
SS-20's mobility and consequent redeployment capability of Asian
based SS—20' s, The Reagan Administration's rationale behind this
proposal centered on its desire to send a signal to the Soviets
that the U.S. was committed to eliminating an entire class of
potentially dangerous and destabilizing weapons.
Criticisms soon came from both NATO allies and the Soviets
that the Reagan proposal was not serious and that the Soviets
would be forced to give up weapons already deployed for U.S.
promises to drop deployment of weapons not even in production.
In March 1983, after three rounds of negotiations and mounting
criticisms at home and abroad. President Reagan modified his
position and announced the U.S. was willing to discuss an interim
agreement in which the US. would substantially reduce the number
of Pershing II' s and GLCM's to be deployed, provided the Soviet
79
Union reduced the number of its warheads on land-based long range
INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis. This was met
with relief by our NATO allies who were having to deal with
growing public pressure at home from domestic "peace" groups, in
particular by Britain and Germany.
In September the U.S. modified its position even more by
stating it would not seek to match the combined Soviet INF force
levels (in Europe and Asia) with U.S. deployments in Europe.
Additionally, the number of Pershing II's deployed could be
reduced below the 108 previously agreed to by NATO. Heretofore,
the number of Pershing 7 s were fixed at 108 , and the GLCM
component of the modernization program had remained fluid up to
the 572 aggregate ceiling agreed to. Another area of concern to
the Soviets and previously excluded from immediate consideration
revolved around that of limits on aircraft. The final U.S.
proposal was made in November 1983. This proposal was for a
global 420 warhead (or 140 missile) limit which included European
and Asian missiles, for the Soviet Union.
B. THE "WALK IN THE WOODS"
The so-called "walk in the woods" proposal is unique among
the U.S. and Soviet positions put forth at Geneva. Unique in
This was the number of the older Pershing lA's that were to
be replaced. By holding to this number NATO hoped to demonstrate
to the Soviets that this was merely a modernization effort and
not an attempt to gain a margin of strategic superiority over
Soviet TNF. This did not include the conventionally armed
Pershing lA's maintained by the Luftwaffe.
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that it appeared to be a joint proposal put -Forward on the
personal initiative of the two negotiators, Paul Nitze -for the
U.S. and Yuli Kvitsinsky for the Soviet Union. It is also
different in that it came to light just prior to the collapse of
the INF talks and that afterwards, the views of both negotiators
appeared in separate editions of the We-w York Times in January
19S4 CRef. 553.
The formula for the "walk in the woods" proposal consisted of
an offer by both sides to reduce each side's long range INF
missiles by 572 warheads, and a suggestion that the Soviets would
not insist on compensation for French and British missiles at the
INF talks in Geneva, but would seek to include them in other
negotiating forums CRef. 563. The effect of this would be no
U.S. deployment and a reduction of over 1/2 of the assumed total
of 368 SS-20's deployed both in Europe and Asia.
An interesting and almost byzantine aspect to this affair is
just who proposed it and how it came to be. According to
Kvitsinsky, Nitze forwarded the idea in an informal setting in
July 1982, and was told in no uncertain terms that it would
either be severly amended or rejected altogether CRef. 56 J.
Nitze CRef. 573 stated in response that first, the two of them
attempted to work up a package of reciprocal concessions that
would hopefully resolve the major issues. Nitze mentions that
Kvitsinsky showed him a document from his (Kvitsinsky* s)
government rejecting the principles upon which the walk in the
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woods proposal was made. He then notes CRef. 583 that on
November 12, 1983 Kvitsinsky said if Washington proposed equal
reductions in Europe by 572 on both sides, Moscow would accept
the proposal CRe-f 593. Since then, Kvitsinsky has imputed this
proposal to Nitze. The proposal became moot as both governments
rejected it even though it was never put -forth in formal settings
(i.e., at the conference table).
C. SOVIET PROPOSALS
Throughout the INF arms control process, the Soviet position
has been marked by three elements. The first and ultimately sole
goal of Soviet foreign policy during the period in question,
centered on thwarting any deployment of the Pershing II or GLCN.
While this was the dominant theme under Andropov and continues to
be under Chernenko, the roots of this policy may be traced to
Brezhnev. Secondly, the Soviets consistently sought to include
the national strategic systems of Britain and France into the INF
forum despite the protests of these two states that their forces
were the sole province of their respective nations and leaders.
Finally, the Soviets continually sought to impose limits on dual-
capable aircraft (DCA) . By far though, their chief concern
remained in stopping any deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe.
Soviet proposals were characteristically a conglomeration of
older ones repackaged and reproposed, within the framework of the
previously described areas. Typical of this was the Soviet
position through December 1982 that the USSR and NATO should each
s:
limit the total number of intermediate range nuclear missiles and
aircraft in and near Europe to 300, and that no U.S. missiles be
allowed in that -figure — only its aircraft. In a speech marking
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, Andropov
modified this stand somewhat by retaining the framework, but
specified a sub—limit on missiles for each side, with the Soviets
retaining only as many missiles as were in the combined French
and British forces, about 162 by Moscow's count CRef. 60 3.
Again, Andropov refused to agree to any U.S. missile deployment.
By linking the proposal to French and British force levels
Andropov made the possibility of agreement very unlikely, if not
altogether impossible.
In May 1983, Andropov announced a willingness to agree to
eguality in intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe with
regard to both delivery vehicles and warheads. It would appear
this proposal addressed Western concerns over the MIRV capability
of the SS—20 and hence, its greater destructive potential. In
actuality it provided a hedge for Soviet force planners against
projected French and British SLBM force modernization programs.
The proposal in August 1983 to liquidate rather than redeploy
east any European SS—20' s removed under an agreement was
primarily to ease Chinese, Japanese and NATO concerns in this
regard. The proposal directly contradicted remarks made bv
Foreign Minister Sromyko at an April press conference to the
effect that previous American demands along these lines made any
agreement impossible.
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Yet another modi f i cation came in late October—timed to
coincide with the parliamentary debates and anti-nuclear
demonstrations in Europe, particularly in West Germany, and to
benefit -from negative reaction to the U.S. operation in Grenada.
In doing so, the Soviets hoped to capitalize on European
perceptions o-f American intransigence in the -face o-f Soviet
-flexibility. This ploy did not work as the Soviets were still
suffering bad press over the KAL 007 atrocity and revision of
French and German attitudes over the Grenada operation. By now
it was apparent to the Soviets that the deployment would take
place.
D. PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT AT THE INF TALKS
In examining the INF talks from the first session until the
final round in November 1983, the question of whether either side
sincerely desired to reach an accord on limiting theater nuc leaf-
weapons must be addressed. On the part of the U.S. there
certainly were strong lobbies on both sides of the aisle. The
enormous bureaucratic apparatus of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department on one side
were pushing for some agreement. On the other side were those
who felt that some form of deployment must take place to signify
that NATO could still agree to and carry out major policy
decisions. In addition, a major debate was growing in the
strategic arms control arena over not only technical issues of
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verification, but over Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements. This was having collateral e-ffects on the U.S. INF
position as well.
Yet as negotiations progressed, the U.S. demonstrated
increasing flexibility in its position as its focus broadened
from that of intermediate range missiles to a wider vision of
theater nuclear forces. Indicative of this was first the
willingness to reconsider Pershing II deployment levels and later
an indication of willingness to consider limits on aircraft, both
of which were major Soviet concerns.
The Soviet approach to the INF talks centered on stopping the
deployment of the U.S. missiles. Anything beyond that would be a
benefit, but the primary goal was stopping the deployment. To
this end the Soviets adopted several rather extraordinary methods
not found in their actions in other arms control forums.
Andropov appeared to personally take charge of the Soviet
position, making it (the December 21 proposal) his first major
foreign policy initiative CRef. 613. As the year progressed, he
made major, public pronouncements on the INF issue every month
except for January, June, and December. Another extraordinary
measure was that Soviet proposals were anything but secretive,
with many being put forward outside of the talks at Geneva.
The actions listed above were probably carried out in belief
that they (the Soviets) might be able to stir up enough pressure
in Western Europe to stop the deployment. Overt plays to the
peace movement and attempts at influencing the West German
8?
elections in March 1983 were along these lines. The quote at the
beginning of this chapter is illustrative o-f Soviet attempts to
increase pressure on the Germans to oppose deployment rather than
concentrating on reaching some accord with the U.S.
However, the Soviets overestimated their ability in this
field as their attempts to influence the election backfired.
Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democrats remained in power while
the Soviets lost what credibility they may have had in the wake
of the KAL tragedy. The Soviets were also less than optimistic
about their chances of reaching an agreement with the Reagan
Administration. Pessimism abounded in statements in the press
and by the Soviet leadership about any chance for successful
negotiations with Reagan.
That there were Soviet efforts at reaching some kind of
agreement at the INF talks cannot be denied. The primary efforts
though of the Soviets were not present at Geneva. Outside of a
very brief period following Brezhnev's death when the Soviet-U.S.
atmosphere was not as hostile, indications are that the Soviets
came to hold a fatal isitc belief that the deployment would
proceed inspite of their extracurricular activities and as such,
progressively boxed themselves into a tighter situation with
their growing insistence on no deployment.
E. DEPLOYMENT AND SOVIET RESPONSE
Andropov flatly stated in the first week of November 19S3
that if the deployment went forward, the Soviets would walk out
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o-f the Geneva talks. The -first components of the GLCM's arrived
one day ahead o-f schedule at Greenham Common Royal Air Force Base
on 14 November 1933, ostensibly to avoid planned public
demonstrations. Gn Tuesday, November 22, the West German
Parliament approved installation o-f the Pershing II's which in
turn began to arrive on the 23rd. That same day the Soviets
delegation walked out o-f the Geneva talks without setting a
renewal date.
Soviet actions since then have consisted o-f leaving the START
and MBFR talks. In addition, they appear to be making good on
Brezhnev's threat to "put the U.S. in an analogous position" if
deployment went ahead. Soviet cruise missile carrying Echo II
SSSN's have taken up patrols at various times off the U.S., and
Delta class SSBN's have extended their patrols into old Yankee
patrol grounds in the Atlantic, ensuring shorter flight times to
continental U.S. targets. Additional SRBM's <e.g.. SS-22) a.r&
being deployed in East Europe as part of a planned modernization
program. However, these deployments Are being cited in the
Soviet press (and parroted in the West) as stemming solely from
the U.S. deployment. The Soviets had asserted that the missiles
must be removed as a precondition prior to the reopening of any
INF negotiations. It would appear though that the proposal by
the U.S. to engage in "umbrella talks" covering strategic
nuclear, space and intermediate range weapons may have offered
the Soviets a way out of their self imposed exile. Even this
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rests on thin ice as the Soviet -foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko,
asserted in a recent domestic television interview that the talks
might be in jeopardy i-f the GLCM and Pershing II deployments
continue. Additionally, the Soviets Are insisting that agreement
be reached in all three rounds and o-f course, that the French and
British systems be included (nothing about counting Chinese
systems though). Thus, along with the research effort of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), INF once again stands to
complicate and possibly derail arms control efforts. In the
meantime the U.S. missiles have just topped 100 while SS—20"
s
have grown past 400.
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X. SUMMARY AND TRANSITION
A. U.S. THEATER NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IN EUROPE—SUMMARY
U.S. nuclear doctrine in Europe has been driven foremost over
the years by economic and technological -factors, with sound
strategic doctrine ranking at best a poor third. This fact is
epitomized by the transition in force structure that took place
during the 1950' s. As previously shown, the years prior to
Eisenhower yielded no clear doctrine with respect to nuclear
weapons. The Truman Administration had hoped that the atomic
bomb would be sufficient to compel the Soviets into proper
behavior.
However, it soon became evident that even during the short
period of the American monopoly, the Soviets would not be
deterred from fomenting trouble in Europe. The clearest
indication of this was the Berlin blockade in 1948. There ^r&
those that might say the prospect of atomic devastation kept the
Red Army from sweeping over Western Europe, but in point of fact,
in the years immediately following the war, the Red Army was in
no condition to do this. Although at war's end there were some
11.36 million under arms in the Soviet armed forces, by 1948 this
had dropped to 2.87 million CRef. 623. These forces were fairly
well occupied with the consolidation of East Europe into Soviet
satellites. Granted a mobilization would have pumped these
numbers back up, but even in that event, the atomic force
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structure was such that it would not have had a significant
impact against either invading -forces or the strategic re^r (by
themsel ves)
.
With Eisenhower, the convergence of economic considerations
and technological advances made possible the wholesale expansion
of nuclear (atomic and thermonuclear) weapons in Europe. On the
economics side, Eisenhower was determined to cut back on ground
force commitments on the part of the U.S.; an interesting
decision in light of the 1952 Lisbon conference agreement whereby
NATO settled on 96 divisions as being sufficient to quell a
Soviet led attack. Increasing dependence was placed on airborne
strategic nuclear deterrence to the detriment of conventional
forces, especially ground troops and the Navy. To make this
policy credible (t/2'7. the threat to use nuclear forces to counter
any type of aggression), the Administration deliberately set out
to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional forces.
Eisenhower stated in an address before the United Nations General
Assembly in December 1953 that "CaJtomic weapons have virtually
achieved conventional status within our armed farces. " CRef . 633
There was an apparent low regard for the potentially devastating
effects on Europe should nuclear weapons be used on a widespread
basis. This was confirmed by NATO Supreme Allied Commander
General Alfred M. Gruenther * s statement in 1954 that:
...simply because atomic bombs do create casualties—and
heavy casualties against women and children—is no reason why
we should become sentimental over... what weapons must be
used. The chore is to make war itself impossible. CRef. 643
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The ultimate expression of this ambiguity came again -from
Eisenhower in 1955 when he said that he didn't see why atomic
weapons shouldn't be used "just exactly as you would use a bullet
or anything el se. " CRe-f . 651 The qualifying statement that these
weapons would be used where strict military targets could be
identified and struck, provided small consolation for Europeans,
given the yield and collateral effects of these weapons and the
inaccuracies of their delivery systems. It might be noted this
was the same year that the infamous Operation "Carte Blanche" and
its large scale use of atomic weapons took place. In sum, by
allowing economic costs and technological advances dictate
strategy, greater reliance on nuclear weapons came to pass which
in turn constituted greater risks.
The policy of flexible response sought to reduce this
increased level of risk by rebuilding conventional forces and
strategic nuclear forces (especially those that would be based in
the U.S.). The strategy of flexible response made good sense in
an alliance system where major partners (i.e., the U.S. and
Britain, France and Germany) ^r& separated by an ocean. This was
especially the case between the main nuclear partner and its
allies where the latter is the principle theater of operations,
and where the potential aggressor's forces stand to inflict grave
damage on all alliance members. Flexible response then allows
NATO to deter aggression by responding at whatever level the
enemy would choose to fight—so called "escalation dominance."
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A key factor in this scheme is the ability to convince the enemy
that one is able to convincingly terminate combat at any level,
from small scale conventional combat up to that of global,
strategic nuclear war.
Critics of flexible response focus, in part, on questions
regarding force planning. Such questions include what targets
should be struck with nuclear weapons, when and with what weapons
should those targets be struck with, etc.CRef. 663 As related to
nuclear force structure in NATO, flexible response became less
viable as the years passed due to a number of factors. Among
these were the growing vulnerability of the land-based arms of
the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent (i.e., the heavy bombers and
Minute-man ICBM's) in the face of the massive Soviet strategic
arms build up that started in the mid-1960 :'s, and an asymmetry
introduced with the theater nuclear arms build up by the Soviets
in the 1970*s following unilateral withdrawal by the U.S. of a
substantial portion of its theater-strategic forces by 1963.
Compounding the situation is a conventional balance of forces
that has historically been numerically in favor of the Soviets
and an inflexible conventional strategy that requires the
emplacement of conventional forces as far forward as possible to
try and stop the expected flood of Soviet forces from pouring
across the borders.
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B. SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR DOCTRINE IN EUROPE—SUMMARY
In studied contrast to NATO's theater nuclear doctrine, which
some have charitably labeled ad hoc, has been that o-f the
Soviets—a process that has been both evolutionary and
revolutionary over the past -forty years. At -first the Soviets
tended to downplay the significance o-f nuclear weapons, a result
o-f their natural desire not to call attention to the perceived
lead of the U.S., questions over the actual utility of nuclear
weapons in war and the lack of an effective means of delivery.
Variations of this theme continued well into the 1950' s until the
synthesis of thermonuclear weapons and long range missiles
combined with Khrushchev's desire to break the stranglehold of
Stalin on military thought laid the groundwork for the
"revolution in military affairs" that began in 1962. In a
curious way, Khrushchev may also have been motivated by some of
the same beliefs as Eisenhower by seeking to reduce the
dependence on and costs of maintaining conventional forces <i.e=,
Soviet Ground Forces and all but missile armed submarines in the
Soviet Navy) by increasing reliance on nuclear armed, long range
missiles. Indeed, these weapons were now deemed to be decisive
weapons in a future war and the Strategic Rocket Force (which
would control all land based missiles with ranges greater than
500 km) was elevated to the position of the supreme service, one
formerly held by the ground forces.
Here too technology was a factor although for the Soviets it
was more a limitation than one of force enhancement. Limiting in
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the sense that while a credible ICBM force eluded the Soviets
until the second and third generation ICBM's came on line, the
MR/IRBM -force came to be a credible and effective force in its
own right. It is an axiom of Soviet force planning that once a
weapon system proves itself effective it is aggressively retained
and not likely to be given up
—
unlike the case of U.S. medium
range forces in Europe. The result of this process, the ongoing
improvement of the MR/IRBM force as well as that of the other
theater nuclear forces, has been gradual quantitative and
qualitative improvements, best exemplified by the development and
deployment of the SS-20 IRBM (Figure 7).
By the mid-late 1970' s when the Soviets realized that no
immediate response from NATO was forth coming on the SS—20
deployments, it became apparent that there was an opportunity to
drive a wedge between the U.S. and West European members of NATO.
This would come about by putting the credibility of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent in question. One of the ways this came about
lay in the change in the strategic balance of forces. Unlike the
situation of the early 1960*s when the U.S. enjoyed not only a
significant margin of strategic superiority but one of
invulnerability as well, the situation of the late 1970' s was
one of perceived strategic parity (some assert a growing Soviet




For theater forces, the Soviets clearly had (and still have)
the upper hand both in terms of numbers o-f warheads and delivery
vehicles as well as total EMT. The exception to this were
tactical nuclear weapons, especially those found with nuclear
artillery and ADM's. However, these are subject to degradation
due to age as many have been in the stockpile for almost 25
years, and have begun to be withdrawn as part of the Montebelio
Decision of 27 October 19S3 . Again exacberating the situation
was the conventional force imbalance such that NATO became faced
with the dilemma of being forced to resort to early, if not first
use of tactical nuclear weapons to counter Soviet conventional
force advantages and yet in doing so, risked devastation from
Soviet counter-nuclear attacks with elements of their theater-
strategic forces.
In fact, current Soviet doctrine calls for preemptive attacks
(preferably with conventional or unconventional forces, e.g.,
Spetznaz) on storage sites and bases of NATO's theater nuclear
weapons. Aiding Soviet planners is the fact these sites are
among the most heavily guarded, well lit and presumably well
known to enemy forces, in Europe. They are also few in number
The Montebelio Decision of 27 October 1983 was a decision
taken by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe over the next
"several years." When added to previous warheads withdrawn since
1979 a total of over 2,400 will be withdrawn. Most of these are
obsolete warheads, or those that were part of weapons systems
being replaced in favor of conventionally armed ones. An example
of the latter case is the replacement of Nike Hercul e> AAM
batteries in favor of the Patriot and I-Hawk AAM's.
95
with many in forward areas of NATO territory, simplifying pre—
strike targeting.
The superiority enjoyed by the Soviets with their theater-
strategic forces in Europe prompted them to move into the
political arena with the onslaught of the "peace offensive."
Aided by U.S. proclivity to shoot itself in the foot in a
diplomatic sense (one need only recall the neutron bomb debacle),
the Soviets seemed on the verge of making a successful attempt to
use the well meaning but somewhat naive peace movements in West
Europe to their political and military advantage. The saving
grace for the Alliance came with the 1979 two track decision and
the elections of conservative governments in the U.S., Britain
and West Germany, and surprisingly, a socialist government in
France. As the deployment date approached, Soviet intentions
became clearer through their heavy—handed machinations, not the
least of which was their attempt at manipulating the West German
elections in March 1983.
Today the deployment is proceeding, but the question of
whether security for the Alliance has been assured still lingers.
To a large degree this rests on perceptions of what path NATO
will take for Alliance security in the future. The implications
of this question are addressed beginning with the next chapter
which assesses the current conventional and nuclear balance in
Europe. Far now, the Alliance is in the position of a convict




ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
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XI. PRESENT BALANCE IN EUROPE-
I
A. NATO AND WTO CONVENTIONAL FORCES
The analysis of the current military balance in Europe serves
as a point o-f departure -for part two. A -few items are worthy of
note be-fore proceeding. One is that given the unclassified
nature of this work, the figures used are likewise drawn from
unclassified sources. However, given the nature of Western
society those mentioned for NATO forces Are probably closer to
actual figures than those given for WTO forces. It might serve
well to remember that one of the major points of contention at
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks is the very basic
question of counting both sides'" forces and agreeing to a common
data base.
Another item is the very reason for addressing conventional
force balances and doctrine in a body of work reserved for
discussion of theater nuclear weapon issues. It serves the
purpose here of showing the present inseperabi 1 i ty of
conventional forces and conflict, and built in escalation to the
use of tactical nuclear weapons under present doctrine. The end
purpose is to explore this link to see if emphasis can once again
be placed on the deterrent aspect of nuclear weapons and
conventional forces. Reinforcement of the deterrent aspect of
conventional forces is assured by a conventional warfighting
ability that guarantees a WTO defeat in the event of incursion
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into NATO territory and of the -former, by ensuring the
credibility o-f certain theater nuclear weapons.
1. NATO Forces
Since the inception o-f NATO in 1949, it has numerically
remained below -first Soviet, and later WTO forces. It has been
shown that even when NATO decided on a major expansion of its
conventional forces (e.g., the Lisbon Conference decision), the
Alliance failed to follow through and fell short of matching
Soviet or WTO forces.
Today is no exception as NATO conventional forces
quantitatively remain below those of the WTO. Instead the
Alliance has come to rely on nuclear weapons and technology to
offset these imbalances. The idea is that superior Western
technology gives NATO military personnel a decisive qualitative
edge over WTO quantitative superiority. This line of reasoning
would give, for example, one F— 15 pilot the ability to engage and
destroy say, three opposing MiG-23's.
This analysis revolves around the Central front, and as
such will primarily look at ground and land based air forces.
This does not mean though, that naval forces have a small role to
play in NATO strategy. Indeed, in certain respects, they play
the pivotal role. However, when considering the central front,
naval forces do not play a direct conventional part, short of
contributing some carrier-based or maritime aircraft or elements
of amphibious forces in support of land based aircraft and ground
forces. These forces will more likely be heavily engaged on
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NATO's northern tier (Norway), or southern flank (Mediterranean).
Table 1 below shows the disposition of divisions in
Northern Europe (including those in Norway) as of the end of
1933. It is broken down by:
(a) divisions in Europe and manned in peacetime;
(b) divisions manned and available for immediate reinforcement; t
(c) extra divisions available for reserves.
"Tnk" includes tank and armored divisions; "Mech"
includes mechanized, motorized and motor rifle; "Other" includes
airborne, airportable, mountain, amphibious and light infantries.
Table 1
NATO Divisions, N. Europe, non—U.S.
Tank Mech Other
(a) 18.0 13.33 6.67
(b) 0.0 1.67 2.67
(c) 0.67 16.0 11.0
Totals 18.67 31.0 20.33
Source: IISS, The Military Balance., 1983-84.
Adding U.S. and Southern European divisions (which
include French and Canadian forces in Europe but not Spanish)
yields Table 2. This latter table is obviously the best case for
NATO, especially when considering the central front. Table 3
gives the breakdown for major eguipment types. These types s.r&
main battle tanks (MBT's), artillery and multiple rocket






















Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1983-84.
launchers, anti-tank guns (ATG) , anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW)
launchers (e.g., TOW), anti—aircra-f t guns (AA) and surface—air
missile launchers (SAM). The -first column, (a), is -for N.
Europe, non—U.S., the second, (b) for the U.S., and the third (c)
is the total number, including S. Europe -for the "best case"
picture.
Table 3






















Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1983-84.
101
Table 4 lists land based aircraft which include bombers,
attack (including -fighter-bombers), -fighters, interceptors,
reconnaissance (including electronic counter-measures (ECM) and
airborne early warning (AEW) ) , and armed helicopters. The
differences between bombers and attack aircraft &re found in
range and/or payload while that between fighters and interceptors
centers mainly on range, with interceptors reserved more for
point defense purposes (e.g., RAF Lightning' s) and fighters able
to range more widely and establish air superiority over the
battle front (e.g., USAF F-15's). The first column, (a), is for
N. Europe, non—U.S. assets, the second, (b), for U.S. aircraft
and the third, (c) , lists the totals.
Table 4



















Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 29&3-S4.
As may be seen from the tables above, the NATO forces s.re
not inconsiderable and those contributed by European NATO members
s.r& fairly sizeable in all categories, constituting the majority
in some. Soviet and other WTO forces will next be detailed.
10:
2. WTO Forces
Because o-f certain geographical advantages that accrue to
the Soviet Union, it is di-f-ficult to accurately assess the
balance o-f conventional -forces in Europe. The scheme adopted by
the IISS in this case will be utilized here. Namely, those
Soviet -forces in the European Military Districts in the Western
and Southern Theaters, excluding the Turkestan MD, o-f the Soviet
Union will be counted. Additionally, territorial defense units
(e.g., Voyska-PVQ) and paramilitary units (e.g., KGB border
patrol) are not counted.
Tables 5 and 6 list WTO ground -force divisions in the




(a) 15.0 25.0 2.0
(b) 1.67 0.0 0.0
(c) 0.0 13.0 0.0
Totals 16.67 38.0 2.0













Source: 1 1 S3, The Military Balance, J 983- 84.
Table 7 shows equipment totals in the same manner as
Table 3 did -for NATO. The -first column shows non—Soviet WTO
forces, the second is Soviet forces in place, and the third shows
the totals.
Table 7









Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 2983-84.
Table 8 shows the geographic advantages of the Soviet
Union. The first column is carried over from the totals above
(column c) , the second shows the the additional equipment






ATGW 1 , 500
6. AA 2,900
7. SAM 1 , 400
and the third gives the sum o-f the -first two columns—a "worst
case" condition -for NATO.
Table 8
Ground Force Equipment, WTO Totals
(a) <b)
1. MBT's 25,490























Source: IISS, The Military Balance? 2983-84.
Table 9 shows the disposition o-f WTO land-based aircraft
The -first column, (a), lists non-Soviet aircraft, the second,
(b) , lists only Soviet aircraft, and the third, <c), lists the
totals.
Table 9






















Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1983-84,
10!
As was the case with ground forces equipment, the same is
true -for WTO aircra-ft and Soviet reinforcement capabilities. The
advantages o-f this are once again seen in Table 10.
Table 10
WTO Land Based Aircraft (Fixed and Rotary Wing)
(a) (b) (c)
1. Bombers 455 +0 • 455
2. Attack 1,663 +900 2,568
3. Fighters 700 +1,000 1,700
4. Intercpt. 4,386 +0 4,386
5. Reccon. 564 +400 964
6. Arm. Hel . 786 +0 786
Source: IISS, The Military Balance-. 1983-84.
Again, it is plain to see that this too is a "worst case"
situation confronting NATO.
3. NATO-WTO Conventional Force Comparisons
Before starting to make the comparisons, some
distinctions should be drawn. First, divisions on the two sides
are unequal both in strengths and equipment assigned. The
figures that are shown for comparison purposes constitute the
"best case" for NATO. That is, they include forces in S. Europe
(Italy, Greece and Turkey) and presume full equipment
availability on both sides (e.g., full mission capable (FMC)
aircraft). Two comparisons in each case will be made, one versus
WTO forces in place, the other the "worst case" situation which
incorporates Soviet reinforcements.
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The first comparison. Table 11, is that o-f divisions.
The first column shows NATO forces, the second WTO forces and
the third presents a ratio (rounded to the nearest tenth) between
the two.
Table 11
NATO: WTO Force Comparisons (Divisions)
NATO WTO Ratio Adv.
Mech.
1. Tank 31.0 l: 1.4 +WTO
2. Inf. 25.0 52.0 1:2.
1
+WTO
Subtotal 50.3 83.0 l: 1.7 +WTO
3. Other 68.0 2.0 34: 1.0 +NATO
Total 118.3 85.0 1.4: 1.0 +NATO
Source: IISS, he Military Balance, 1983-84.
Table 12 adjusts the figures found in Table 11 to reflect
the "worst case" scenario facing NATO with the addition of WTO
reserves (especially those drawn from the Soviets).
Table 12
NATO: WTO Force Comparisons (Divisions)
NATO WTO Ratio Adv.
Mech.
1. Tank 25.3 56.67 1:2.2 +WTO
2. Inf. 25.0 107.0 1:4.3 +WTO
Subtotal 50.3 163.67 1:3.3 +WTO
3. Other 68.0 7.0 9.7:1.0 +NATO
Total 118.3 170.67 1:1.4 +WTO
Source: IISS, The Mil itary Bal ance , 1983-84.
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As may be seen -from a comparison of mere numbers, the
Soviet backed WTO -forces hold noteworthy leads in mechanized
divisions in both circumstances, although they Are somewhat slim-
mer in the -first comparison. NATO on the other hand holds
decisive margins in the "other" category in both conditions. It
will be recalled that this category includes airborne divisions,
light infantry, etc.
The next comparisons are between levels of ground
equipment available, again using the "standing force" and "worst
case" situations facing NATO.
Table 13
NATO: WTO Force Comparison (Equipment)
NATO WTO Ratio Adv.






7. SAM 2, 103
25,490 1:1.2 +WTO
1 1 , 830 l: 1.3 +WTO
607 1:4.2 +WTO
1,928 1:2.0 +WTO
1,787 l: 1.2 Draw
3,986 1.5: 1.0 +NATO
3, 151 l: 1.5 +WTO
Source: IISS, The Military Balance,, 1933-34.




NATO: WTO Force Comparison (Equipment)
NATO WTO Ratio Adv.






7. SAM 2, 103
44,690 1 +WTO
21,830 l::2.4 +WTO
1,337 1 :9.3 +WTO
3,674 l::4.0 +WTO
2, 172 1 : 1.0 Draw




Source: IISS, The Military Balance.. 19S3-84.
Clearly once again the geographic advantages of the
Soviet Union show -forth. Top be sure, it the conflict were
prolonged and NATO was able to bring to bear its productive
capabilities as well as mobilizing its reserves, these balances
would begin to shift back to a 1:1 basis. The next two tables
(15 and 16) compare land based aircraft.
Table 15







6. Armed Helo. 1, 195
WTO Rat i o Adv.
455 l: 13.4 +WTO
1,668 1:1.3 +NATO
700 1 . O. O +WTO
4,386 1:6.8 +WTO
564 l: 1.6 +WTO
786 1.5: 1.0 +NATO
Total 4,628 8,559 1:1.8 -WTO
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 29S3-S4.
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Adjusted -for Soviet added reserves:
Table 16
NATO: WTO Land Based Aircraft
NATO WTO Ratio Adv,
1. Bombers 34 455 l: 13.4 +WTO
Attack- 2, 186 2,568 l: 1.2 +WTO
-z Fighters 212 1,700 1:8.0 +WTO
4. Interceptors 647 4,386 1:6.8 +WTO
5. Recce. 354 964 1:2.7 +WTO
6. Armed Hel-o. 1, 195 786 1.5: 1.0 +NATO
Total 4,628 10,859 1:2.3 +WTO
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 1983-S4.
The previous comparisons are use-ful in some regards, but
a more accurate -force comparison would be with elements intended
-for o-f-fense versus those -for defense. This is the case with
the next series o-f tables. The -first will consider the air
picture with WTO and NATO -forces swapping o-f-f on either
interdiction/deep strike missions or air defense. The deep
strike/interdiction order of battle for this comparison will
consist of bombers, attack, fighters and SSM's. Air defense
forces include interceptors, fighters, SAM's, and AA guns. The
dual capabilities of AEW and ECM aircraft for both sides is
recognized by counting them in both the deep strike and air
defense missions. The first line assigns the deep
strike/interdiction mission to WTO forces, and that of air
defense to NATO. The second line reverses the mission
assignments. The third and fourth lines follow the same
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3,994 2.3: 1.0 +NATO
12,787 1:4. 1 +WTO
6,060 1.5: 1.0 +NATO
19,265 1:6.2 +WTO
mission assignment scheme, but this time with the addition of
Soviet reserves.
Table 17
NATO vs. WTO Forces (Air Battle)
NATO WTO Ratio Adv.
1. Case 1 9,378
2. Case 2 3,086
3. Case 3 9,378
4. Case 4 3,086
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2983-84.
Moving to the ground battle, the same sort of comparison
will be used. This comparison is less clear cut than that
between aircraft for several reasons. For example, an armored
assault may be accompanied by mechanized infantry and supported
by helicopters, artillery and a variety of anti—armor weapons.
Counterposed to this assault may be the same arrangement of
forces. Some assumptions &r& in order before continuing the
comparisons for ground forces. The first of these is the role of
helicopters. Given their greater vulnerability to ground fire
as well as some range/payload tradeoffs and limitations, it is
assumed that the defending forces have access to their
helicopters whereas the attacking forces would lack immediate
support beyond the areas bordering NATO and WTO territory. The
key to this of course lies in the ability of the defending forces
to maintain air superiority over the battle field. Some who have
decried the trend towards more tanks and other armor pieces
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maintain that adequate defenses may be maintained through the
exclusive use o-f anti-armor weapons (e.g., TOW, Hellfire, etc.).
Therefore, the cases listed below follow this scheme:
Case l: NATO (Defense: no tanks) vs. WTO (Offense)
Case 2: NATO (Defense: +tanks) vs. WTO (Offense)
Case 3: Same as Case 1 + Soviet reserves
Case 4: Same as Case 2 + Soviet reserves
Offensive forces primarily include tanks, artillery, and
anti-tank weapons (guns and PGM's). Defensive forces combine
these forces (in consonance with the above listed cases) with
hel icopters.
Table 18




















41,035 l: 1.2 +WTO
72,366 1 c cr1 . *J . wJ +WTO
72,366 1:2. l +WTO




Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 19S3-84.
In the past, some have stressed that superior Western
technology significantly makes up for some of these deficits. As
an example, consider the case of aircraft <ca. 1968). For NATO
the front line aircraft was the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom,
which began to enter the inventory in 1967. On the other side
n:
was the MiG—21MF Fzshbed , which also began deliveries during
1967. Table 19 gives a run down on the capabilities o-f these
aircraft with respect to the air superiority mission.
Table 19
F-4E vs. MiG-21MF Comparison
F-4E MiG-21MF Adv.
1. Missi on Mul ti -role Mul ti—role
_ m Wt. (max) 24,430 kg 10,000 kg MiG-21
-T Max. Spd. ©
36,000 -ft Mach 2. 17 Mach 2.0 F-4E
4. Combat
Radius 840 km 500 km F-4E
Climb rate 49,800 -Fpm 25,900 fpm F-4E
6. All Weather ? Yes No F-4E
7. Max . Weapon
load 10,000 3,800 F-4E
a. Thrust:
Wt. ratio 1:0.7 1:0.8 MiG-21
9. Wing
loading moderate low MiG-21
10. Max. rng.
o-F AAM's 20 mi (AIM-7E) 4 mi (Atoll) F-4E
Source: Gunston, Encyclopedia of Horld Airpo»er,
Clearly the advantage went to the F-4E which had a longer-
range, longer engagement range, greater weapons load capability,
etc. Yet even given these advantages, U.S. aircrew had many a
nasty surprise during engagements with MiG—21' s over North
Vietnam when loss ratios marginally favored USN fighters
(including F-8's and F-4's) by barely 2:1 in 1968 CRef 673.
li:
Improved training increased this to 12:1 with the same aircraft
just four years later CRef. 683.
However, the Soviets have been striving over the past
fifteen years to overcame this technology gap. To show this, the
same comparison will be made between the McDonnell Douglas F— 15C
Eagle and the MiG-23 Flogger 6.
Table 20
F-15C vs. MiG-23 Comparison
F-15C MiG-23 Adv.
1. Mission Air Super. Air Super.
2. Wt . < max
)
25,401 kg 18,500 kg MiG-23
Max. Spd. ©
36,000 ft Mach 2.5+ Mach 2, F-15C
4. Combat
Radius 4,631 km 930 km F-15C
Climb rate 40,000 fpm n/a
6. All Weather ? Yes Yes
7. Max . Weapon
load 12,700 7,200 F-15C
8. Thrust-to—




of AAM's 62 mi (AIM-7F) 20 mi (AA-7) F-15C
Source: Gunston, Encyclopedia of Norld Airpower.
As may be seen in comparing the two tables, the West
still maintains a lead, but it is a smaller margin.
Additionally, both these aircraft had their design impetus in the
This chiefly came from the establishment of the Fighter
Weapons School (Top Gun) at NAS Miramar by the U.S. Navy. The
Air Force soon followed with their own version.
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late 1960's/early 1970' 5. Within the past two years, the Soviets
have begun to deploy a new generation of tactical land based
aircraft, represented by the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the Su—27
Flanker. Indications are that these aircraft are very similar to
the F— 16 and F— 15 respectively in terms of airframe and weaoons
system performance. The same may be seen across the broad
spectrum of weapons, ranging from anti—tank and anti-aircraft
missiles able to be launched by a single man to aircraft and
submarines.
The "dark side" of the technology "trump card" (and this
holds for both NATO and WTO forces although it is more pronounced
in the case of the West) lies in the mounting cost and
complexities of these systems. Cost has been a factor resulting
from inflation and a tendency to "gold plate" weapons systems.
that is, continuing to add mission reguirements/capabi 1 i ti es to
the system as it is developed to make it able to do all things.
This in turn complicates the system, aggravating maintenance
requirements and spare parts supply. The final result is a more
capable weapon—when it works, is available and not "down" for
lack of spares or maintenance.
As the technology "trump card" fades in significance with
the determined Soviet effort to catch up, the focus shifts back
to nuclear weapons as the second potential "trump" available to
stop a WTO onslaught. This issue is addressed in the next
chapter.
11!
XII. THE PRESENT BALANCE IN EUROPE— II
A. NATO AND WTO NUCLEAR FORCES
Continuing the previous chapter's theme, this one examines
the nuclear balance in Europe. In many ways this is a somewhat
easier balance to calculate, and in others, more difficult. As
an example, until the advent o-f the small, long range cruise
missile and land—mobile IRBM, theater nuclear delivery systems
were a bit easier to keep track of with the various "national
technical means" <NTM) at the disposal of the major powers.
In assessing the nuclear balance of power in Europe, a
methodology was employed that provided some common basis for
comparison since each nuclear system on both sides has
comparative disadvantages and advantages. This basis for
comparison is "counter military potential" or CMP. It has been
used in calculating the counter-force capabilities of the American
and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. CMP is a function of the
equivalent megatonage (EMT) of a weapon system divided by the
square of its circular error probable (CEP) .
EMT: a measure used to compare the destructive potential of
differing combinations of nuclear warhead yield against
relatively "soft" countervalue targets.
*->
^CEP: A measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system.
It is the radius of a circle around a target of such size that a
weapon aimed at it has a 50"'. probability of falling within the
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To get a better picture of what these and other numbers mean, a
mathematical model was developed covering two scenarios with two
variations within each scenario. Brie-Fly, both situations call
-for preemptive Soviet strikes on elements of NATO's theater-
strategic nuclear forces with a given number of SS—20'" s. This is
in keeping with current Soviet doctrine which calls for
preemption and does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons. One
variation in each situation came with the addition of French
national strategic forces. The other concerns the year such that
one variation counts forces as of 31 December 1984, the other
with forces projected to December 19S7. The assumptions,
formulae, lists of forces, etc. Are found in Appendix E. Later-
conclusions as to the effects of nuclear war in Europe are drawn
from the model as well.
1. NATO Nuclear Forces
NATO's nuclear forces over the past few years have begun
to tread the same path U.S. strategic nuclear systems started
down in the early 1970' s. That is towards MIRV'd SLBM's, higher
accuracys and lower yields. A prime example of this process is
the difference between the Pershing 1A and the Pershing II.
Table 21 compares the two. As may be readily seen, yield was
traded off in favor of an improvement in accuracy of some i , 2507.
.
CMP correspondingly jumped to a value almost 4.5 times that of
the original. This came about as the equation for CMP is
2particularly sensitive to changes in CEP (CMP = EMT/CEP ).
117
Table 21
Pershing 1A vs. Pershing II





























0.2 nm (450 m)
1 x W50 nuclear
60,200,400 KT
0.54 MT
















C > — denotes # in Europe, U.S. only
Source: Nuclear Weapons Data Book, Vol. 1.
There was no clearly defined doctrine that dictated this
progression. Rather it chiefly came about as technology provided
breakthroughs at increasingly lower levels in such fields as
micro-miniaturization and digital controls. Even the advent of
PD-59 and NSDD— 13 with their respective contemplation of waging
limited nuclear war, came about after technology had made
abundantly clear what present and future capabilities would be.
Other elements of the force structure (most notably British
SLBM's) were due for modernization in the near future. Finally,
there was the previously noted political and military requirement
to counter the Soviet theater nuclear build up. The i miTiedi ate
results of NATO's reply are listed below.
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On the issue of nuclear capable aircraft, those listed as
theater - strategic platforms (e.g., F-lll E/F and Mirage IV) are
aircraft reserved for the QRA role, whose primary duty is nuclear-
deterrence. The other aircraft (e.g., F-16's, Tornado*^, etc.)
are included under the theater-tactical section since they have
both a nuclear and conventional mission, and in the initial days
of conflict will probably be heavily engaged in air
superiority/close air support missions of a conventional nature.
It should be remembered though that the combination of range,
payload, and basing makes these aircraft a potentially formidable
nuclear strike force for the Soviets to deal with.
a. Theater-Strategic: Land Based Missiles
As mentioned, the first units of the Pershing II and
the GLCM were deployed in November 1983. These consisted of 32
GLCM's and 9 Pershing II's. When deployed, a GLCM "flight"
consists of 4 transporter—erector-1 aunchers (TEL's), 16 missiles
(4 per TEL), two launch control centers (LCC's), 16 support
vehicles and 69 personnel CRef. 693. A total of 565 missiles are
planned for production, of which 464 will be deployed in Europe,
barring any change in arms control negotiations. By March 1984
one GLCM flight was established at Comiso, Sicily. Plans are to
have 166 deployed in Europe by the end of FY 1935, and the full
464 by the end of FY 1987 CRef. 701. In addition to the initial
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site at RAF Greenham Common and Comiso, others are set -For RAF
Molesworth; Woensdrecht, the Netherlands ; Florennes, Belgium;
and Wueschein, FRG.
The -first 9 Pershing II missiles constitute the first
o-f -four planned firing batteries in a planned three battalion
deployment (one brigade) located at Neu Ulm and Schwabisch
Gmuend, FRG. The full 108 are expected to be deployed by the end
of 1986.
The only other missiles officially considered as
"strategic" are 18 silo based French IRBM's located on the
Plateau d' Albion in Haute Province. The SSBS S-3 IRBM's are
deployed in these silos. It has a 3.500 km range (Figure 8) ar>u
a 1 MT warhead that includes decoys and penetration aids^ CRef. 711
These silos have been hardened to withstand an overpressure of
200 psi"'. The S-3 employs the "hot-launch" technique and as
such, it is believed that there are no reloads with the silos.
The Netherlands base has been put on temporary hold by the
Dutch government. Deployment will proceed if they (the Dutch)
feel the Soviets have deployed any more SS—20' s. As of January
1935, there appeared to be no change in the Dutch position.
Belgium will begin deployment at the end of March 1985.
^Penetration aids: devices employed by offensive weapons
systems to increase probability of penetrating enemy defenses
(e. g. , chaff )
.
"For reference, Minuteman III silos are hardened to ca. 2,000
psi .
4Hot Launch: the missile is fired from the silo with no
provisions to protect the inside of the silo from thermal or
blast damage, making it a "single-shot" launcher. The SS-1S and
MX employ cold launch techniques.
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The si Ids themselves have been placed no closer than three
kilometers CRe-f. 723 which requires more warheads to be allocated
for a "kill." Table 22 summarizes the land-based missile force.
Table 22
NATO Land Based IRBM's
Number Yield Range CEP
System Dep 1 yd
.
(MT) (km) (nm) CMP
Pershing II 36 .05 1800 .02
GLCM 64 .05 2500 .02 er-7" 1 *~y
SSBS S-3 IS 1.0 3500 .40 (est)
Source: Various
b. Theater-Strategic: Sea Based Missiles
With the dis-establ ishment of a large portion of the
land based missile and air breathing nuclear forces in the late
1960's and early 1970 r, s, the sea based leg (Figure 9) grew in
importance. Today it maintains a significant portion of the
total theater-strategic EMT deployed (some 153 MT worth or 233 MT
including the French), but a much smaller portion of the total
CMP.
In assessing the sea based balance of forces, it was
assumed that one Poseidon carrying SSBN is allocated to SACEUR.
This yields 16 Pose idon C3 SLBM's with sin average force loading
of 10 warheads per missile CRef. 73D. These consist of the
W63/Mk-3 MIRV with a yield of 50 KT apiece. The CMP is not
considerable, with 22.47 per missile resulting from low yields
121
and modest accuracies. Combining the small CMP and other factors
such as delayed communications serves to ensure that this weapon
remains one with a second strike mission. Unlike the land—based
systems, deployed BSBN's are assured virtual invulnerability for
the near term pending any unforeseen Soviet ASW breakthrough.
The British presently deploy the Polaris A-3 SLBM
with the Ch&val ine warhead. The Ch&vsl ine warhead consists of 6
x 200 KT MRV'5 (as distinguished from MIRVs), improved
penetration aids, and incorporates post—boost guidance to improve
ACizursLizy CRef. 74 j. The present SSBN force consists of 4 aging
hulls of the Resol ution class. In July 1980 the British
government decided to accept an offer by the U.S. to allow the
British to subscribe to the new Trident I (or C4) SLBM. Over a
year later, the Reagan Administration announced its intentions to
accelerate the development of the Trident II (D5) so as to reach
the fleet by 1989. After some agonizing reappraisals, the
British Government signed on to the D5 program with plans to
build 4 new SSBN's able to carry the D5 with the first to be
deployed by 1994—5. The addition of this capability (along with
the U.S. deployments) will give a significant CMP capability to
the sea based force. For now though it remains a retaliatory
force unless used against fairly "soft" targets (i.e., airfields,
non-hardened missile sites, etc.). For the model, it was assumed
The D5 has an 8-10 MIRV warhead (150-600 KT range yield)
with a CEP of .07 nm. The calculated CMP for the D5 yields a
staggering 140,000 per missile. By way of comparison, the CMP of
the entire Minuteman III force armed with the Mk-12A RV is 30,168,
that two boats were on patrol or immediately available (i.e., not
in port) under the non-alert scenario.
The French sea based force has characteristics
similar to the first Polaris SLBM's, i.e., large yields (one MT)
to make up -for greater inaccuracies. The French SSBN force
consists of 5 hulls of Le Redoutabl e class, and is building two
"improved" Redout-able' s to form the basis of a new class, the
lead of which will be L* In flexible slated to enter the fleet in
mid— 19S5. This class, and some units of the older Redoutabl
e
class are scheduled to be outfitted with the M—4 SLBM which
incorporates a MIRV capability. However for the present, the
M—20 is deployed and incorporates "hardening" for penetrating a
limited ABM defense CRef. 753.
The sea-based legs of NATO's theater-strategic force
are by far the most "delicate" diplomatically, for in the case of
Britain and France they fall directly under the control of their
respective heads of state and Are dedicated to "national" ends.
This is not to say that the Poseidon' s allocated SACEUR Are not
ultimately controlled by the U.S. President. Rather, more than
any other system (save the French IRBM's) the commitment of these
systems to NATO is somewhat ambiguous. There is evidence that
the British cooperate considerably more with NATO in this regard
though. Finally, of all the systems—air breathing, land based
missile, etc.—these Are the only ones presently covered by
Number Yield Range CEP
Beplyd. <MT) (km) (nm) CMP
16 <10 X .05) 4600 22.47
64 (6 X .2) 4600 .51 7.99
80 (1 X 1.0) 3000 .51 3.89
signed and ratified arms control agreements . Table 23
summarizes NATO's sea based nuclear -forces.
Table 23





Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1983-34.
c. Theater—Strategic: Air Breathing Forces
Aircraft represent over half o-f the total number of
theater-strategic nuclear systems and deliverable CMP. The U.S.
maintains 120 F-lll E/F's split between RAF Upper Heyford and
Lakenheath in the U.K. These aircraft are on nuclear armed quick
reaction alert (QRA) at all times. They are configured to carry
the B43, B57, B61, or B83 nuclear bombs with yields ranging from
10 KT up to 1 MT. With an excellent low-level, all weather, high
speed penetration profile and avionics suite that allows precise
delivery of weapons, these are potent weapons systems that will
put a great degree of stress on WTO air defenses.
This is true even though SALT I has expired and SALT II was
not ratified by the U.S. Nevertheless, both the U.S. and the
Soviets have agreed to still adhere to the provisions of these
aqreements.
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Additionally, elements o-f the U.S.A.F.'s Strategic Air Command
have deployed on a more or less regular basis out o-f England
since SAC's other bases in Europe and North Africa were closed
during the 1960's. These include FB-lll's and B-52's, both armed
with the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) and nuclear bombs. It
may be assumed that in the case o-f the B—52, cruise missile
carrier (CMC) con-figured aircraft might be included, adding to
the WTO air defense woes. However, these forces are not counted
in the balance as they are not dedicated to NATO (just as CMC
configured Bear H's and the Bl ack Jack are not included in WTO
totals)
.
With the retirement of the last of the (Jul can
strategic bombers from the RAF, Britain no longer has a long
range airborne strike force. At one time there were plans to
acquire F— Ill's for the RAF as well as some consideration to
developing a long range cruise missile, but these plans were
dropped. Britain still has a considerable number of nuclear
capable medium and short range aircraft, but these will be noted
in the following section.
For its part, France still has an air breathing force
dedicated to the nuclear strike role. However, this consists of
34 aging Mirage IVA's (Figure 8, IOC 1963). These will be phased
out beginning in 1985 with completion sometime in the 1992—3 time
frame in favor of silo based IRBM's. The French firmee de l'fiir
will still have a capability for deep strike missions with the
Mirage 2000 supplementing the remaining IVA's, although these
will not be maintained in the same high alert state. Beginning
within the next two to three years, both aircraft will be armed
with the AMSP, a 300 km stand—off weapon with a yield of 100—300
KT CRef. 763.
For the moment, the ai rbreathing -Forces represent an
important leg o-f NATO's nuclear deterrent. However, just as
manned bombers in the U.S. nuclear triad ^re becoming
increasingly vulnerable in their present basing modes, so too
&re NATO's long range bombers. This is amply demonstrated in the
nuclear exchange model where only 42 F— ill's survived a
preemptive SS-20 attack on their two main airfields. Moving
towards better dispersal of assets may improve their chances of
surviving a preemptive attack. Additionally, WTO air defenses
^re being reinforced with the addition of such "new generation"
systems as the MiG-29 Falcram, MiG-31 Foxhound, and Su-27
Fl anker
, all with "look-down, shoot-down" capability, the IL-76
Mainstay AEW&C platform, and SA-10 SAM's. Table 24 summarizes
NATO's air breathing long range nuclear forces.
The primary threat faced by the bomber force stems from
SLBM's launched from just off the coasts of the U.S. These may-
have flight times as short as 10 minutes. This will be
aggravated as SLBM's with depressed trajectories Are developed.
^This is the ability to pick targets out of ground clutter
(e.g., cruise missiles) engage and destroy them.
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Table 24
Long Range Aircraft, NATO (+3200 km range)
Number Number of Yield CEP
System Deploy. Warheads (MT) (nm) CMP
F-lll E/F 120 2 Kea.) 0.1 200
Mirage IVA 34 2 .015<ea.) 0.1 15.35
Source: IISS, The Military Balance, 29&3-S4.
d. Theater—Tactical : Missiles and Artillery
During the heyday of the atomic battlefield a
substantial portion of the tactical nuclear forces were found in
this category. These ranged from the sublime (the Redstone) to
the ridiculous (Davy Crockett) . Today the numbers have been
drastically pared back, with the only new system (i.e., not a
derivative of an existing system) being the Lance (IOC 1972) and
Tomahawk SLCM (IOC June 1984). There is a certain amount of
controversy surrounding the latter which will be discussed below.
For land based forces, joining the Lance are the Pershing 1A and
Honest John for the U.S. and NATO countries (excluding France).
Not to be left alone, France also fields a tactical nuclear
battlefield missile, the Pluton. The Pershing and Honest John
ar& relics from as far back as 1954 (for the Honest John). These
The Redstone was directly developed from the V—2 of WW II
vintage with a range of almost 370 km and put the first U.S.
astronaut into space. At the other end of the spectrum was the
Davy Crockett, a .25 KT, 51 lb. rocket of reportedly very short
range and not popular with the infantry men assigned to fire it.
It was finally withdrawn from the inventory in the early 1970's*
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missiles as well as the Lanes and PI aton have a dual
nuclear/conventional capability. However, with CEP's ranging
-from over 1 nm (Honest John) to 0.16 nm -for the Platon* the use
o-f high explosive conventional warheads could be somewhat
ineffectual. It should be pointed out that the Honest John is no
longer in the active inventory of the U.S. and is maintained by-
Greece and Turkey. However, the U.S. retains control over the
nuclear warheads. Accompanying the age of these weapons systems
are attendant problems in reliability . The U.S. has 72
Pershing lA's that are being replaced with the longer range
Pershing II' s. However, West Germany continues to operate 72
Pershing lA's under the aegis of the Luftwaffe. The Lance is
operated by the U.S. as well as Belgium, West Germany, Britain,
Italy, and the Netherlands. France deploys 42 PI aton' s.
By far the largest number of warheads are those
dedicated to nuclear artillery. Most estimates place the number
deployed in Europe at close to 5,000 CRef. 771. A substantial
portion of these also entered the stockpile during the height of
the doctrine of the atomic battlefield. Because of this, a
significant portion of the number of nuclear warheads being
withdrawn from Europe under the Montebello decision consist of
nuclear artillery shells. There are two versions of nuclear
For example, the Honest John must be warmed by electric
blankets for a 24-48 hour period prior to use to attain a
predetermined temperature for even propel lant burn. This
procedure along with several other system draw backs combine to
reduce the overall reliability of the system.
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capable artillery (dependent on caliber) currently in use.
These are 155 mm and 8-inch pieces. The warheads used are the
W48 (155 mm) with a sub—kiloton yield (~. 1 KT) , produced during
the early-mid 1960's and the W33 (8-inch) with a 2-12 KT yield,
produced during the mid— 1950' s to mid-1960' s.
These weapons were to have been replaced by the ERW
in Europe, but events have combined to scrub that -for the
immediate -future. Two ERW's have been produced and are stored in
the U.S. These are the W70—3 -for the Lance and the W79-1 for
8-inch^ (203 mm) artillery CRef. 783. A third warhead, the
W82~', has had a -fitful period of development.
The Tomahawk SLCM is a departure from the other
missiles by virtue of its range, yield, and accuracy.
Essentially a sea based version of the GLCM, the Tomahawk has a
250 KT warhead that when combined with its accuracy of .02 nm
yields a devastating CMP of over 1,550. A limited deployment was
started with the reactivated battleships few Jersey and Iowa
(later to include the Missouri and Wisconsin) and the USS
Guitarro (SSN—637 class). Ultimately these missiles would be
The W70—3 ERW is a 1 KT weapon utilizing tritium. About 340
warheads for 100 launchers were in NATO were built and are stored
in the U.S.
^The W79-1 ERW is a 1 KT yield weapon of which 65—707. is
fusion utilizing plutonium and tritium. Approximately 120—300
were built and are stored at Seneca Army Depot. NY.
-r
"The W32 ERW has a yield of < 2 KT and was intended to
replace the W4S. Costs have climbed to $3 mill, per warhead, but
funding was reinstated in the FY 1985 budget.
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deployed in the remainder of the SSN—637 class as well as the
SSN-594 and SSN-6B8 classes, California.. Virginia, and Long Beach
class CGN's, Ticonderoga CG's, Spruance DD's, and Burke DDG's.
Also unlike the other missiles, the Tomahawk can be a most lethal
conventional weapon in both an anti—ship and An air-field/second
echelon strike (using precision guided submunit ions/runway
cratering submuni tions) roles. There are no external
distinguishable characteristics between the nuclear armed and
conventional Tomahawk though. It is this ambiguity and the
potential veri-f i cation problems it might pose to -future arms
control agreements that led Congress to cut funding for nuclear
armed Tomahawk SLCM's in the FY 1935 budget. However, since some
44 Tomahawks have deployed at various times, these were included
in the force balance table. Table 25 summarizes theater—tactical
missiles and artillery.
e. Theater—Tactical : Aircraft
As previously noted, aircraft were the first
platforms to carry tactical nuclear weapons. Today aircraft
c^rry the majority of deliverable megatonage both for theater-
strategic and -tactical purposes. It is a safe assumption that
any aircraft in the U.S. inventory capable of carrying weapons is
nuclear capable . That mean that its primary mission is
Possible exceptions to this are the A-10 and the F-14, the




NATO Theater-Tactical Missiles S< Artillery
CMP
Number Yield Rng. CEP
System Deplyd. <MT) (km) (nm)
U.S.
0.4 720 .22 11.33
0.05 125 .21 3.24
0.25 2400 .02 1 55 1 . 63
.002-. 0005 IS n. a. n. a.







1. Pershing 72 0.4 720 .22 11.33
2. Honest-
John 54 0.02 40 1.02 0.07
3. Pluton 42 0.025 120 .09 3.19
4. Lance 56 0.05 125 .21 3.24
5. M-109 252 .002-. 0005 18 n.a. n.a.
6. M-110 200 .002-. 0005 21 .09 1.78-0.73
Source: Various.
a nuclear one though. As an ex ample, the F-16 has a range
greater than the Mirage IVA (3800 km vs. 3200 km) but the
majority will be occupied with gaining air superiority and
providing ground support. They may be called upon though for
nucl ear strikes beyond the FEBA.
In addition to land based aircraft, carrier based
aircraft (both CTOL and VSTOL) enter the picture. Their
capabilities run -From close air support (Av*—8A Harrier, A—7E
Corsair II) to medium range penetrati on— i nterdi ct i on (A—6E
Intruder, Super Etendard) . Carrier based aircraft have been a
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particularly sharp thorn in the Soviet's side since they -first
began to be deployed with nuclear weapons over thirty years ago.
Of all the theater nuclear systems, aircraft,
particularly short and medium range aircraft, have seen the most
efforts towards modernization. Indicative of this is the
widespread production and deployment of the F-16, Tornado, and
Mirage F.l. Still there are significant numbers of older nuclear
capable aircraft still in the inventory, including the F—4E and
Mirage HIE.
The weapons carried by these aircraft are the same as
those available to the F-lll's (for NATO members excluding
France), namely the B28, B43, B57, B61, and B83 nuclear bombs
with yields ranging from 5 KT to +1 MT. The lone nuclear AAM
still in the inventory is the Genie which is fast approaching
retirement. Work is underway at a low level of intensity to
build a nuclear version of the AIM-54 Phoenix. Table 26
summarizes the tactical nuclear aircraft balance of forces -for
NATO.
2. WTO Nuclear Forces
The buildup of theater nuclear forces by the Soviet Union
has already been amply documented. This buildup continues today
inspite of Soviet protestations of a self imposed "moratorium" or
statements to that effect. The net result is a substantial
Soviet nuclear force margin over NATO forces, one of the largest

















Tactical Nuclear Capable Aircraft, NATO
Number Number of Yield CEP*




1 (ea. > . 1 200 . 00
1 .05 400.00
1 (ea. ) . 1 200 . 00
1 (ea. ) . 1 200.00
1 (ea. ) .05 800.00
2 1 (ea.) .05 800.00
1 1 .05 400.00
2 1 (ea. ) .1 200.00
2 .015 (ea.) .10 12.20
2 .015 (ea.) .10 12.20
C*: CEP' s estimated^
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 19S3-S4.
a. Theater-Strategic: Land Based Missiles
Soviet military doctrine differs -from that of the
West in, among other things, including a middle level of
classification between strategic and tactical, called operational
tactical . One of the spinoffs from this is the blurring of what
constitutes a "strategic" and a "tactical" missile. Ostensibly,
the SS—22 would be considered a "tactical" missile in a Western
inventory, yet in Soviet eyes it may fulfill a "strategic"
mission. For purposes here though, it will be included with the
theater—tactical nuclear systems.
Recent articles CRef. 79 3 have quoted Reagan
Administration officials and intelligence sources as stating that
some 400 SS—20's are now deployed, up -From 378, with 1,200 total
warheads deployed. One o-f these articles states the Soviets may
be headed toward an eventual 600 missile -force that would be
teamed with two new GLCM's CRef. 803. I-f the same ratios held
-for the projected deployment of SS—20' s (with 2/3 immediately
available to cover all of Europe), this would mean 400 SS-20's
would be dedicated to targeting NATO with another 200 deployed
against Chinese forces and presumably available to bolster the
European SS—20' s. This was the scheme followed for the model
where it was assumed 267 and 300 of 400 and 450 SS-20's
respectively were immediately available. The remainder of the
aging SS-4/SS-5 IRBM force is deployed in the western region of
the Soviet Union and may be expected to be retired within the
next few years.
Of the two GLCM versions, the one that is in final
operational tests and soon to be deployed, the SS-CX-4, is
virtually identical to the U.S. GLCM in terms of size, range, and
presumably guidance. A much larger version CRef. 811, nearly
twice the physical size of the SS-CX-4, is in development and
most likely will have a larger warhead, longer range and/or
Dismantling of the weapon and launchers may not immediately
fallow though, an important point to remember with Soviet weapon
system philosophy.
134
greater speed. Finally, to complicate matters, the Soviets have
begun deploying a new ICBM, the SS-25, at established SS-20 sites
CRef. 823. The SS-25 is a three stage, solid fuel missile with
capabilities similar to those of the Minute-man ICBM. Unlike
Minuteman though, it is land mobile. The issue faced here is
that this missile provokes troubling comparisons to previous
ICBM/IRBM codevelopment (witness the previously mentioned SS-
16/SS-20 genealogy) in addition to making future arms control
negotiations more complicated. Table 27 summarizes Soviet land
based MR/IRBM's.
Table 27
Soviet /WTO Land Based IRBM's
Number . Yield Rng. CEP
System Deployed (MT) (km) (nm) CMP
SS-4 223 1 2000 1.26 0.63
S3-5 16 1 4100 0.60 2.75
SS-20 267 (400) 3 X .15 5000 0.11 70.08
SS-CX-4 devl. .2 3000 0.04 213.98
(Includes SS-20 's deployed in Far East)
Source: Various.
b. Theater—Strategic: Sea Based Missiles
Even in a category that has long been dominated by
the West, the Soviets still hold a significant margin here too
when matching CMP (870 vs. 1598 not including French SLBM's).
This comes about chiefly because of the smaller yields (in spite
of greater accuracys) of Western SLBM's. For the model, the
SS—N—5 was considered to be exclusively for the European theater.
13'
stemming -From its age and platform limitations . The SS-N—6 and
SS-N— 17 received similar considerations when including them*". The
more modern SLBM's (e.g., SS-N-3, -18, -20, and -NX-23) were
considered to have a primary role outside of the European
theater. It should be remembered though, that just as elements
of the strategic triad of the U.S. might be used against WTO
territory, so to may elements of the Soviet SLBM force, outside
of the —5, —6, and -17, be used against NATO territory. Table 28
summarizes the sea based missile forces.
Table 28
Soviet /WTO Sea Based Missiles
Number Yield Rng. CEP
System Deployed <MT) (km) (nm) CMP
SS-N-5 48 1 1400 1 . 53 0.42
SS-N-6 384 1 2400 .49 4. 11
SS-N- 17 12 1 3900 .77 1.69
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1963-84.
c. Theater—Strategic: Long Range Aircraft
The capabilities of the Backfire have been covered
elsewhere and as such will not be repeated here. The other long
The SS—N—5 is deployed in te rapidly ageing Hotel class SSBN
and Golf SSB. It is considered an obsolescent weapon, but is
still deployed (see previous footnote).
^The SS-N- 17 is deployed in the Yankee class SSBN. This
class is roughly comparable to the early Polaris SSBN's of the
U.S. They Are subject to SALT I restrictions and accordingly,
some have been converted and removed from SLBM duty.
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range aircra-ft with a likely theater-strategic mission would be
the Bear B/C carrying the AS-3 Kangaroo , a 650 km stand o-f-f
weapon. The most likely target for this weapon would be port
facilities and other "soft" targets . The newer AS-X-15 ALCM
carried by the Bear H may have theater role, but it is more
likely intended for use against the U.S. homeland as a reply to
the fielding of the ALCM by SAC. The Blackjack, a long range,
supersonic bomber somewhat larger than the B— 1 is expected to
enter service in the 1985—86 time frame. It too is most likely
intended for strikes against the U.S., but it also poses a
considerable threat to NATO forces either as a CMC or with
nuclear bombs. Table 29 summarizes Soviet long range aircraft.
Table 29
Soviet /WTO Long Range Aircraft
Number Number of Yield CEP
System Deployed Warheads <MT) (nm) CMP
Backfire 210 2 1 0.05 800.00
Bear B/C 100 1 +1 1.00 1.00
CCEP's est. except for Bear B/C — CEP is for AS-3}
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1983-84.
d. Theater-Tactical: Missiles and Artillery
The Soviets have only recently begun to acquire
significant amounts of nuclear capable artillery. They have.
Some wags have noted the AS—3 was intended to "sink Iceland"
in view of its yield and poor accuracy.
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however, always had an overabundance o-f tactical nuclear
missiles. Like the Honest John in NATO, some o-f the older
battlefield missiles are now deployed by non—Soviet WTO -forces
(i.e., the SS-1 Scad B/C and FR0G-Z/-5) although the nuclear-
warheads remain in Soviet custody at sites within the Soviet
Union. As part o-f the theater modernization program the
SS-21/-22/-23 a.re being deployed to replace an entire generation
o-f battle-field missiles. Again, the capabilities o-f these have
been alluded to elsewhere. Table 30 summarizes these systems.
Table 30
Soviet/WTO Theater-Tactical Missiles & Artillery
Number Yield Rng. CEP







SS-C-lb 100 0.35 450 0.50 3.11
1S0 mm 168 0.002 30 0.02 1.59
non-Soviet:
FR0G-3/-5 198 0.2 70 0.34 7.14
SS-1 137 0.2 450 1.50 0.15
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1933-84.
In addition to the missiles shown above, there Br& a
significant number deployed by submarine, surface and air forces
of the Soviet Navy which may have a secondary land attack role.
0.2 70 0.34 7. 14
0.2 900 0.49 1.41
0.2 120 0. 16 12.73
0.5 900 0. 16 23.43
0.2 500 0. 16 13.37
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For example, the SS-C-lb Sepal is a derivative of the sea based
SS-N-3 Shaddock. The main mission of these missiles is anti-
shipping, especially -for anti—carrier warfare (ACW) .
e. Theater-Tactical: Aircraft
As was the case with NATO, virtually all the WTO
tactical aircraft Are nuclear capable as well as having
conventional capabilities. Those aircraft included here are the
ones with strike/interdiction roles as a significant portion of
their mission, hence the exclusion of the MiG-23 Flogger B/G, and
the new generation MiG—29, MiG—31, and Su—27. This was done in a
similar vein for NATO forces by excluding the F-14, F-15, F-106.
Lightning, Tornado F.2 (air defense version), and Mirage 2000.
These aircraft are summarized in Table 31.
Table 31
Soviet /WTO Tactical Nuclear Aircraft
System
Number Number of Yield CEP
























Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2983-84.
3. NATO - WTO Nuclear Force Comparisons
This section puts into perspective the numerous variables
presented in the previous balance figures (e.g., CEP, CMP, etc.).
The basis for this is the previously mentioned model of a theater
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nuclear exchange. While modeled on theater—strategic forces, it
may be similarly expanded to include theater-tactical weapons,
a. Theater-Strategic Comparison
The first systems to be compared must by nature of
the controversy they have generated be the land based missiles.
That is, the Pershing II's, GLCM's, and to a lesser degree, the
French S-3's, and the SS-4/-5/-20. This is found in Table 32.
Table 32
NATO/WTO Land Based Theater-Strategic Missiles
Pisrs hzng GLCM S-3 SS-4 SS-5 SS-20
X m Number 36 64 IS 117JL£.0 16 400
£ > Rng
.
, km 1800 2500 3500 2000 4100 5000
"7 Yield, EMT . 14 . 14 1.00 1.00 1.00 .85
4. CEP, nm .02 .02 .51 1.26 .60 . 11
CMP, ea. 53• 1 • Jt 6.25 .63 2.75 70.08
Totals:
6. EMT 5.04 8.96 IS 223 16 340
7. CMP 19,124 34,000 113 140 44 28,032
NATO vs. WTO CMP C+ France} 53,124 {53,2373 vs. 28,216 1
*With 267 SS-20' s: 53124 C53,2373 vs. 13,395.
Source: Various.
The same comparison is made with SLBM's in Table 33 and with




NATO/WTO Sea Based Theater-Strategic Missiles













16 64 80 48 384 12
4600 4600 3000 1400 2400 3900
1.36 2.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 . 00
.25 .51 .51 1.53 .49 .77
22.47 7.99 3.89 0.42 4. 11 1.69
22.00 131.00 80.00 48.00 384.00 12.00
360 511 311 20 1578 20
IP O France^ 870 (1,182) vs. 1,618
(Source: IISS, The Military Balance)
Table 34
NATO/WTO Long Range Aircraft
F-lll Mirage IVA Backfire Bear B/C
1. Number 120 34 210 100
2. Rng. , km 4700 3200 8000 12800
3. Yield, EMT 2.0 0. 15 2.00 1.00
4. CEP, nm 0. 1 0. 10 0.05 1.00
5. CMP, ea. 200.00 15.35 800.00 1.00
Totals:
6. EMT 240.00 5. 1 420.00 1 00 . 00
7. CMP 24,000 522 168,000 100
NATO vs. WTO CMP C+ France} 24,000 {24,522} vs. 168,100
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1983-34.
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Table 35
Overall Theater Strategic Totals (+ France)
Category NATO (NATO) WTO
1. Total 5y5. 300 432 1,393
J- m Sum, ttl.
warheads 885 1,016 2,403
3. Sum, yield (MT) 329.8 430 1,383.
1
4. Sum, CMP 77,992 78,942 197,891
Avg. , warheads
per plat-Form 2.95 2.35 1.73
6. Sum, EMT 407 . 510.8 1 , 527 .
7, Avg. , EMT per
pi atform 1.33 1. 13 1. 10
8. Avg., yield per
plat-Form (MT) 0.37 0.42 0.58
9. Avg. , CMP per
platform 88.23 77.70 82.35
Source: Appendix E.
The guest ion is how to interpret these figures.
Table 35 is perhaps the easiest to interpret. The total number
of platforms is clear enough, showing the enormous margin of
superiority enjoyed by WTO nuclear forces. However this is not
enough, and thus the reason for CMP, EMT, and other comparisons.
It would seem in the final analysis that compared to NATO's TNF
assets, the WTO theater nuclear capabilities are more widely
dispersed, making each platform a "low value" target. This means
that NATO is forced to expend more warheads to gain assured
14:
"kills" on WTO systems. The greater a system becomes in value,
the more destabilizing it becomes as the opposing -forces become
more and more inclined to preemptively strike it based on their
assumptions o-f a high probability o-f success in doing so with a
smaller -fraction of their -forces. An illustration o-f this
situation is -found in the ICBM arena with criticisms of current
plans to base 100 MX missiles in former Minuteman silos without
significant hardening capabilities. The MX has a CMP of 7,196
each compared with the older Minuteman missiles 7 40.98. The
silos themselves require a CMP of about 40 to ensure a kill <2
RV s per silo), a capability easily handled by the SS-18 force.
A similar situation has evolved on the theater-
strategic front regarding NATO's forces. Since NATO's nuclear-
capabilities tend to be concentrated on fewer platforms or
systems and in fewer geographic locations, they" tend to be
"higher value" targets than their rough counterparts. Tables 36
and 37 show the results of a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike
against NATO's theater—strategic assets in a "bolt out of the
blue" strike. Tables 38 and 39 show the results of another
preemptive strike but one that occurs following a conventional
stage of fighting during which time NATO has been able to
disperse its assets. However, at the same time the Soviets have
been able to reinforce theirs as well and expend them
accordingly. In both cases the numbers remaining would be those
available to the theater commander for a retaliatory strike.
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Table 36
Post-Attack Analysis #1: Force Levels as o-f Dec 1984 C+ France]
NATO:
1. IRBM's
a. Destroyed CMP 34,529 £34,6293
b. Surviving CMP 18,593 • E 18, 6053
c. 7. original surviving 35 7. C31 7.3
d. Number surviving 22 GLCM/
13 P-II C2 s-33
2. SLBM's
a. Destroyed CMP 170 C290]
b. Surviving CMP 705 C8953
c- 7. original surviving 81 7. C76 7,3
d. Number surviving 16 Poseidon/
43 Polaris C49 M-20'sl
Aircraft
7 <2.6> C22 <8.2>3
<0> C0 <0>3
<0> C0 <0>3
a. Destroyed CMP 15,600 C 15, 938]
b. Surviving CMP 8,400 [8,58411
c. 7. original surviving 35 7. C35 7.1
d. Number surviving 42 F-lll C12 Miragel
4. Total Force
a. Total CMP (pre-strike) 77,993 £78,9393
b. Surviving CMP 27,696 t 28, 0333
c. 7. of total surviving 45 7. C45 7.3
Soviet /WTO:
1. Forces expended <7. of respective force)
a. IRBM's (SS-20's only)
b. SLBM's
c. Aircraft
2. CMP employed <7. of respective force)
a. IRBM's 491 <2.6>C 1,542 <S.2>3
b. SLBM's <0> [0 <0>:
c. Aircraft <0> C0 <0>3
3- Totals expended <7. of total >
a. CMP 491 <0.5>C 1,542 <1.6>3
b. Megatonaqe 3.15 C9.93
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a. Total CMP (pre-strike) 50,209
b. Surviving CMP 27,785
c. 7. of total surviving 49 7.
Soviet/WTO:
1. Forces expended <7. of respective force)-









C 28, 253 3
C53 7.3
14 V vJ ? C 33 < 1 2 > 3
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Post-Attack Analysis #3: Force Levels as of Dec 1987 C+ France]
NATO:
1. IRDM's
a. Destroyed CMP 255,516 C255,6163
b. Surviving CMP 48,341 C 48, 3533
c. 7. original surviving 16 7. C16 7.1
d. Number surviving 78 GLCM/
13 P-II C2 S-3J
SLBM'
a. Destroyed CMP 170 C 29011
b. Surviving CMP 705 C8953
c. 7. original surviving 81 7. C76 7,2
d. Number surviving 16 Poseidon/
43 Polaris C49 M-20 ? s:
Aircraft
a. Destroyed CMP 15,600 1115,93811
b. Surviving CMP 8,400 C3,5S4 3
c. 7. original surviving 35 7. C35 7,1
d. Number surviving 15 F-lll C4 Miragel




a. Total CMP (pre-strike) 328,728 C329,6743
b. Surviving CMP 57,444 C57,8313
c. 7. of total surviving 25 7. L2S 7.1
Soviet /WTO:
1. Forces expended <7. of respective force>
a. IRBM's (SS-20's only)
b. SLBM's
c. Aircraft
2. CMP employed <7. of respective force)
a. IRBM's 1,332 <6> C2,383 < 1 1 > D
b. SLBM's <0> C0 <0>1
c. Aircraft <0> C0 <0>1
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a. Total CMP <pre-strike) 328,730
b. Surviving CMP 102,156
c. 7. o-f total surviving 37 7.
Soviet /WTO:
1. Forces expended <7. of respective force>






7 <6> [46 <10>3
< > [ < > 3
<0> [ <0>3




1,892 <6> [3,224 < 1 > 3
<0> [0 <0>3
<0> [0 < > 3













Clearly the only leg with a major portion o-f its CMP
remaining is the SLBM leg. However, even assuming that the
entire French and British SLBM -force was allowed to be used to
retaliate against the remaining Soviet theater—strategic -Forces
along with the survivors of the remainder of NATO's TNF, it falls
well shy of being able to put a substantial dent in the remaining
Soviet forces.
Escalation to use of strategic nuclear forces by the
U.S. would most certainly garner a reply from the Soviets that
would destroy a large portion of the ICBM's and bombers withheld
from the initial attack as well as putting U.S. population
centers in jeopardy. Additionally, the Soviets aren't likely to
distinguish between an SLBM launched in retaliation as one that
was at the behest of SACEUR or one as part of a U.S. strategic
force response.
Some might argue that this is at best a specious
exercise, that the value of nuclear weapons lies only in
deterrence and that if they are used then their raison d'etre is
defeated. Of course there is the other side which argues for
application of nuclear weapons as one would any other type of
weapon. The relative merits and demerits of these viewpoints and
those that lie between Bre debated in a later chapter.
For now it is important to stress that one of the
critical aspects of deterrence is the credibility of the weapons
systems charged with that mission. Their credibility increases
14J
or declines as a -function of age, national will, and
vulnerability among other -factors. Mere modernization is not
always enough to enhance credibility.
The illustration of this idea was one of the purposes
behind the theater nuclear exchange model. There remain two
standouts in this scenario from a survivability standpoint. One
is that as the GLCM reaches more and widespread deployment that
in an alert situation they may be able to disperse early enough
and without notable detection by the Soviets such that a larger
number would survive following a Soviet first strike.
Additionally, a larger portion of the Soviet inventory would be
needed to gain a higher kill probability and as this level
escalates, the collateral damage to non-military targets may
become unattractive to Soviet plans for post—attack occupation
and exploitation. The other standout is that of the Tomahawk
SLCIi. Discounting arms control complications for the moment,
deployed in highly survivable platforms (e.g., SSN's or converted
SSBN's) it provides a formidable retaliatory force. Retaliatory
since both the SLCM and the GLCM lack one requirement of first
strike weapons, namely they are not a time urgent weapon because
of their subsonic speed. To a degree it is offset by their small
size and low flight profile, but the advent of a new generation
of interceptors and SAM's with quick reaction and low altitude
engagement capabilities diminishes this advantage.
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b. Theater-Tactical Comparisons
Largely ignored but looming in the background during
the recent TNF (or INF if one prefers) debates are tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe. As previously noted, they made a
brief foray into the light during the neutron bomb debacle in
1978, but since then have merged back into the shadows. while
the theater—strategic weapons are oriented more towards
deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons are intended more for war
fighting with a thin veneer of deterrence to "justify" their
existence. These weapons were the ones that raised such
controversy with the Germans during the 1950' s and may provide
the spark in a future conflict that might prompt escalation up
the nuclear ladder.
To gain a better understanding of the present balance
of tactical nuclear forces. Tables 40—42 are provided which
summarize battlefield missiles, nuclear capable tactical
aircraft, and finally a total force balance. Nuclear capable
artillery was not included as only one system was available for
the Soviets (S-23 180 mm) and the U.S. /NATO (M-109 155 mm)
wherein all the data were available to complete the requisite
calculations. Aircraft (U.S.) are assumed to carry the B-43 or
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3. Sum, yield (MT) 1,207.80
4. Sum, CMP 315,311
5. Avg. , warheads
per platform 1.40
6. Sum, EMT 1,250
7. Avg. , EMT per
plat-form 1.20
8. Avg., yield per
platform <MT) 0.80
9. Avg. , CMP per
platform 212
Historically the U.S. maintained a slight lead over
the Soviets with about 7,000 warheads in Europe CRef. 333. Since
1979 this has shifted to a 2,000 warhead advantage or the Soviets
with some 6,000 warheads for the U.S. vs. 8,000 for the Soviets.
As pointed out earlier a large percentage of this number for the
U.S. is found in artillery shells (""5,000), many of which ar&
over 20 years old. In fact, nuclear capable artillery is the
only Area, where NATO holds a numerical or any other advantage
over the Soviets in tactical nuclear weapons. Given the ranges
and probable employment of these weapons they provide troubling
implications for NATO's European members, particularly the West
Germans.
However from the tables above it is clear to see that
even though NATO forces maintain a rough 1.2:1 advantage in
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average CMP per warhead, the Soviets hold a quantitative edge in
total systems and in total CMP (almost 3:1 in the latter
category). The conclusion that stems -from these calculations is
that the tactical nuclear force o-f P4AT0 is postured to fight a
limited nuclear war on or near friendly territory and forces.
Counterposed is a much larger Soviet force that is less concerned
about the "niceties" of a "limited" nuclear war. Rather this
force is structured more to overwhelm the opponent in a nuclear
sense in much the same way that conventional forces (e.g.,
artillery) Ar& employed. That the war would be fought away from
Soviet territory and portions of non—Soviet WTO territory, along
with other considerations, is evident in the larger amount of
megatonage in the inventory and greater inaccuracies, lending
these weapons more suitable to "area" coverage missions rather
than precise, "surgical" strikes. It is worth noting though that
the new generation of battlefield missiles (SS—21/—22/—23) show
substantial improvements in CEP's over the previous generation.
XIII. THE PRESENT BALANCE IN EUROPE— III
A. THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHIC EQUATION
Thus far the balance of conventional and nuclear -forces has
been addressed. Most analyses end at this point, yet there is
more that needs to be considered. Military power, nuclear and
conventional, is but one part o-f the overall or "big" picture.
There is more to being a "superpower" than having dominance in
strategic missiles—economic, political, cultural, and other
strengths are necessary as well.
In some respects this approaches the "correlation o-f forces"
that the Soviets are so fond of referring to. However there are
non-quantitative variables that must be included in the equation
as they have a direct impact on such things as military and
political capabilities and influence. These are brought together
with other known, readily identifiable variables in the strategic
geographic equation CRef . 84 1. Figure 10 illustrates this
equation.
The equation finds its source in the most fundamental element
of all, pure geography. Everything else stems from the four
determinants of location, area, physical features, and climate.
In turn, these factors largely determine the natural resources
The strategic geographic equation was developed in a series
of lectures presented by Dr. R.H.S. Stolfi during the summer
quarter of 1934 at the Naval Postgraduate School , Monterey, Ca.
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available to be exploited by the population o-f a particular state
or polity. The size and ethnicity of that populace and its
ability to apply knowledge (i.e., technology) in the exploitation
o-f those natural resources largely determines production.
The equation yields two products, one is potential or
projected military influence based on undeveloped reserves. The
other is real pol i tical -mi 1 i tary influence as exemplified by the
production capability of the state and other factors. It is
these other factors that add other dimensions to the assessment
of the military and overall balance of power.
These factors include multiplicative, quantifiable variables
such as numbers of men and equipment and technical qualities of
weapons (e.g., range, payload, etc.). Non-quantifiable factors
include command style and combat spirit, and partially
quantifiable factors within the strategic framework of operations
(e.g., terrain, climate, etc.). These factors &r& integrated
into the picture later. For now, the assessment of the balance
of forces will be completed by addressing the fundamental aspects
of the equation, namely geography, population, natural resources
and production capabilities.
B. THE NON-MILITARY BALANCE
1 . Geography and Populace
One of the elements that tends to be somewhat
unjustifiably skewed in favor of the Soviets is the size of their
land mass compared to member states of NATO. There is no denying
the -Fact that the Soviet Union constitutes the largest state in
the world. Adding the territory of the non—Soviet WTO states to
this leviathan seems to exacberate the situation, especially when
one looks only at the European members of NATO. However, when
the territory of the United States and of Canada are added, this
disparity is narrowed. Table 43 is germane.
Table 43
NATO/WTO Area Comparisons (Major Partners)
Area (sq. mi .
)
NATO
1 West Germany- 96.000
»~1 Britain 94 , 000
j. France 210,000
4 Spain 195,000
Italy 57 , 000
6. U.S. 3 S 680,000

















While the enormous Area of the Soviet Union still
contributes the leading edge in total area, useable area, such as
arable land (constituting only 10 '/• of its territory) is
considerably less. Even though NATO has some 666,000 sq. mi.
less land area, it holds a margin in population over the WTO by
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about 173,500,000 (517,500,000 vs. 344.000,000). NATO's
favorable margin implies a larger manpower reserve or "pool" in
the event o-f a prolonged military conflict to be drawn upon,
either for direct military use cyr in support of the military
(e.g., production). This trend is expected to continue inspite
of zero ar near zero population growth in Central Europe
(including European USSR) and the U.S., as Mediterranean
countries and Central Asian and Moslem populations are expected
to make up for manpower deficits in the next decade for NATO and
the Soviets respectively.
2. Natural Resources and Production
The one natural resource that has gained the most
attention both in terms of production and reserves is that of
petroleum. It is no secret that the Soviets are the world's
leading producers of petroleum, accounting for nearly 19% of the
world total of 3,123,256,000 metric tons and weighing in at third
place with proven reserves of 9.67. of world totals of
35,543,000,000 metric tons in 1979. What may surprise some is
that the U.S. was close behind at 13.4 7. in production with 4.6 V.
of the world's proven reserves. Viewed within the framework of
NATO and the WTO, the combination of U.S. and British reserves
and production, the latter from North Sea oil fields, serves to
bring the Western Alliance within 27. of the Soviets on both
accounts. The WTO on the other hand, is almost wholly dependent
on the Soviets for their petroleum supply. Examining coal
production one will find an advantage for NATO over the WTO, that
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when subdivided (U. S. -W. Europe vs. E. Europe-USSR) -finds much the
same situation as with petroleum. Namely, while the U.S.—
W. Europe ratios o-f support are slightly tilted in favor of the
U.S.. the WTO figures weigh heavily on the Soviets. A final note
on energy resources; the U.S. and Canada dominate the worldwide
reserves and production of uranium with 40.2 7. (28.67. —U.S.,
11.67: -Canada) and 56.4 7. (38.27. -U.S., 18.27. -Canada)
respectively.
Turning from reserves and exploitation of natural
resources, one sees the previously mentioned trend continuing in
manufacturing semi—finished products (e.g., crude steel and
aluminum) and finished products (e.g., automobiles and
telephones). Table 42 summarizes these items.
1978 worldwide reserves of uranium totaled 1,853,000 metric
tons and 1979 production was 37,953 metric tons.
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Table 44
NATO-WTO Semi -Finished and Finished Products
Crude
Steel Aluminum
(10 "6 mt) (10-3 mt)
NATO
1. W. Germany 43.8
*3
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1. Poland 18.6 95. 1 1.84 -r n
E. Germany 7.3 60.0 2.4
Czech. 15.2 3S.3 2.3
4. Hungary 3.3 83.0 1.0 1 . _'
Subtotal 44.9 276.4 11.1





These -figures in combination with those -from the previous
chapter help -fill in the remaining quantifiable blocs within the
-framework o-f the strategic geographic equation. What remains is
to illustrate the final partially— and non—quantifiable blocs.
Completing this will give the reader the complete framework
within which to view the debate in the next chapter av&r the
efficacy of nuclear weapons in Europe, a question that surely
ranks as one of the most important to be faced not only for this
generation, but for those still to come.
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3. Partial— and Non—quant i f iable Factors
a. The Strategic Framework of Operations
The strategic framework of operations is a set of
factors whose product yields a partially quantifiable balance.
These factors &re terrain and weather, war principles, and
whether one i s on the offensive or defensive CRef. 853. To
illustrate the role of these factors in the overall balance, bad
weather may be modeled mathematically somewhat regarding the
effect it may have (e.g., sorties scheduled/made/cancelled as a
result of weather, reduced visibility and its effects on target
acquisition, engagement, destruction, and kill assessment, etc.)
on the battle. What is not quantifiable (and hence accurately
modeled) is whether one is on the defense and caught by a
surprise attack on a narrow or broad front. This factor may
change over a period of time as the attack unfolds and the
defender steels himself to defend his home territory, or
conversely, collapse like a rotten apple that is stepped on. Ws.r
principles figure in as they seek to exploit the advantages of
offensive/defensive actions, terrain, forces on hand/on reserve,
and so forth, for fighting the battle to a decisive conclusion.
b. Operational and Combat Styles
One of the most neglected factors in assessing the
balance of forces in this age of computer enhanced operations
analysis and research is the role of operational style as
exemplified by the style of the commanders and their staffs, and
of combat style as exemplified by troop spirit and determination.
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One o-f the assumptions typically made is that it doesn't matter
either because it would play an insignificantly small role in the
overall balance or it -falls into the category of "too hard" in
trying to develop a mathematical model -for these factors.
Another reason why these have not been examined in
too great a detail, especially by American commentators and
analysts, lies in the unhistorical nature of American society
which tends to minimize things or events that may have occurred
more than a few years ago. Hence the reason for the first part
of this thesis which examined the historical background of
nuclear weapons in Europe. The importance of the historical
condition or style of a nation's armed forces is cited by von
Mellenthin and Stolfi when they state:
Armed forces possess historical instincts which can be
considered systematically and used both to obtain a more
accurate measure of the peacetime military balance, and to
forecast the outcome of potential wars. The Soviet emphasis on
large numbers of men and weapons is based on the historical
style and instincts of the Russian armed forces. CRef. 863
A more specific and detailed accounting of the role
of operational and combat style, especially as applied in wartime
"case histories" is found in von Mellenthin and Stolfi CRef, S7J.
For purposes here, in a potential combat situation between NATO
and WTO forces, the Soviet commander will find himself encumbered
by rigid planning, constant requirements to report to superiors,
and a "dual" chain of command with assignment of "political
officers" to his unit. Much talk is made of the drunkenness,
161
lack o-f initiative, etc. o-f the common soldier and other problems
within the Soviet Army, as well as potentially unreliable non-
Soviet WTO allies. However, these assertations should not be
wholly relied upon, for the Soviet combat soldier has shown
himsel-f to be a fierce -Fighter, able to exist on the slimmest of
rations, and exhibit strong patriotism. Additionally, some
writers now stress the growing integration of WTO forces and
their concomitant increasing reliance on the Soviets CRef. 373.
Set against this are the members of NATO whose
combined historical conditioning allows commanders to be more
flexible in the employment of troops (an attribute that would be
enhanced by adopting mission-type orders for commanders and
cutting the growing numbers of career "staffers") and combat
troops faced with the defense of their homeland. Within this
context, combat style, the Western alliance has seen an upturn in
the professionalism and spirit of the personnel in their
respective armed forces.
C. THE BALANCE OF FORCES - SUMMARY
The final assessment of the balance of forces or of power in
Europe tends to be the following. On the part of the West,
exemplified by NATO, and including the forces of France who
Mission—type or oriented orders are brief orders that set
major objectives to be accomplished by the commanders. These
types of orders relied heavily on the judgement and character of
commanders and troops.
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ultimately is enmeshed in the Western historical condition, the
numbers may seem overwhelming and potentially morally
discouraging. However, more detailed analysis points to closer
margins in conventional -Forces than initially suspected. Looking
to potential capabilities the picture grows somewhat brighter
when one considers the enormous potential inherent in Western
productive capabilities for turning out the equipment and even
manpower -For defending itself from aggression. The image that
comes to mind is that of a long distance runner that is taking
easy strides, exerting but a small portion of the stored energy
reserves.
On the other hand there is the situation of the Soviets.
They 3.re faced with a hostile, developing nation with enormous
manpower reserves (China) on one long, contiguous border, and a
cluster of dependent, satellite states on the other who have,
with few exceptions, little reserves or capabilities of their
own, and an economy that by any reasonable measure is a failure.
True, they have managed to build an awesome military machine of
seemingly overwhelming capability, and through extreme sacrifice
have managed to bring numbers and technological capability of
various weapons to if not parity, then superiority compared to
similar ones in the west. Yet the Soviets lack many other
aspects of a true superpower, resembling in many respects one of
the poorer developed nations in the so-called "Third World." The
image here is of a sprinter caught in a long distance race who is
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struggling to remain tied with the lead runner while expending
almost all its reserves.
In consideration then of the scenario above, the guest ion
inexorably arises "why nuclear weapons?" Why nuclear weapons if
the West as such tremendous production capabilities and
conventional potential to deter Soviet aggression with a moderate
expenditure of effort ? Why risk the destructive consequences of
a nuclear war in Europe by relying on tactical nuclear weapons to
stem Soviet aggression if in fact these potentials exist? These
questions have been and continue to be part of the ongoing
nuclear debate which is addressed in the following chapter.
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XIV. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
For now we see through a glass, darkly....
— I Corinthians 13:12
Indeed, since the -false dawn at Alamogordo, New Mexico -Forty
years ago, individuals and governments have sought clearer
definition of the role, if any, nuclear weapons have in national
and alliance strategies. As the previous chapters have shown,
the post war situation in Europe has proven to be very fertile
ground for development of thought and weapons in this regard.
This chapter summarizes the previous discussion and critically
examines the role played by nuclear weapons in Europe. The first
part examines conventional and nuclear doctrines, especially some
of the popular schemes currently being proposed while the second
part looks at the weapons involved. The final chapter follows
with recommendations and conclusions.
A. MATTERS OF DOCTRINE
C'est une drole de guerre.
The doctrine of flexible response has been NATO's declaratory
doctrine since the adoption of MC 14/3 in 1967. In recent years
this policy has been affirmed in a number of multilateral actions
with in the Alliance. This is not to say that there a.r5 no
criticisms of flexible response nor any number of alternatives
that have been put forward to supplement or replace it. These
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may be subsummed as "alternative" nuclear doctrines and those
relying wholly on conventional forces. Straddling the gap
between these two schools of thought is the doctrine put forward
by licGeorge Bundy et al CRef. 883 recommending the adoption of a
"no first use" (NFU) policy by NATO.
1 . Alternative Nuclear Doctrines
The chief alternatives to controlled response, the
nuclear operational doctrine of flexible response, ^re a return
to "massive retaliation" (MC 14/2) or acceptance of a theater
nuclear warfighting doctrine. Neither one is acceptable though
-for reasons which ^re enumerated below.
The policy of massive retaliation is viable only in
the face of both overwhelming nuclear superiority and
invulnerability of the United States to a Soviet second strike-
This holds true for both strategic and theater matters. However,
the development and maintenance of an invulnerable Soviet second
strike capability {viz. highly mobile SS—20 force) coupled with
an immense build up of theater and strategic nuclear forces by
the Soviets has rendered this doctrine obsolete.
The other doctrine, nuclear warfighting, encounters
problems in implementation—both politically and militarily.
Van Cleave and Cohen argue in their work on tactical nuclear
weapons CRef. 893 that it does not necessarily follow that
employment of Soviet and American nuclear warheads will result in
large-scale collateral damage. Indeed, in some respects the
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model in Appendix E bears out some aspects of this argument.
The reality of the situation though is that the area that will be
most a-f-fected is one of the more densely populated regions in the
Northern Hemisphere, Central Europe, whose people and government
do not look kindly upon any mention of nuclear warfighting in
Europe.
Furthermore, in the absence of deployment of the ERW
or intensive development of very low yield or "tailored" yield
weapons, collateral damage and commensurate civilian casualties
would not be held to low levels with initiation of large scale
use of theater nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Alliance would
have to be prepared to "pre-delegate" authority to military
commanders to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, it may be safely
said that this policy is wholly unacceptable to European leaders,
without whose assent any new doctrine would not be workable. The
sensitivity of Europeans to the nuclear warfighting doctrine is
seen in their reaction to some addmitedly mild public discussion
by members of the Reagan Administration about having to fight a
"limited" nuclear war in Europe.
For the foreseeable future then, the alternative
nuclear strategies offered to replace flexible response d.r&
either obsolete themselves or not viable because of
implementation problems. The other side of the coin, so to
See especially Appendix E-7 and E-8.
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speak, concerns conventional strategies offered as substitutes to
nuclear oriented ones.
2. Conventional Strategies
One of the other thorns troubling NATO since its
inception is the role o-f conventional forces and the extent to
which they should be maintained. As seen, the 1952 Lisbon
Conference set a goal of building to 96 divisions as a
conventional force structure deemed necessary to counter Soviet
led forces. Since then though, NATO has fallen well shy of
building to these levels. Still, matching the Soviets one—for—
one in manpower and equipment represents one of the conventional
doctrines that is still held to by some analysts and
commentators. Chapter XI showed that in some areas, NATO was
numerically close to Pact force levels while enjoying superiority
in others. By and large though, NATO forces remain
quantitatively inferior, especially when figuring in Soviet
reserves, an advantage that accrues to the Soviets due to
geographical factors.
The problem then as now remains one of committing
substantial amounts of national and Alliance (European as well as
U.S.) resources to such an end. However, it has only been with a
great degree of pleading, cajoling and threatening that the LJ.S.
has prodded the various European members of NATO to a goal of
increasing defense spending by 3% per year after inflation. As
Table 45 shows, results have been mixed.
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Table 45
NATO Deiense Spending 1 (7.) , 1982-83 •!-< 1983-84.
1982-83 1983-84
Nation Spend. Inf 1 . Diff . Spend. In-f 1 . D iff.
Belgium + 3.6 + 7.7 + 4.1 + 7.8 + 5.3 +
Canada + 5.6 + 3.8 + 1.8 + 14.7 + 3.8 + 10.9
Denmark + 7.8 + 6.9 + 0.9 n. a. + 3.8 n. a
France + 11.5 + 5.9 + 5.6 + 6.5 + 7. 1 - 0.6
Germany + 4.2 + 3.3 + 0.9 + 2.9 + 1.5 + 1.4
Greece + 9.7 +20.5 -10.8 +28.5 + 18.9 + 9.6
Italy + 17. 1 + 14.6 + 2.5 + 18.8 + 9.9 + 8.9
Luxembourg + 11.1 + 8.7 + 2.4 + 9.1 + 3.9 + 5.2
Netherlands + 5.5 + 2.8 + 2.7 + 5.0 + 2.8 +
Norway + 13. 1 + 8.4 + 4.7 + 6.6 + 6.1 + 0.5
Portugal +20.3 - 5.2 +20. 1 +27. 1 - 7.0
Turkey +24 .
3
+28.8 - 4.5 +44.2 +50 . 7 - 6.5
Britain + 15.2 + 4.7 + 10.5 + 9.7 + 4.6 + 5. 1
U.S. + 10.6 + 3.2 + 7.4 + 15. 1 + 4.2 + 10.9
Defense spending -Figures based on NATO figures, using NATO
definitions. Figures vary from those in national defense budgets
because of differences in definition. Comparisons Are based on
local currencies. Inflation figures supplied by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 1983-84 inflation
rate is based on the 12-month period ended September, 1984.
Source: filiation Meek and Space Technology
,
January 21,1985. pg. 109
Even assuming that the various member nations were to
increase their defense spending to levels necessary to purchase a
larger inventory of equipment, demography, particularly German,
presents a problem. John Mearshimer CRef. 903 notes that Germany
will begin experiencing severe manpower shortages as early as
1937 which will increase in severity as the years pass. As such,
with the current system of conscription, the German armed forces
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will drop from their present manning level of 495,000 to 290,000
in the mid-1990' 5 CRef. 91 D .
In the U.S. the all volunteer military and "petering out"
of the post war "baby boom" will likewise have an effect on
manning levels. Even if these were not factors, it is unlikely
that there would be strong domestic support in the U.S. for
increasing troop levels in Europe. This is especially the case
in Congress where there is some latent ant i—European sentiment
and strong pressure for reducing the percentage of the burden
borne by the U.S. as well as competing requirements outside of
NATO (especially in the Middle East and growing commitments in
Central America)
.
Another option requiring increased outlays is that of
investing in highly sophisticated weaponry — the technological
trump card. The advantages and problems of this doctrine were
covered in Chapter XI. It is therefore sufficient to reassert
that as this century closes, the advantages posed by superior
technology on the battle field will eventually be lessened by
high R&D and maintenance costs as well as growing Soviet
abilities to close the so-called "technology gap." However,
efforts in this field still should not be abandoned. Rather,
they should be looked upon as force enhancers instead of force
multipliers or replacements.
One option that is put forward as requiring a minimum of
costs to Alliance members is to seek security in arms control
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measures. The problem with this approach is that the driving
factor here, economics, has also tended to -figure prominently in
the strategic arms control negotiations with subsequent poor
results. In other words, the U.S. looked to arms control
solutions to satis-fy domestic budgetary requirements rather than
addressing genuine security interests. The results of SALT and
their attendant problems have come to be well known and when
teamed with Soviet actions, figured largely in the decline of
public and official support for detente in the U.S. One also
need look no further than the MBFR talks to see the very
difficult problems stemming from attempts at conventional arms
control negotiations. For the near future then, arms control can
not be considered as a viable alternative to flexible response.
The final candidate for consideration is a change in the
operational strategy of NATO's conventional forces to one wherein
conflict escalation may be halted prior to use of nuclear
weapons.
Within the topic of change in operational strategy a.r&
two dominant schools oriented towards offense and defense. The
offensive school generally argues for an immediate NATO counter
attack into WTO territory, well beyond the FEBA. Some members
even call for a preemptive strike against WTO forces should it
appear they are preparing to attack NATO forces. There &re
certain dangers inherent in both arguments, the central one being
the risk of dramatically expanding the scope of conflict and in
fact increasing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.
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particularly by Soviet forces. It should be remembered that
these counter—of fensi ves are more than strikes by aircraft and
conventional long range artillery and rocket forces against the
"second echelon" WTO forces. Rather, it is a full blown counter-
invasion of East Europe (or portions thereof). NATO was
conceived as and is bound by its charter to be a defensive
alliance. Any move to adopt an offensive strategy by NATO would
surely be met by very strong opposition in Europe; particularly
since many vestiges of detente remain in place between East and
West Europe.
Looking to the defensive strategies, two are very much in
evidence, one in favor with the Left in Germany and the other
finding favor with factions within the various military reform
movements in the U.S. and Germany. The first is one of "area"
defense wherein NATO forces would allow WTO forces to penetrate
deep into Germany and then be subject to "guerilla" warfare by
roving bands of missiliers armed with ATM 7 s spread throughout the
countryside. This strategy is aptly known as an "attrition
sponge" strategy. The Left is attracted to this strategy since
such a force structure would be less dependent on a large army
supported by mechanized equipment and artillery, air forces,
etc., as well as reducing requirements for stationing foreign
(e.g., U.S.) troops on German soil. It quickly becomes evident
though that such forces would be extremely vulnerable to infantry
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accompanying a WTO armored assault, not to mention problems in
coordinating efforts among the various "dispersed" units.
A second, defensive strategy relies on maneuver and and
certain non—quantifiable advantages that accrue to the West.
This was discussed in Chapter XIII within the framework of the
strategic geographic equation. Unlike the the vagaries
associated with the "area" defense concept above, the tactical
principles behind maneuver defense have been proved in combat and
merit further consideration. Compared with the present
operational doctrine of forward defense, the adoption of the
principles offered in maneuver defense potentially stand to raise
the nuclear "threshold" as the prospect for thwarting a WTO
offensive brighten.
However, as we have already seen, the fact that something
works (or does not work) in the heady atmosphere of military
theory does not guarantee its acceptance or rejection in the real
world. Such is the case with maneuver defense, for one of the
central tenants of this operational doctrine is that NATO not
fight to keep very square inch of territory. Rather, it requires
that the dug in mentality of forward defense make way for
increased mobility, especially with armor and mechanized infantry
in concert with strongly reinforced "anchor" points co-located
with strategic avenues of advance. The major problem with this
lies in the refusal of successive West German governments to
accept any operational doctrine that requires NATO to surrender,
even temporarily, any German territory and potentially fight
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battles in the heart of West Germany. Granted there is a certain
"head-in—the—sand" approach here that belies the potential -flaw
in -forward strategy — namely that while Allied forces provide a
seemingly "solid" front deployed linearly along the common
border, well placed and directed WTO assaults at critical stress
points will fracture this solid front like a fine crystal goblet.
The resulting downward turn in events for NATO forces then
prompts the start of the nuclear "action chain" and subsequent
vertical escalation of the conflict.
A notion that has gained increasing popularity is that
NATO should commit itself to a declaratory policy of "no first
use" of nuclear weapons. On the surface this has a certain fuzzy
appeal that distorts reality. Most of its proponents argue that
conventional defense measures would obviate the need for nuclear
weapons. Yet as the previous discussion has shown, there is no
consensus on what conventional doctrine/force structure would
meet this stipulation. Furthermore, there must be absolute
certainty that a conventional defense will succeed.
Others have noted that the Soviets have adopted a no
first use policy and on that basis so should NATO. Again, there
is a certain amount of naivete at work here based on wishful
desires of the Soviet Union. First, there is no guarantee that
the Soviets would respect such a pledge given their performance
in holding to other pledges; to wit, the threat or use of force
(Art. 2 U.N. Charter) against other nations, the socialistic
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niceties of "-fraternal assistance" aside. Other problems ^r&
definitional, namely what constitutes -first use. In a crisis
situation one of the first moves by NATO would be to disperse its
nuclear assets. Such a move might well be interpreted by the
Soviets as the prelude to a NATO nuclear strike and prompt them
to launch a strike.
The overall effect of adoption of NFU by NATO then would
be a false appearance of enhanced security for Western Europe. A
final note on no first use is in order. In 1978, the U.S. and
Britain gave assurances that, in keeping with the provisions of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they would not use nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear states that were also parties to the NPT,
The accepted reservation of course was in the event of an armed
attack on themselves by a non-nuclear state in association or
alliance with another nuclear-weapon state.
In summary, the breeding ground for either alternatives
or supplements to the current doctrine of flexible response is
guite fertile. However the political realities ^re such that for
the immediate future the doctrine of flexible response and its
attendant conventional force structure and operative strategies
as well as the nuclear doctrine of controlled response will
remain in its present form for the foreseeable future. What
remains then is to examine certain aspects of the nuclear force
structure in an attempt to see what the future holds in the way
of changes and improvements; stability or instability.
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B. MATTERS GF WEAPONS
To ensure the credibility o-f the NATO nuclear deterrent, as
implemented under -flexible response, there are two primary,
military considerations to consider. The first of these is the
survivability of the theater—strategic -forces. The second is the
flexibility in employment offered by NATO's nuclear forces.
1 . Survi vabi 1 i ty
A deterrent rapidly loses its credibility if the opponent
perceives that he can remove it with little or no risk and at
minimal cost to himself. While simplified in some aspects, the
model in Appendix E shows that the current and future land-based
missile and air breathing legs of the theater-strategic triad of
NATO Are in fact vulnerable and quite possibly could suffer
devastating losses in the face of a "small" preemptive strike.
To an extent, the GLCM's and Pershing 1 1 * s survivability
is enhanced by their ability to redeploy. However, this is
subject to qualification. The first qualification is that this
survival is dependent on covert dispersion during a time of
increasing tensions, precisely such a time when both sides will
be extremely sensitive to movements of just such a nature. A
GLCM caravan or "flight" of 16 missiles (the normal dispersal
mode) consists of two Launch Control Centers (LCC's), four
Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL's) with four missiles per TEL,
16 support vehicles and 69 ground personnel. At some locations
(e.g., RAF Molesworth with 6 flights assigned) this approaches a
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not inconsiderable number o-f vehicles, personnel, etc. and would
hardly be conducive to covert movement. The situation is
exacberated by the restricted area and moderate to high
population density o-f the regions within which these weapons &r&
deployed. Without sounding too paranoid, it is not inconceivable
that Warsaw Pact agents &re in place whose sole mission is to
report such movements, coincident with other intelligence
collection measures. The second qualification, arrival on
target, is addressed below.
Turning to the air—breathing -force, the dispersal matter-
is even more critical. For though a GLCM -flight or Pershing
firing battery may secret themselves in small clearings or the
like, there ^re only so many air-fields that the F-lll's may
operate out o-f, rendering them even more susceptible to first
strikes. As was previously alluded to, these Are subject to many
of the same vulnerability problems faced by the bomber leg of the
U.S. strategic triad.
Yet another aspect of survivability lies in the matter,
not always simple, of ensuring the weapons get on target. Weapon
system reliability aside, this means that they are able to
surmount the formidable defenses that will confront them over WTO
territory. A recent USAF forecast CRef. 923 estimates that
within fifteen years, Warsaw Pact forces will have in place over
5,000 SAM's, 8,000 fighter aircraft and 10,000 radar controlled
anti-aircraft guns with proximity fuzes. Combined with the
technological upgrades of the PVO mentioned earlier, the gauntlet
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the GLCM's, F—Ill's and their successors (if any) would have to
run is staggering. There is some possibility that the Pershing
too may be susceptible to PVO measures.
For the -foreseeable -future then, the only leg of NATO's
theater—strategic triad assured survivability is the sea—based
leg found in the Poseidon and Polaris (later Trident) SLBM's.
The SLCM is not counted here inspite of its capabilities because
of a very real possibility it will be sacrificed on the altar of
arms control or unilaterally cut from U.S. forces by
Congressional action. There are some problems though with the
current sea-based leg. The foremost has already been mentioned,
that is, the effect of strategic arms control, Second, the very
nature of the SLBM is such that their use would most likely come
in the form of a General Release (i.e., the release of all of
SACEUR's nuclear assets in the event of an all out war). Such an
action renders moot consideration of controlled response and
conflict limitation. The capabilities of carrier-based nuclear
attack aircraft should not be overlooked even though they are not
always considered to be theater-strategic systems. Those that
decry the "vulnerability" of the large CV would be surprised at
how well a CVBG can disguise and defend itself in certain
circumstances. However, current capabilities are such that the
aircraft involved, the A-6E and the A-7E, are subject to the same
constraints/conflicting missions as land-based aircraft not
dedicated to the nuclear mission.
178
Finally, one aspect o-f survivability that goes hand in
hand with dispersal is sustainabi 1 i ty of the systems once
dispersed. Consideration here must be given not only to
consumables (human and machine), but also on maintaining rapid,
secure command and control over these units once dispersed.
Compounding the problem is the very real likelihood these systems
will be forced to survive and operate in severe chemical,
biological and/or nuclear environments, all of which serves to
degrade operability and sustainabi 1 i ty.
2. Flexibil itv
The other military consideration is to ensure that NATO's
nuclear forces maintain a degree of "flexibility." In other-
words, maintain an ability to threaten a wide range of targets
and carry out strictly [highly selective and limit collateral
damage. It should be kept in mind that this latter aspect is
sometimes too narrowly defined, being limited to theater-tactical
weapons and their immediate battlefield use. The doctrinal
problems associated with this circumscribed approach have already
been touched upon.
Flexibility here is extended to the full extent of
theater-strategic systems; systems that will be called upon for
attacks ranging from (possibly) the front line to rear echelon
staging areas and perhaps ultimately to military-industrial
targets in the Soviet Union, thereby linking the Soviet homeland
to conflict in Europe. Therefore, the ever popular "show of
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resolution" nuclear strike does not necessarily have to come in
the form of a battlefield nuclear weapon. It may well be a
strike with medium range assets against targets deep in Pact
territory.
The historical record shows that when NATO adopted
flexible response in 1967, the force structure it inherited was
one that had been haphazardly acquired during the era of massive
retaliation and thereby had weapons with large yields and poor
accuracies. Slowly the character of the stockpile has shifted to
weapons of greater AocurAoy and sometimes of lesser yield. This
trend was firmly ensconced with the deployment of GLCM's and
Pershing II's beginning in November 1983. These weapons, to be
sure, add significant flexibility to NATO's arsenal in light of
their phenomenal accuracies. Reinforcing this trend is the
withdrawal of Nike Hercules nuclear SAM's, older nuclear
artillery shells and some ADM's.
C. SUMMARY
The trend towards greater survivability and flexibility in
NATO's nuclear forces pales in comparison when placed beside the
robust growth in size and capabilities of Soviet theater forces.
The SS—20 (aptly named Pioneer by the Soviets) represents the
essence of survivability and flexibility. Survivability in that
the greater portion of its basing lies outside of the range of
all of NATO's land—based systems with the sea—based leg adding
scant increased coverage (Figures 6 and S Are germane). Flexible
1S0
in that it has the proper combination of accuracy and yield to
engage in the very sort of selective, low collateral damage
strikes that NATO holds to under flexible response.
The net effect is to cancel the effectiveness and thereby the
deterrent aspects of some parts of NATO's doctrine. At present,
NATO is thwarted from threatening to use nuclear weapons,
tactical or strategic, to counter a successful WTO conventional
offensive because of the threat in return of Soviet massive
retaliation with their numerically superior theater forces. In
turn, NATO's own theater-strategic forces (with the exception of
the SLBM's) a.rB faced with extinction through a preemptive
strike, or barring that, ^r& confronted with a "target rich"
(more targets than existing systems can reach, much less strike)
environment. In the highly unlikely event that a genuine arms
control agreement will be reached in the near future and given
the present plans for deployment, this disparity will continue
well into the next decade.
1S1
XV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
i . Conventional Doctrine
Recommendation: NATO should adopt a doctrine o-f mobile
defense emphasizing mechanized -forces (both armor and infantry)
combined with immediate strikes by conventionally armed aircraft
and missiles against the strategic rear or "staging areas" of WTO
forces. For maximum effectiveness the aircraft and missiles
should be armed with a variety of "smart" PGM's and mass-
destruction conventional weapons (e.g., fuel—air explosives,
fragmentation optimized submuni tions, etc.).
Benefits: Mobile defense gives NATO a better opportunity
to regain the initiative and as a result, to cope with a wider-
variety of Pact offensives. Upon regaining the initiative, NATO
has the opportunity to use it to stop conflict at the level of
its own choice, thereby preventing an escalation to the
employment of nuclear weapons.
2. Nuclear Weapons and Doctrine
Recommendation: NATO should reject a policy based on "'no
first use" of nuclear weapons for reasons previously mentioned
(e.g., operational differences between what NATO and WTO
commanders see as defining first use of nuclear weapons).
is:
Benefit: If NATO were to adopt a no -first use policy,
WTO commanders would be faced with increased certainty with
regards to projected NATO actions. In turn, WTO risks would be
diminished thereby increasing the possibility of conflict.
Recommendation: The process started by the Montebello '
Decision (i.e., the withdrawal of obsolete tactical nuclear
warheads) should be extended to all tactical nuclear weapons. In
particular, nuclear artillery shells, nuclear warheads for short
range missiles (e.g.. Honest John and Lance) and ADM/SADM"
s
should be removed from Europe and destroyed. Medium range
systems (including tactical aircraft) should be converted to
conventional capability either by upgrade or replacement. This
conversion should take place as part of an arms control agreement
covering such systems.
Benefits: The credibility of any armed forces
(especially NATO) employing battlefield nuclear weapons is
suspect today. The presence of such weapons, either stockpiled
in a few, centralized locations or deployed close to potential
battlefields, is highly destabilizing and unnecessary given the
potential strengths of a mobile, conventional defense. By
significantly reducing the nuclear stockpile in Europe, which is
largely made up of tactical nuclear weapons. West European
governments may accordingly experience a reduction in domestic
pressure, for example, as represented by the Leftist dominated
ant i -nuclear movement.
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Recommendation: In the absence o-f an arms control
agreement on theater—strategi c systems, the current deployment of
the Pershing II and GLCIi must continue. NATO planners must
ensure the survivability and sustai nabi 1 i ty of the land based
legs of the theater—strategic deterrent as well as their command
and control links through both active (defense) and passive
(dispersal) measures. The strategic defense initiative (SDI)
holds great promise for defense against IRBM's and must be
extended to protect Europe against the SS-20 and other MR/IRBM's.
European members of NATO should be strongly encouraged to
participate in the research and development of such a program
with promises of technology exchange. Wider dispersal,
especially of aircraft, is also recommended. Additional thought
should be given to basing at sea, i.e., using converted Poseidon
SSEN's (removed from this duty under SALT) deployed with SLCM's,
In addition to guaranteeing the survivability of theater-
strategic forces, NATO force planners should also direct efforts
towards ensuring the ability of these systems to reach their
targets. These efforts would entail improvements both in range
(and thereby coverage) and penetration (e.g., on board jammers,
reduced observability, terminal maneuvers, etc.).
Benefits: The continued growth of Soviet theater-
strategic forces cannot be allowed to go unanswered. This growth
was the stimulus for the 1979 decision for the U.S. to deploy the
new intermediate range weapons—the GLCM and Pershing II.
The credibility of theater-strategic forces is enhanced because
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they decrease certainty in the minds o-f Soviet commanders about
the Soviet capability to eliminate substantial portions of NATO's
theater-strategic -force with a small fraction of their own
conventional or nuclear forces. It must be emphasized again that
this enhancement of survivability i s an interim measure and that
efforts should be directed towards elimination of this species of
weapon on both sides.
Recommendation: Arms control negotiations are imperative
in both a military and political sense. The U.S. must continue
efforts in good faith to this end. The INF negotiations should
be changed from a bilateral forum to a multilateral one—incorporating
the forces of France, Britain and China. Barring multilateral
negotiations, U.S. negotiators should seek to minimize the impact
of those forces on any agreement.
Benefits: While prospects for a workable agreement are
distant, engaging in negotiations again eases domestic pressure
in both the U.S. and West Europe. When approached in the proper
manner (i.e., with patience), arms control agreements in this
area could yield notable increases in security.
B. CONCLUSION
Forty years ago. American planners were striving to define
what role, if any, nuclear weapons would have in the defense of
Europe. Nuclear weapons, and the deterrent provided by their
awesome destructive power, were the very bedrock on which NATO
was founded in 1949. Yet down through the years, nuclear
doctrine has swung between the two poles of strict restraint and
-free use, with seeming little regard -for conseguences to the
people of Europe. To complicate matters, technology has often
apparently determined doctrine, many times with un-forseen
conseguences. For its part, the Soviet Union, driven both by
internal dynamics and external stimuli, has correspondingly
compounded difficulties. NATO (and especially the U.S.) has
become a modern day Prometheus; inexorably bound to the rock of
nuclear weapons and seemingly doomed to eternally suffer the
eagle of ambiguous doctrine plucking at the vitals of the
Alii ance.
Nevertheless, there is cause for justifiable optimism that
the present situation may be ameliorated. To do so requires that
NATO recognize its inherent superiorities that Are both directly
and indirectly related to the military balance—what some call
the "correlation of forces." In part, by adopting the
recommendations listed above, NATO can be assured of regaining
the initiative to prevent conflict or terminate conflict at a
level of its own choosing without wholesale dependence on nuclear
weapons.
We have the means at our disposal to embark on such a course.
To do so requires that the Alliance close ranks and step-forward
in a decisive, forthright manner.
The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that-




1. Freedman, L, , The tvol ution of Nuclear Strategy,
p. 23. St. Martin's Press.
2. Cochran. T. ; Arkin, W. ; and Hoenig, M. , Nuclear
Weapons Data Book. Vol 1- U.S. Nuclear Forces and
Capabilities, p. 15, Bal linger, 1984.
3. Rosenberg, D. , "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear
Weapons and American Strategy, 1945—60,"
International Security, p. 14, Spring 19S3.
4. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, pp. 6-18.




ed.. Military Policy and National
Security, pp. 225-6, Princeton University, 1956.
3. McNamara, R. , "The Military Role of Nuclear




p. 263, November /December 1983.
9. Osgood, R. , NfiTQ.. The Entangling Pil 1 iance,
pp. 125—6, University of Chicago, 1962.
10. Ibid.
11. Boutwell, J., "Politics and the Peace Movement in
West Germany," International Security
, p. 74, Spring 198;
12. Ibid., 75.
13. von Mellenthin, Maj. Gen. F.W., Panzer Battles,
p. 299, Translated by H. Betzler and Edited by
L.C.F. Turner, University of Oklahoma, 1956.
14. Balck, General Herman, Taped interview, 13 April
1979, p. 15, Translated by Battel le Columbus Laboratories
Tactical Technology Center, Columbus, Ohio, July 1979.
15. Jacobsen, C. , Soviet Strategy--Soviet Foreign
Policy, p. 27, University Press, 1972.
187
16. Werth, A., Russia at Mar, p. 1037, von Books, 196o.
17. Fast, H. and W.F., The firmed Forces of the USSR,
Second edition, p. 38, Westview, 19S1.
IS. Dinerstein, H. , Mar end the Soviet Union, pp. 32-36,
Praeger, 1959.
19. Aspaturian, V., "The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet
National Security Decision Making," p. 57, in
Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, ed.
Jiri Valenta and William Potter, George Allen S<
Unwin, 1984.
20. "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security
Council," Naval Nar College Review, V. 27, pp. 51-108,
May—June 1975.
21. Ibid.., p. 66.
22. Meyer, S. , Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part 11'.
Capabil ities and Implications, Adelphi Papers No.
188, p. 4, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Winter 1933/84.
23. Garthoff, R. , Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear fige,
p. 173, Praeger, 1958.
24. Meyer, S. , Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part Is
Bevel opment of Doctrine and Objectives, Adelphi
Papers No. 187, p. 12, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/84.
25. Scott and Scott, firmed Forces of the USSR, p. 40.
26. h'olloway, D. , "Research Note: Soviet Thermonuclear
Development," International Security, Vol. 4, No.
3, p. 196, Winter 1979/80.
27. Miller, M. , Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine,
p. 12, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982.
28. Ibid.
29. Holloway, p. 196.
30. Scott and Scott, p. 41.
188
31. Penkovskiy, 0. , The Penkovskiy Papers, With an
Introduction and Commentary by Frank Gibney and a
Foreward by Edward Crankshaw. Translated by Peter
Deriabin, p. 258, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965.
32. Sarthof-f, R. , "The SS-20 Decision," Survival,
p. 110, May /June 1983.
33. Van Cleave, W. and Cohen, S.T., Tactical Naclear
Weapons? An Examination of the Issues, pp. 6—7,
Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 197S.
34. Ground Zero, Nucl ear War- What's In It For You.?,
p. 267, Table C.l, Pocket Books, 1982.
35. DePorte, A.W., Europe Between the Superpowers* p.
Yale University, 1979.
36. Yost, D.S., "SALT and European Security," in David
S. Yost, ed. , NATO's Strategic Options, p. 114,
Pergammon , 1981
.
37. Sbitov, N.A., General Lieutenant of Aviation, "The
Revolution in Military Affairs and its Results,"
Red Star, 15 February 1963, in William R. Kintner
and Harriet Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revo 1 ut ion in
Soviet Mil itary Affairs, p. 27.
38. York, H. , The Advisors, p. 93, W.H. Freeman, 1976.
39. Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment, p. 293,
Oxford University, 1982.
40. Yost, D.S., "SALT and European Security," p. 110.
41. Ibid., p. Ill-
42. Garthoff, R. , "The SS-20 Decision," Survival,
pp. 110-11, May/June 1983.
43. Jane's Weapons Systems 19S3-S4, with a Foreward by
R.T. Terry, p. 312, Jane's, 1984.
44. Pol mar , N. , Guide to the Soviet Navy, Third
Edition, pp. 363-4, Naval Institute, 1983.
45. Ibid., p. 362.
46. Labrie, R.P., ed
.
, SALT Handbook- Key Documents
and Issues ( 2972-79) , p. 279, American Enterprise
Institute, 19S0.
189
47. Ward, R. , Soviet Mil itary Qircraft Design and
Procurement-- A Historical Perspective, pp. 11-12,
General Dynamics Corp., 1983.
48. Gunston, B. , consul, ed. , The Encyclopedia of
NorId Gir Pouter, p. 341, Crescent Books, 1980.
49. Meyer, Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces.. Part 77,
p . £./ m
50. Ibid. , p. 28.
51. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Nil itary Power
19'34
, pp. 30-31, USGPO, April 1984.
52. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the firmed
Services r Hearings on the Nil itary Posture and
H.R. ,1872 CH.R. 4040 J and H.R. 2575 CS, 429 J.
Part 2. 96th Cong., 1979, pp. 147-150, and
Statement of General Alexander Haig, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, beginning p
1371.
53. Brzezinski, Z., Power and Princi pie
,
p. 302,




55. Kvitsinsky, Y. , "Soviet View of Geneva," New York
Times, January 12, 1984.
56. Gwertzman, B. , "U.S. Says Moscow Offers to Reduce
Missiles by Half," New York Times, November 19, 1983.
57. Nitze, P.H., "The U.S. Negotiator's View of Geneva
Talks," New York Times, January 17, 1984.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Hedlin, M. , "Moscow's Line on Arms Control,"
Probl ems of Communism, p. 21, May/June 1984.
61. Ibid.
62. Jacobsen, C.G., Soviet Strategy--Soviet Foreign
Policy, p. 27.




66. Thomson, J. A., "Nuclear Weapons in Europe,"
Survival, p. 98, May/June 1983.
67. Mersky, P.B., and Polmar, N. . 77>e Naval ftir Mar in
Vietnam, p. 106, Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 198:
63. Ibid.
69. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 180.
70. Ibid.
71. Yost, D.S. France's Deterrent Posture and Security
in Europe, unpublished manuscript. Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey. Cali-fornia, 1983,
p. 40.
72. Ibid.
73. Cochran, p. 134.
74. Couhat, -J.L., Combat Fleets of the tforld 2982/33,
p. 220, Naval Institute Press, 1982.
75. Ibid., p. 131.
76. Yost, p. 39.
77. Cochran, p. 300.
78. Ibid., pp, 72-78.
79. Gelb, L.H., "Soviet Said to Expand Edge in Medium-
Range Missiles," New York Times, p. 6, August 8, 1984.
80. Ibid.
81. Soviet Military Power 29S4, pp. 30-31.
82. Middlston, D. , "Soviet Said to Deploy New
Missile," Wew York Times, p. 5, October 22, 1984.
S3. Gelb, p. 6.
191
84. Stol-fi, R.H.S., "The Strategic Geographic Equation,"
presented as part o-f NS 3710, Probl ems of
Government and Security in Contemporary Western
Europe, National Security Af -fairs Department,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
9-20 July 1934.
S5. von Mel lenthin, F.W., and Stol-fi, R.H.S., with





87. Jones, C. D. , Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe,
pp. 106-131, Praeger, 1981.
88. Bundy, M. ; Kennan, 6. F. ; McNamara, R.S.; and
Smith, G. , "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance," Foreign Affairs, pp. 753-768, Spring 1982.
89. Van Cleave, W. and Cohen, S.T., Tactical Nuclear Weapons, p
103.
90. Mearsheimer, J., "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence
in Europe," International Security, p. 34, Winter 1984-85.
91. Ibid.
92. "USAF Forecasts Growing Soviet Arms Threat,"





ABM Anti -Ballistic Missile
ADM Atomic Demolition Munition
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AEW?<C Airborne Early Warning and Control
ALBM Air-Launched Ballistic Missile
ALCM Air—Launched Cruise Missile
ASM Air-to—Sur-f ace Missile; Anti -Ship Missile
CBN Chemical, Biological, Nuclear War -fare
CDU Christian Democratic Union (West Germany)
CEP Circular Error Probable
CG Guided Missile Cruiser
CGN Guided Missile Cruiser, Nuclear Powered
CMP Counter Military Potential
CTOL Conventional Takeoff and Landing
DCA Dual Capable Aircra-ft
DD Destroyer





ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon
FBS Forward Based System (s)
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FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile
HICBM Heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF Intermediate range Nuclear Forces
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
KT Kiloton
LNO Li mi ted Nuc
1
e^r Opt i on
LRTNF Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MaRV Maneuver abl e Reentry Vehicle
MIRV Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle
MLF Multi -Lateral Force
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MRV Multiple Reentry Vehicle
MT Megaton
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA National Command Authority
NM Nautical Mile
PVO Protivovozdashnaya Oborona <Air Defense)
QRA Quick Reaction Alert; Quick Reaction Aircraft
RV Reentry Vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command (USAF)
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SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM Surf ace-to-Air Missile
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SDV Strategic Delivery Vehicle
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
SPD Socialist Democratic Party (West Germany)
SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile
SSBN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSGN Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Submarine
SSM Surf ace-to-Surface Missile
SSN Attack Submarine, Nuclear Powered
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNP Theater Nuclear Force
TVD Teatr Voyennykh Deystviy — Theater of Operations
VRBM variable Range Ballistic Missile
VSTOL Vertical /Short Takeoff and Landing
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization ( also Warsaw Pact)
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Figure 1. SS-4/SS-5 Coverage.
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Figure 2. Jupiter/Thar Coverage (as o-f 1962)
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Figure 5. SS-22 Coverage -from Central GDR Launch Site.
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Figure 7. SS-20 Deployment History
Figure 7. SS-20 Deployment History,
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Figure 8. French Land Based Systems.
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Photo 1. "Fat Man" Atomic Bomb
(Photo courtesy o-f National Atomic Museum, Albuquerque, N.M.)
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Photo 2. Mk. 6 Atomic Bomb.
(Photo courtesy o-f National Atomic Museum, Albuquerque, N.tf.)
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Photo 3. Mk 7 Tactical Atomic Bomb.
(Photo courtesy of National Atomic Museum, Albuquerque, N.M.)
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Photo 4. MGM-13 Mace Ground Launched Cruise Missile.




Photo 5. W54—2 Davy Crockett Tactical Nuclear Weapon.
(Photo courtesy o-f National Atomic Museum, Albuquerque, N.M.)
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Photo 6. B-43 High Yield (1 MT) Nuclear Bomb.







Photo 7. B-61 Tactical Nuclear Bomb.




During the period surveyed (1977-79) several questions relevant
to public perceptions of the relative strengths of the two
superpowers were asked o-F the populaces o-f the U.S. and West Europe.
Presented in this appendix are some of the more topical ones that
set the public mood providing the background to the 1979 "Two-Track"
decision.
I . Superpower Power/ Inf luence
Which of these do you think is likely to be true of
i977<78/79): A year when America [Russia] will increase her
power in the world or a year when power will decline ?
1*777




537. [637.3 247. [16% 3 187. [217
Sex
:
a. Male 60 [663 [163 15 [183
b. Female 56 [613 24 [153 20 [243
Political Affiliat ion:
a. Republican 57 [713 28 [143 15 [153
b. Democrat 65 E61 J 17 [173 IS [223
c. South. Dem. 66 [543 14 [173 20 [293
d. Independent 49 [63 3 34 [163 17 [213
Trend:
1977 58 [633 24 [163 IS [213
1976 42 [633 44 [183 14 [193
1974 29 [553 50 [143 21 [313
1969 62 [583 21 [193 17 [233
1968 63 [563 [223 15 [223
1967 66 C49D 20 L263 14 [253
1966 74 14 S-jL
1 70J 64 [383 19 [333 17 [293
1960 72 [533 10 [233 18 [243
:i4
International :
West Germany 44 [49 3 20 [143 36 [373
Britain 40 [443 17 [103 43 [463
France 28 [293 21 [173 51 [543
Italy 25 C2S3 19 [143 56 [583























South. Dem. 52 [57 3






















42 [533 26 [163 [313
58 [633 24 [163 IS [213
42 [633 44 [183 i4 [193
29 L 553 50 [143 21 [313
62 [583 [193 17 [233
63 C563 j—, *-\ [223 15 [223
66 C49 3 20 [26 3 14 [25 3
74 14 12
64 [383 19 [333 17 [293






















Balance o-f this category (~557.) = "remain the same.
Increase Decline Remain same/don't know
United States:
National: 53'/l [617.3 32% L 197.1 157. [20% 3
Sex:
a. Male 55 [633 79 [193 13 [183
b. Female 51 [593 ^o- [193 16 [223
Political A-f-f i 1 iation:
a. Repub 1 i can 50 [723




d. Independent 46 [583
38 [123 12 [163
25 [213 14 [193















61 [533 19 [323 15 [20 3
42 [533 26 [163 [313
58 C63 3 24 [163 18 [213
42 [633 44 [183 14 [193
29 [553 50 [143 21 [313
62 [583 21 [193 17 [233
63 [563 [223 15 [223
66 [49 3 20 [263 14 [253
74 14 12
64 [383 19 [333 17 [293
72 [533 10 [233 IS [24 3
West Germany 20 [273 16 [083 64 [65 3
Bri tai n 31 [483 T3* [083 46 [443
France 30 [ 34 3 [203 47 [463
Italy
Balance of this category (^557.) = "remain the same."
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Analysis: By the above, the U.S. public generally felt that
expectations for the expansion of U.S. power (or influence—not
necessarily military alone) would either progress or remain the same
through this period while the Soviets stood a 5-107. greater
likelihood of increasing their power/influence. Contrasting this
were the perceptions in Western Europe wherein the populace
generally saw den ten te enduring as evidenced by the large numbers
believing the two superpowers would remain equal.
1 1 * European Surveys
A. West Germany
"Which side is strongest at the moment <1979), America and
the West or Russia and the East ?"
America and the West 46%
Russia and the East 49
No response 06
"Which side will be strongest in 5 years ? In 10 years 7
5 years 10 years
America and the West 427. 33"/.
Russia and the East 52 56
No response 07 10
Includes PRC, East Europe, and rest of Communist Bloc
B. Britain
"Which side—NATO or Warsaw Pact—has the strongest <1)












"What do you think is best for Britain's security—that we





"Do you believe there will be another world war within 10
1939 response 1979 response
Yes 457. 1 77.
No 27 53
Don't Know 23 25




Don't Know 26 22
"Do you feel NATO made a right /wrong decision to exchange
old/obsolete equipment for new missiles to counter the SS—20 ?'
Right 317.
Wrong 43
Don ' t Know 26
(of those answering right/wrong, 82/C had heard or read about
the NATO NPG decision)
"With new missiles, are the Soviets/Warsaw Pact better
equipped than NATO countries ?"
Are better equipped 437.
Are not better equipped i3
Don't know 34
"Would you vote yes or no on NATO deployment of nuclear
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3. Nuclear systems (listings)
a. NATO (land-, sea-based)
b. WTO (land—, sea—based)
c. NATO and WTO nuclear capable aircra-ft
4. NATO nuclear system BSKP/TKP's
5. WTO nuclear system SSKP/TKP's
6. Force structure disposition
a. Levels as o-f 31 December 1984
b. Projected levels to December 1987
7. Exchange and post—strike analyses
a. NATO seen. "A" (Dec 34)
b. NATO seen. "B" (Dec 84)
c. NATO seen. "A" (Dec 87)
d. NATO seen. "B" (Dec 87)




1- Counter Military Potential:
w
(2/3)
CMP = Where: W = Warhead Yield (MT)
<CEP)^ CEP = Circular Error Probable
(nm)
2. Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP)
:
r,™ , C-(5.83/H° ' 7 )*<cmp) 3ooKr — 1—exp
3. Overall System Reliability <OAR)
:
OAR = (P *P,)# (P *P *P ) * < 1-P ) * ( 1-P ) *P
c 1 f a w a e mirvWhere:
P = Countdown Reliability
c
P = Launch Reliability
P, = Fliaht and Reentry Reliability
T
P = Guidance Reliability
g
P = Warhead Reliability (e.g., -fuzing, etc.)
w
P = Probability of ABM Intercept and Kill on
Incoming Rv"
P = Probability of Target Escaping by Launch Prior
e to Strike by RV
P . = Reliability of MIRV Deployment
mirv
4. Terminal Kill Probability (TKP)
:
TKP = SSKP * OAR
5. Cross Targeting on N Seperate Missiles; Probability of
Kill of Target by One of N Missiles (PK ):
n
PK = 1-P = 1 - ( 1 -TKP ,)*...*< 1 -TKP )
n surv,n i n
6. Equivalent Megatonnage (EMT)
:
EMT = (N Warheads)*(Indiv. Warhead Yield)"'""
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SECTION SZ
FIRST STRIKE MODEL ASSUMPTIONS (NATO/SOVIET) *
Assumptions — NATO :
A. No Alert
1. IRBM's: not dispersed
a. GLCM:
1) UK: one location; i -flight (16 missiles) in
hardened shelter <H= 50 psi ) , one
flight not on alert <H= 10 psi ) ; total
o-f 2 flights (32 missiles)
2) Italy (Sicily): same as for UK
b. Pershing II: 1 location, 1 battalion of 36
missiles -C4 firing batteries}, H= 10 psi
(incl. QRA missiles)
c, SSBS S-3 (France): 18 silos, IS missiles,
H= 200 psi
SLBM's:
a. Poseidon; 1 x 16 missiles, deployed,
invul nerable
b. Polaris A—3: 2 x 16 missiles, deployed,
invulnerable; remaining (in port) ac&
vulnerable (2 x 16 missiles), H= 30 psi
c. MSBS M-20 (France): 2 x 16 missiles, deployed,
invulnerable; remaining (in port) a.r^
vulnerable (3 x 16 missiles), H= 30 psi
This model was derived from a series of lectures by Dr.
Karheinz Woehler and Mr. Kerry Kartchner April 13-20, 1984 at the
Naval Postgraduate School as part of the course "Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy" (NS 3280).
3. Aircraft:
a. F-lll E/F QRA: 2 locations with 60 a/g ea.
1) 207. on immediate alert (12 a/c), H= 50 psi
2) 807. on standby alert (48) , H= 10 psi
b. Mirage IVA: 2 locations with 17 a/c ea.
1) 207 on immediate alert (3 a/c). H= 50 psi
2) 807. on standby alert (14 a/c), H= 10 psi
B. Forces Alerted
1. IRBM — Dispersed:
a. GLCM:
1) UK: 2 locations, one flight at each
location (16 missiles), H= 10 psi
2) Italy (Sicily): same as for UK
b. Pershing II: 2 locations, 18 missiles at each
location (2 firing batteries of 9 missiles
each)
c. SSBS S-3: no change
2. SLBM:
a. Poseidon: no change
b. Polaris A—3: 3k 16 invulnerable, 1 x 16
remaining vulnerable
c. MSBS M-20: 4 >; 16 invulnerable, 1 x 16
vulnerable
3. Aircraft:
a. F-lll: dispersed — 10 airfields total; 12 a/c
H= 50 psi, 48 sl/c H= 10 psi
b. Mirage IVA: dispersed — 6 airfields total;
10 a/c H= 50 psi, 24 a/c H= 10 psi
I I . Assumptions — Soviet :
A. SS-20 -force used exclusively (all ar<a 3 MIRV vers.)
1. Number available:
a. NATO scenario "A" (no alert): 2/3 of total
SS—20 -force deployed available (those
immediately within range of W. Europe) — 267
b. NATO scenario "B" (alerted): full force
available — 400
B. SS-4/-5, SLBM and air breathing forces reserved for
followup strikes if necessary
C. TARGETING :
1. See schematic for targeting on individual systems
2. Goals: (1) destruction of 60-707. of NATO's theater-
strategic force C variation incl. France 3, <2) low
collateral damage
D. Full system availability, launch from pre—surveyed sites
E. NATO C not targeted unless co-located with TNF sites
(e.q. , GLCM LCCTs)
Mindful of the simplified nature of this model, there were
certain other variables present with nuclear exchanges that were
not included here. That does not mean they ars to be wholly
discounted though. Among these is the effectiveness of NATO and
French systems against the improving ABM system in the Central
Strategic Region and centered on Moscow. As this svstem receive-;
continued upgrades in the form of new battle management radars,
interceptor missiles, etc. the ability of such systems as the
Pershing II, MSBS M-20, and Polaris to penetrate this defensive
ring (even with penetration aids in the case of the latter two)
becomes more suspect. Additionally, the fielding of the highly
capable SA-10 SAM and deployment of the MiG—31 Foxhound will
lower the probability o-f cruise missiles' ability to penetrate
Soviet airspace to strike targets in the Soviet Union.
As for aircraft (e.g., F—Ill's), while the model shows a
certain number surviving the first strike, it does not take into
consideration the possibility of runway destruction and nuclear
effects on aircrew and ground personel or equipment degradation.
The same might be said for in port SSBN's as well.
Finally, the Soviets would not restrict themselves solely to
use of SS—20' s. More likely a wide range of attempts ranging
from Spetznaz to conventional and nuclear weapons would be used.
The primary reason for the approach taken is to illustrate
certain points made within the main body of the thesis with






NATO <H = 10 psi ) : Q
NATO (H = 50 psi): n
French (H = 10 psi): ]]
French (H = 50 psi/200 psi CSSBS S-3 only 3)
: j]
SS-20 (1 missile/3 MIRV warhead)
:
A









SSBS S-3 (#*s = #*s of missiles)
[ x 18][M ]
In Port SSEN's (#' s = #"s of SSBN's; missiles = #









F. Mirage IVA (#'s = #'s of aircraft)
France (two locations)
[ (T) @ ] x 2
A x 2
G- Total number o-f SS-20 :'s required:
1. Without French -forces: 7
2. With French -forces: 22
III. NATO SCENARIO "B"
A. GLCM (#""5 = #'s of missiles)
UK Italy
(16) (T& fl6)
A A A A




C. SSB5 S-3 (tf's = #="5 of missiles)
£) dl ^ (2) (t d
[ A x 12 J
D. In Port SSBN's (S's = #'s of SSBN's; missiles = # k i<
© a
A A
E. F-lll (4TS = # of aircraft)
UK
x 2 (T& x 6
A x2 A x 6
F. Mirage IVA (#*s = #'s of aircraft)
France
[ [I] <Z) *® ] x 2
[A A A ] x 2
G. Total number of SS-20's required:
1. Without French forces: 14
2. With French forces.: 33
IV. NATO SCENARIO "A" (December 1987 Force Levels)
A. GLCM <#'s rep. "flights"; 1 flight = 16 missiles)
UK (2) Italy (1) FRG Neth. Belg.
0© 0© ©0 ©0 ©0©
Ax 2 Ax 2 Ax 2 Ax 2 A A
B. Pershing II (#'s = #*s of missiles)
FRG (three locations)ABC
(36) (3& (3^
[ A x 6]
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C. SSBS S-3 (#'5 = #'s of missiles)
Same as previous examples
D. In Port SSBN's <#'s = #'s o-f SSBN's; missiles = # >; 16)
© a
A A
E. F-lll (#'s = # of aircraft)
UK
Same as previous examples
F. Mirage IVA (#'s = #"s of aircraft)
France
Same as previous examples
G. Total number of SS—20* s required:
1. Without French forces: 19
2. With French forces: 34
>34
V. NATO SCENARIO "B" (December 1937 Force Levels)
A. GLCM (tf's rep. "flights"; 1 flight = 16 missiles)
UK (2) Italy (1) FRG Neth. Belg.
a s
©0 ©© © © ©
[Ax 3 + A x 2] x 2 A x 3 Ax 2 A A
B. Pershing II (#'s = # 7 s of missiles)
FRG (three locations)ABC
(36)
[ A x 6 ]
C. SSBS S-3 (#*s = #'s of missiles)
Same as previous examples
D. In Port SSBN's (tt's = #*s of SSBN's; missiles = # x 16;
Same as previous examples
E. F-111 <#'s = # of aircraft)
UK
Same as previous examples
F. tii rage IVA <#'s = #'s of aircraft)
France
Same as previous examples
S, Total number of SS-20"s required:
1. Without French forces: 27





GtNUCLEAR SYSTEMS Systea Deployed
(Europe) Nar.e (12/83; li
NATO:
a. US
i. SLBM's Poseidon C-3 16
2. Interaediate



















LUUfl v.t> 111 lull ?
Potential














a) Britain Polaris A-3 64




a) France bbfb b"j 13





Vlii. 18 n .a.




















d) Belgium, FRS, Britain, Italy,
Netherlands Lance
a) Multiple non- rl-1 10 203aa*
U.S. NATO inbrs. (two vers.)
a; Multiple non- H-109 155aa*
U.S. NATO sbrs. (two vers.)
54 1 .02 40 \ ar>i Pi
/ L 1 .4 720 99. 4.4.
1 .025 120 .16
56 1 .05 110 91. 4.1
200 1 .002 21 .09
200 1 .0005 21 .09
252 1 .002 18 n.a.
•Ten























Yield Range CEP Hegatormage
(MT) iki) <na) EMT = nyA.666
Counter Military
Potential
CHP = ERT/CEP -2
1. SLBM' Poseidon C-3 16 .il 4600 .25 1.36 01 Al,41
L Intsrsediate
(HR/IRBH's) Pershing 11 108 ti .05 1800 .02
pi rw 464 1 fit 2500 .02
T
Tactical
(SRBM's, etc.) Pershing 1A 11 720 .22
Lance 36 .05 125 .21
SLCfl 44 .25 24«0 .02
H-111 203m* 200 .002 21 .09
(two vers.) 200 .0005 1i .09
H-1W 155m* i.ji .002 13 n.a.












) PI SM»1 . w'Llmi
a) Britain Polaris A - 3 64 6


















a) Greece, Turkey Honest John
b) West Seraany Pershing 1A
c) France Piuton
d) BelQius, FRG, Britain. Italy,
Nether 1 anas Lance
a) Multiple non- R-110 203m*
U.S. NATO sbrs. (two vers.)
a) Multiple non- B-109 155ns*





i Vi. 40 1 illi i vL

















* : +5,000 nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe
(Incl. France)
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Nuffiber Nuaber Equivalent Counter Military
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS Systea Deployed of Yield Range CEP Negatonnage Potential
(Europe) Naie (12/83) Warheads !HT) (ks) (na) EHT = ny\666 CMP = EMT/CEPA2
Warsaw Pact
a. Soviet Union








1 L t ' J
n T .4 7
i 7 ~?i
5 00 11 _'
SS-N-6 Mod 1 334
5S-N-17 12
Intermediate












rCj pmiULLIII CC_M_IO 30
SS-NX-21 devl
.
(HLCM) AS --3 Kangaroo 70
AS-X-15 devi.
































FR0G-3/-5/-7 198 1 .2 60
aiG Nuclear Systess (DEC 84)
1.00
1 .2 .34 213.93
1 .002 30 .10 .02 ' 1.59
[SRBH) SS-1 Scud B/C 137 1 .2 450 1.50 .34





I C| C|M »
=
































C-T7 <Ol3aB3 io iLL'mai ! £.0i •-"-'







(na) EMI = ny
A
.&66 fMp - CMT/rCD'«1
1400 1 =171 i J c 1.00
2400 .49 1.00




.2 900 .49 .34
.2 120 .16 .34
c
.J 900 .16 a U-J
• L 500 .16 .34
35 450 .40 .50
? 3000 .04 .34
35 1000 .40 .50
• i. 3000 .04 .34
1 650 1.00 1.00
L 3000 .04 .34
02 30 .10 .02


























BTQ Nuclear Systeis (DEC 86)
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Nuaber Number Equivalent
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS System Deployed of Yield Range CEP Kegatonnage
(Aircraft-Europe) Name (12/83) Warheads (NT) (ki) \ n uw EflT = ny A .666
NATO:
A. USA









100 ii tl 12800 1.00 1 . 00
210 L 1 8000 .05 2.00
165 i 1 4000 .10 2.00
40 1
i
i 4800 .10 2.00
800 i 4000 L'J L . v v
650 1 l 1400 .10 1 ,MiItVV






f+ CV based A/C) F-4E Phantoi 96 2 1 2200 .11 2.00 200.00
F-16 Falcon 144 1 1 3800 .05 1.00 400.00
A-6E Intruder 30 2 1 1810 .10 2.00 200.00
A-7E Corsair II 72 2 1 1000 .10 2.00 200.00
F/A-18 Hornet 24 2 1 645 .05 2.00 800.00
NON-US
MEDIUM RANGE
Britain Tornado 30 2 1 2800
Bslg/Neth. F-16 Falcon 90 1 1 3800
FRG. Greece F-4E Phantoi 142 2 1 2200
France Mirage IVA 34 1 .06 3200
Mirage HIE 30 2 .015 2430










Tu-22 Blinder 2 200,0^
Tu-16 Badger 2 1 3 200.^0
Su-24 Fencer 9 2 1 .05 2 00 300,00
MiS-27 Fioqger D 1 1.00 100.00
Su-17 Fitter D/H 100.00
(Note: CEF""s estimated except for Bear B/C IAS-3 CEF'3)
NATO/WTO Nuclear Caoaole Aircraft
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NATO NUCLEAR SYSTEM TKF'
Assumpti ons :
A. Hardness :
H = 5 psi Ha= ^^® P5 ^
H = 10 psi Hcr= 200 psi
H^= 50 psi H,= 300 psi


















same as above except that P =0.9
mi rv
- ABM systems (e.g. Moscow complex) are not counted







CMP = 22.47 OAR =0.651
mirv
SSKP: TKP:
BSKP = 1.0 SSKP = .995 TKP = 0.65 TKP = 0.64S14 14
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = .960 TKP = 0.65 TKP = 0.625
jL _l X. ^J
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = .911 TKP = 0.65 TKP, = 0.-S933 6 -_:• o
Polaris A—3 (w/C/?e val irte warhead):
CMP= 7.99 OAR = 0.651
mirv
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.S43 TKP = 0.651 TKP = 0.54914 1 H
SSKP^= 1.0 SSKP = 0.6S1 TKP = 0.651 TKPC= 0.443
SSKP^= 0.95 SSKP = 0.577 TKP = 0.619 TKP" = 0.376
w- O --> o
MSBS M-20 (France) :
CMP= 3.89 OAR = 0.723
mirv
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.S43 TKP = 0.651 TKP = 0.549
SSKP = 1.0 SSKPr= 0.681 TKP = 0.651 TKP_= 0.443
JL uJ X. D
SSKP,= 0.95 SSKP.= 0.577 TKP^= 0.619 TKP, = 0.376




CMF- 531.22 OAR = 0.723
mirv
sskp: tkp:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.723 TKP = 0.72314 14
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP^= 1.0 TKP^= 0.723 TKPr= 0.723
*- ^j ^i j
SSKP_= 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP_= 0.723 TKP = 0.723
•-> 6 O" o
glcm:
CMF- 531.22 OAR= 0.615
SSKP: TKP:
S5KP.= 1.0 SSKP„= 1.0 TKP = 0.615 TKP = 0.6i514 14
SSKP^,= 1.0 SSKPC= 1.0 TKP^= 0.615 TKP = 0.615jL ,_> *L !j
SSKP,= 1 . SSKP '
=
1.0 TKP,= 0.615 TKP, = 0. 6i5




SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.766 TKP = 0.723 TKP = 0.55414 14
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP_= 0.591 TKP„= 0.723 TKP = 0.427
^L D ^L J





CMP= 11.33 OAR= 0.723
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.92S TKP = 0.723 TKP = 0.671
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.802 TKP = 0.723 TKP^= 0.5802 5 2. o
SSKP = 0-99 SSKP,
=
0.705 TKP = 0.713 TKP = 0.510
-_> u 3 a
Lance:
CMF- 3.24 OAR= 0.723
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.998SSKP = 0.529 TKP = 0.722TKP = 0.529
1 4 14
3SKP^= 0.99SSSKP^= 0.371 TKP^= 0.722TKPr= 0.268
i. J jC ^i
SSKP_= 0.705SSKP = 0.294 TKP = 0.510TKP = 0.213
w> 6 -_> 6
Honest John (Greece and Turkey) :
CMP= 0.07 CAR= 0.723 (may be as low as 0.216 given age o-f system)
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.12 SSKP = 0.016 TKP = 0.09 TKP = 0.01214- 14
SSKP^= 0.12 SSKP = 0.010 TKP^= 0.09 TKP = 0.007
jL *-l jL vJ
SSKP_= 0.03 SSKP = 0.008 TKF_= 0.02 TKP = 0.006
o 6 o 6
Pluton (France):





= 0.523 TKP = 0.722 TKP = 0.378
SSKP^= 0.99 SSKP = 0.366 TKP^= 0.722 TKP = 0.265
-^ J jL ^J
SSKP_= 0.70 SSKP = 0.291 TKP^= 0.506 TKP, = 0.2103 6 3 6
Ml 10 203mm:
CMP= 1.84/0-73 OAR= 0.723 (may be much lower)
sskp:
SSKP = 0.97/0.75 SSKF'4= . 348 / . 1 56
SSKP = 0.97/0.75 SSKF- = 0.231/0.099
2. _)
SSKP = . 50 / . 2 1
4
SSKP = . .13/0 . 076
TKP:
TKP = 0.701/. 542 TKP = 0.252/. 113
TKP = 0.701/. 542 TKP = 0.167/. 072
TKP = 0.362/. 174 TKP. = 0.13/. 0553 6
Sea t'ssed
SLCM <vs. air de-fense) :
CMF- 1551.63 OAR= 0.615
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.615 TKP = 0.615
SSKP„= 1.0 BSKP_= 1.0 TKP„= 0.615 TKPcr= 0.615
jL >J a. .-J
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP,
=
1.0 TKF%= 0.615 TKP, = 0.615
o 6 •_> o
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SECT IOInI 5
WTO NUCLEAR SYSTEM TKP'
Assumptions:
A. Hardness :
H = 5 psi H = 100 psi
H^= 10 psi Hc= 200 psi








P = 0.9 (.85 for SS-N-6, SS-1/4/5, FKUG and
SS—C— lb, .8 for SSN5)
P = 0.95 (.9 for SSN5, 3S1/4/5/12, FROG, and
SSClb)




P = ( except for SS-C-4, AS-i5, SS-N-2'i where





iarae as above except that P = .9




CMP= 0.42 OAR= 0.577
SSKP: tkp:
SSKF = 0.549 SSKP.= 0.093 TKP = 0.317 TKP = 0.0541 14
SSKP = 0.549 SSKPr= 0.044 TKF = 0.317 TKP = 0.025
' jL <j *- vj
SS-N-6 < Mod 1 )
:
CMP= 4.11 OAR= 0.684
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP4
= 0.615 TKP = 0.684 TKP = 0.422
SSKP = 0.988 SSKPr= 0.444 TKF^= 0.676 TKPr= 0.304
i- ^i x- U
SSKF* = 0.788 SSKP = 0.357 TKP = 0.539 TKP. = 0.2443 6 3 6
SS-N- 17 < 1 i mi t ed dep 1 oyment )
:
CMP= 1.69 OAR= 0.724
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.959 SSKF' = 0.324 TKP = 0.694 TKP, = 0.23514- 1
5SKP_= 0.360 SSKP = 0.215 TKP-= 0.623 TKPcr= 0.156
x. *3 2 iJ
SSKP,= 0.539 SSKP = 0.244 TKP^= 0.341 TKP = 0.120









SSKP = 0.995 SSKP = 0.472 TKP = 0.610 TKP. = 0.23914 14
SSKP = 0.995 SSKP = 0.325 TKP = 0.610 TKP = 0.199
JL. xJ .£. *J
SSKP = 0.645 SSKP = 0.256 TKP,= 0.395 TKP = 0.157
o> 6 3 6
SS-5:
CMP= 2.75 OAR= 0.613
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.995 SSKP.= 0.472 TKP = 0.610 TKP = 0.28914 14
SSKP = 0.995 SSKPC= 0.325 TKP = 0.610 TKP = 0-199
£. zt 2 5
SSKP = 0.645 SSKP, = 0.256 TKP,= 0.395 TKP, = 0.157
-j> 6 %j o
SS-20 (3 MIRV)
:
CMP= 70.03 OAR = 0.651
mirv
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.651 TKP = 0.651
1 *t 1 *i
SSKP
r>
= 1.0 SSKP^= 1.0 TKP = 0.651 TKP = 0.651
jL. iJ ^- wJ





CMF- 3.11 OAR= 0.670 <P = 0.25)
a
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.997 SSKP = 0.514 TKP = 0.668 TKP = 0.344
SSKP = 0.997 SSKP = 0.359 TKP = 0.66S TKP = 0.2412 5 2 5
SSKP,= 0.690 SSKP = 0.2S4 TKP,= 0.462 TKP = 0.190
o 6 ^ 6
SS-N-21:
CMP= 213.98 OAR= 0.615 <P = 0. i5)
a
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.615 TKP4= 0.6i5
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.615 TKP = 0.615
<£ 5 2 5
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP,= 0.615 TKP = 0.615T 6 ' 3 -"— - •6
LSTid ba^-ed
FROG-7:
CMP= 7.14 OAR- 0.613
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.809 TKP = 0.613 TKP = 0.613
SSKP_= 1.0 SSKP^= 0.640 TKF^= 0.613 TKPr= 0.392
j.. ^i j- ._>
SSKP = 0.932 SSKP = 0.536 TKP = 0.571 TKP, = 0.3290-6 $ 6
W
SS-12:
CMP= i.41 OAR= 0.650
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.931 SSKP = 0.279 TKP = . 605 TKP = . 1 S
1
SSKP = 0.931 SSKP = 0.182 TKP = 0.605 TKP = 0.11S
jl 5 xi j
SSKP = 0.412 SSKP = 0.141 TKP = 0.268 TKP = 0.092O 6 3 "— 6
SS-21:
CMP= 12.73 OAR- 0.724
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.948 TKP = 0.724 TKP = 0.6864 -- - — i 4
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.838 TKP = 0.724 TKP^= 0.599
Z _J ji. J
SSKP = 0.992 SSKP = 0.746 TKP = 0.713 TKP = 0.540
^ 6 vj> o
SS-22:
CMP= 23.43 OAR= 0.724
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.996 TKP = 0.724 TKP. = 0.720
1 *» 1 *i
SSKP_= 1.0 SSKP = 0.965 TKP = 0.724 TKP = 0.617
J- uJ .i. >J
SSKP^= 1.0 SSKP = 0.920 TKP = 0.720 TKP = 0.552
o o 3 6
SS-23
CMP= 1-3.37 OAR= 0.724
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.995 TKP = 0.724 TKP = 0.720
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.852 TKP = 0.724 TKP = 0.617
jL sJ jL J
SSKP_= 0.994 SSKP = 0.763 TKP = 0.720 TKP = 0.552
-J 6 •-> ti
SS-C-lb:
CMP= 3.11 OAR= 0.460 (P = 0.25)
a
SSKP: TKF:
SSKP = 0.997 SSKP = 0.514 TKP = 0.459 TKP = 0.236
SSKP = 0.997 SSKP" = 0.359 TKP = 0.459 TKP = 0.165
Z <-> ji. J
SSKP = 0.690 SSKP = 0.284 TKP = 0.317 TKP = 0.131
o 6 jo
SS-C-4:
CMP= 213.98 OAR= 0.615 (P = 0.15)
a
sskp: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP4
= i.0 TKP
X
= 0.615 TKP4= 0.615
SSKF- = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0 TKP^= 0.615 TKP^= 0.615
Z wJ J- x-i




SSKP = 0.248 SSKP = 0.034 TKP = 0.152 TKP = 0.021
SSKP = 0.248 SSKP = 0.021 TKP„= 0.152 TKP^= 0.013
xL i_( jL. wi
SSKP = 0.055 SSKP = 0.016 TKP,= 0.034 TKP = 0,010j o •_> o
FR0G-3/-5:
CMP= 7.91 OAR- 0.613
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 0.841 TKP = 0.613 TKP = 0.5i614 14
SSKP = i.0 S3KP^= 0.677 TKP = 0.613 TKP cr= 0.415
SSKP,= 0.949 SSKP = 0.573 TKP^= 0.532 TKP, = 0.35i
-.:• o -J? o
fiir 1 savebed
AS—3 Kangaroo:
CMP= 1.0 OAR= 0.543 (P = 0.25)
a
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.85 SSKP = 0.207 TKP = 0.462 TKP = 0.112
SSKP = 0.85 SSKP = 0.133 TKP = 0.462 TKP = 0.0722 5 Z D
SSKP = 0.314 SSKP = 0.102 TKP = 0.171 TKP = 0.0553 6 3 o
AS-15:
CMP= 213.98 OAR= 0.615 (P = 0.15)
a
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 1.0 SSKP = 1.0
1 4
SSKP^= 1.0 SSKP = 1.0




CMP= 0.15 OAR- 0.723
SSKP: TKP:
SSKP = 0.248 SSKP = 0.034 TKP = 0.179 TKP = 0.025
SSKP = 0.243 SSKP^= 0.021 TKP = 0.179 TKP = 0.015
-i. ^J J- ^J
SSKP = 0.055 SSKP = 0.016 TKP^= 0.040 TKP = 0.012
SECTION <£»
FORCE STRUCTURE DISPOSITION
N = Number of missiles (aircraft)
x
Sum N = Total number of warheads on missiles (aircraft)
Sum VI = Total yield of missiles (aircraft) in MT
x
Sum CMP = Total CMP of force
x
<N >= Average number of war.heads per missile (aircraft)
Sum EMT = Total EMT
x
<EMT >= Average EMT per missile (aircraft)
X [Sum W /N 3
x x
<W >= Average yield per warhead
* CSum W /Sum N 1
x x
<CMP >= Average CMP per warhead
* CSum CMP /Sum N 3
x x
A. Missiles: Land-based, theater-strategic

























B. Missiles: Sea based, theater-strategic
US/NATO (+Fr.) Sov i et /WTO
N_ 80 (160)
Sum N^ 544 (624)
Sum W_. 84.8 (164.8)
Sum CMP^ 870. SS (1,182.08)
<N_> 6.8 (3.9)
Sum EMT^ 152.96 (232.96)
<EMT > i.91 (1.46)
<W_> 0.16 (0.26)
<CMP„> 1.6 (1.89)


























4 , 000 (24,521.9) 168, 100
(1.78)
240 (245. 1) 520
































1 . 33 (1. 18)
0.37 (0.42)
88.23 (77.70)



























Aircraft: Medium range, Iand/CV based:
US/NATO (+Fr.) Soviet /WTO
N5 67S (778) 2,305
Sum N,_ 1, 122 (1,288) 3,310
Sum Wc3 1, 122 (1, 125.03) 3,310
Sum CMP^ 244,800 (246, 125) 3,31
<N > 1.65 (1.66) 811,000
Sum EMT^ 1, 122 (1, 135) 3,310
<EMT= > 1.65 (1.46) 1.44
<W_> 1.0 (0.87) 1.0
u
<CMP > 218.2 (191.1) 245 .
THEATER-TACT ICAL TOTALS:
US/NATO <+Fr.) Soviet /WTO
N
tt 1
, 039 (1, 181)
Sum N, 1,483 (1,691) 4,577





315,311 (316,770) O 19,474
,Ntt , 1.43 (1.43)
1
"~?fi




> 1.2 (1.07) 1 . 08
<Mtt > 0.81 (0.72) . 8
<CMF
tt
> 212.62 (187.33) 179.04
>57
THEATER-STRATEGIC FORCES
(projection to December 1987)
A. Missiles: Land-based, theater—strategic










B. Missiles: Sea based, theater-strategic








<W > 0.16 (0.26)


























































4,000 (24,521. 9) 168 , 100





1. ( . 8S
)
1.0




US/NATO (+Fr.) S<oviet/W i L!
772 (904)
Sum Nts 1,, 356 (1,547) 2,537
Sum Wts 353 . 4 (453. 1) 1 , 390
Sum CMP^ 328. 700i / ^.o (329,677) 20 1 , 395
Y













<CMF y 242.42 (213. 11) 70 TQts
EXCHANGE AND FIRST STRIKE ANALYSES
NATO scenario "A" (Betz 34)
A. SS-20 data:
N = 267 <EMT >= 0.85 MTV\ A
Sum N = 801 <WA >= ' 15 MT
Sum W = 120.15 <CMP >= 23.36
Sum CMP = 18,711 CMP= 70.08
<N>= 3 OAR = 0.651A mi rv
Sum EMT = 227
SSKP, = 1.0 TKP, = 0.65110 10
SSKP_ = 1.0 TKP_ = 0.65130 30
SSKP_ = 1.0 TKF' = 0.651
vJ5£* vJSL*
SSKP200
= J - TKP200= " 651
NATO losses:
1 . IRBM" s/Cruise missiles :
a. GLCM <2 loc.) (CMP= 531.22; OAR- 0.615)
P = (1-TKF- „)= 0.355urv,h 50
P = (1-TKP, „)= 0.35
surv,uh 10
N = 2C (16) (0.35) 3= 11
surv,
h
N = 2t (16) (0.35) 3 = 11
surv, uh
N = 22 (22 of 64 surviv., 34%)
surv,
T
= > for return exchange, 14 missiles (62"'.) would




b. Pershing II (CMP= 531.22; OAR- 0.723)
P = (1-TKP« „>= 0.35
surv 10
N = (36) (.35)= 13 C 13 of 36 (357.) 1
surv
==> in return exchange 9 missiles (727.) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 6,906
Destroyed CMP 12,218
C. SSBS 5-3 <CMP= 6.25; CAR= 0.723)
P = (1-TKP^,,)^ 0.12
surv,h 200
N = 2 C 2 of IS surviving (127.) 3
surv,h
==> in return exchange 2 missiles would
successfully reach their targets (727.)
Surviving CMP 12.5
Destroyed CMP 100
d. I REM Totals :
1. Number surviving Eincl.Fr.J 35 C37J
2. 7. of original force 35 7. C3i%3
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange 23 C24J
4. 7. of original force 237. C207.3
5. Surviving CMP 18,593
6. Destroved CMP 34,529 C
•61
SLBM ' s






==> in return exchange, 10 missiles (657.) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 359.52
Destroyed CMP
b. Polaris A-5 (CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mi rv





= 2C (16) <1.0) 3= 32
surv, depl
P . = <1-TKP„_>= 0.35
surv, port 30





==> in return exchange, 28 missiles (657.) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 343.57
Destroyed CMP 167.79
c. MSBS M-20 (CMP= 3. 89; OAR= 0.723)
P , _ = 1.0
surv, depl








==> in return exchange, 35 missiles (657) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 190.61
Destroyed CMP 120.59
SLBM Totals Cincl Fr . 1
1. Number surviving
2. 7. of original -force
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange






a. F-ill <CMP= 200)
P . = (1-TKP^,^ 0.35
surv,n 50

































1. Number surviving 42 C541
2. V. of original force 35V. C 357.1
3. Surviving CMP 8,400 C 8,5841




a) used 7 C221
b) 7. of total (267) 2.67. L 8. 27.1
c) CMP expended 491 Cl,542'j
d) MT expended 3.15 C9.91
e) EMT expended 5.95 CIS.
7
2. Total theater-strategic forces:
a) 7. used 0.57. [1,6%
b. NATO forces:
1. Number surviving 136 C1991
2. % of original force 457. C457 3
3. Number reaching targets
in return exchn. (missiles only) 60 C971






7,696 C 28, 0831
0,297 C 50, 856 3
>64
II. NATO scenario "B" (Dec 84)
A. SS-20 data:
NB
= 400 <EMTg>= 0.85 MT
Sum N = 1,200 <WD >= 0.15 MT
Sum W = 180 <CMF- >= 23.36
Sum CMF_ = 28,032 CMF= 70.08B
<N„>= 3 OAR = 0.651B mirv
Sum EMT = 340
a
SSKF- = 1.0 TKP, = 0.65110 10
SSKP_ = 1.0 TKP^ = 0.65130 30
SSKP^ = 1.0 TKP^ = 0.65150 50
SSKF" = 1.0 TKP_,_ = 0.651200 200
B. NATO losses:
1. IRBM* s/Cruise missiles:
5LCM (2 loc.) <CMP= 531.22; OAR= 0.615)
P = (1-TKP. _)= 0.35
surv,uh 10
N = 4C (16) (0.35) 3 = 22
surv, uh
N = 22 (22 ot 64 surviv., 347.)
surv,
T
= > for return exchange, 14 missiles (627.) would
success-f ul 1 y reach their targets.
Surviving CMP 11,687
Destroyed CMP 22,311
b. Pershing II <CMP= 531.22; OAR= 0.723)
P = (1-TKF, _)= 0.35
surv it?





==> in return exchange 9 missiles (72%) would





c. SSBS S-3 (CMF- 6.25; OAR= 0.723)
P = <1-TKP___) 2= 0.12
surv.h 200
N = 2 C 2 of 18 surviving (127.) 3
surv,
h
==> in return exchange 2 missiles would
successfully reach their targets (727.)
Surviving CMP 12.5
Destroyed CMP 100
d. IRBM Totals :
1. Number surviving Cincl.Fr.3 35 C37 3
2. 7. of original force 35 V. C317.3
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange 23 C243
4. 7. of original fores 237. C207.3
5. Surviving CMP 13,593 CIS. 605
J




a. Poseidon (CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mirv
P =1.0 Ci nvul nerab 1 e>5urv
N = 16
surv
—=> in return exchange, 10 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 359.52
Destroyed CMP
b. Polaris A-3 (CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mirv





= 3E (16) (1.0) 11= 48
surv, depl
P = (1-TKP^„>= 0.35
surv, port 30
N = 2C (16) (0.35) := 6




==> in return exchange, 35 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMF 431.5
Destroyed CMP 79.9
c. MSBS M-20 (CMF- 3.39; OAR- 0.723)
P . . = 1.0
surv, depl








==> in return exchange, 50 missiles (72%) would








2. '/. of original force
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange




3 F- 111 (CMP= 200)
P
3urv.,h
(1-TKP50 ) = 0.35
N
survj,h= 2C (i:2) <0. 35) U= S
P = 0.35
surv, uh





b. Mirage IVA (CMP= 15.35)
jrv, h





















1. Number surviving 42 C54 3
2. '/. of original force 357. C357.3
3. Surviving CMP 8,400 (18,584 3




a) used 14 C33 3
b) "/. of total (267) _ 57. 1127.1
c) CMP expended 981 £2,312]
d) MT expended 6.3 C14.93
e) EMT expended 12.0 t28.ll
2. Total theater-strategic forces:
a) 7. used 27. C37.J
b. NATO forces:
1. Number surviving 147 C2313
2- 7. of original force 497. C537.3
3. Number reaching targets
in return exchn. (missiles only) 63 CI 193
4. 7. of original force
(missiles only) 387. C417.3
5. Surviving CMP 27,785 C 28. 253 3
6. Destroyed CMP 50,209 C 50,686
3
>69




= 300 <EMTA >= 0.35 MT
Sum N = 1,350 <Wa>= - 15 MT
Sum W = 202.5 <CMP >= 23.36
Sum CMP = 3i,536 CMP= 70.08
<N_>= 3 OAR . =0.651A mirv
Sum EMT = 332.5
SSKP. = 1.0 TKP. = 0.651
1 k) 1 k?
SSKP, = 1.0 TKP, = 0.651
ZU) 30
SSKP,. ,= 1.0 TKP^ = 0.65150 50
SSKP„ == 1.0 TKF_„ = 0.651200 200
B. NATO losses:
1. IRBM's/Cruise missiles:
GLCM (6 loc.) <CMP= 531.22; OAR- 0.615)




N = 23C (16) <0. 12) 1= 44
survl
N = 6C (16) (0.35) 3 = 34
surv2
N = 78 (78 o-f 464 surviv., 347.)
surv,
T
=> for return exchange, 48 missiles (62%) would
success-f ul ly reach their targets.
Surv i v i ng CMP 41, 435
Destroyed CMP 205,050
17&
Pershing II (CMF- 531.22; OAR= 0.723)
(3 loc.
)
P = (1-TKP, ,) = 0. 12
surv 10
N = 3C (36) (. 12) 3 = 13 I 13 of 103 (127.) 3
surv
==> in return exchange 9 missiles <727. ) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 6,906
Destroyed CMP 50,466
SSBS S-3 (CMP= 6.25; GAR= 0.723)
P = ( 1 -TKF' _ „) = 0.12
surv,h 200
N = 2 C 2 of 18 surviving (127.) 3
surv,h
==> in return exchange 2 missiles would
successfully reach their targets (727.)
Surviving CMP 12.5
Destroyed CMP 100
I REM Totals :
1. Number surviving Cincl.Fr.3 91 C93J
2. 7. of original force 16 7. C167.J
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange





4S,34i C 48, 3533
L i. i_J •—} =j UiL-
- / JL
SLBM's






==> in return exchange, 10 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 359.52
Destroyed CMP
b. Polaris A-3 <CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mirv
P . . = 1.0
surv, depl
-
N , = 2C (16) (1.0) 3 = 32
surv, depl
.
P = (1-TKP^,)= 0.35
surv, port 30





==> in return exchange, 28 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 343.57
Destroyed CMP 167.79
c. MSBS M-20 (CMP= 3.89; OAR= 0.723)
P =1.0
surv, depl








==> in return exchange, 35 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 190.61
Destroyed CMP 120.59
5LBM Totals Lincl Fr.J
1 . Number surv i v i n g
2= V, of original force
3. IMumber reaching targets in
return exchange






P = (1-TKP >= 0.35
surv,h 50

































1. Number surviving 42 C543
2. 7. of original force 357, L3573
3. Surviving CMP 8,400 L3,5S4 3




a) used 19 C343
b) 7. of total (300) 67. L 117.3
c) CMP expended 1,332 t 2, 3833
d) MT expended 8.55 CIS. 33
e) EMT expended 16.15 C28.93
2. Total theater-strategic forces:
a) 7. used 1.37. L 2. 47.3
b. NATO forces:
1. Number surviving 192 C2553
2. 7. of original force 257. C287.J
3. Number reaching targets
in return exchn. (missiles only) 95 C1323
4. 7. of original force
(missiles only) 127. £157.3
5. Surviving CMP 57,444 C57,S3lJ
6. Destroyed CMP 271,284 C 27 1,843
3
!74
IV. NATO scenario "B" (Dec 87)
A. SS-20 data:
N = 450 <EMT_>= 0.85 MT
Sum N = 1,350 <W_>= 0. 15 MTy a
Sum W= 202.5 <CMP_>= 23.36f c
Sum CMP = 31,536 CMP= 70.03
o
<Nn >= 3 OAR = 0.651B mirv
Sum EMT = 382.5
D
SSKP. = 1.0 TKP, = 0.65110 10
SSKP = 1.0 TKP30
=
- 651
SSKP = 1.0 TKP = 0.651
SSKP200= 1.0 TKP200= 0.651
B. NATO losses:
1 . IRBM ? s/Cruise missiles :
a. GLCM (6 loc.) <CMP= 531.22; OAR= 0.615)
P = (1-TKF- )= 0.35
surv 10
N = 29C (16) (0.35)3= 162
surv
=> for return exchange, 100 missiles (62%) would
successfully reach their targets.




b. Pershing II (CMP= 531.22; OAR= 0.723)
P = (1-TKF- ) 2= 0. 12
surv 10





==> in return exchange 9 missiles (727.) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 6,906
Destroyed CMP 50,466
c. SSBS 5-3 (CMP= 6.25; OAR- 0.723)
P = (1-TKP_.,_,) 2= 0. 12
surv,h 200
N = 2 C 2 of IS surviving (127.) 1
surv,
h
==> in return exchange 2 missiles would
successfully reach their targets (727.)
Surviving CMP 12.5
Destroyed CMP 100
d. IREM Totals :
1. Number surviving Cincl.Fr.3 175 C1773
2. 7. of original force 33 7. £307.11
3. Number reaching targets in
return exchange 23 C243
4. 7. of original force 237. C207.D
5. Surviving CMP 92,964 C 92, 9771!





a. Poseidon (CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mirv




==> in return exchange, 10 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 359.52
Destroyed CMP
b. Polaris A-3 <CMP= 7.99; OAR = 0.651)
mirv
P . . = 1.0
surv, depl
.
N . = 3C (16) (1.0) := 48
surv, oepl
P . = ( 1 -TKP^
., ) = 0.35
surv, port 30





==> in return exchange, 35 missiles (65%) would
successfully reach their targets
Surviving CMP 431.5
Destroyed CMP 79.9
c. MSBS M-20 (CMP= 3.89; OAR= 0.723)
P , . = 1.0
surv, depl .








==> in return exchange, 50 missiles (72%) would




SLBM Totals Cincl Fr . 3
1. Number surviving
2. '/. of original force
3. iMumber reaching targets in
return exchange
4. 7. of original force
5
.




P = (1-TKF- )= 0.35
surv,h 50


































1. Number surviving 42 £54 3
2. '/. of original -force 357. £357.3
3. Surviving CMP 8,400 C 8, 534
3
4. Destroyed CMP 15,600 £15,938 3
4.#=fc-r-r^c:K ^inj^lys i s
a. Soviet Forces:
1. SS-20 only:
a) used 27 £46 3
b) 7. of total (450) 67. £107.3
c) CMP expended 1,392 £3,2243
d) MT expended 12.2 C20.73
e) EMT expended 23 £393
2. Total theater—strategic forces:
a) 7. used 27. £37,3
b. NATO forces:
1. Number surviving 287 £3713
2. 7. of original force 377. £417.3
3. Number reaching targets
in return exchn. (missiles only) 154 [2063
4. 7. of original force
(mi ssi 1 es only) 207. £ 237.
J
5. Surviving CMP 102,156 £102,6243
6. Destroyed CMP 226,574 £227,0513
!79
SECT I OlN| O
IMMEDIATE POPULATION LOSS
Model Development and Assumptions
A. Based on Hiroshima population loss model where:
1. R_ = radius -from ground zero within which there were50
507. casualties
2- casualties rapidly fell of-f outside of R._
,
3. ""507. of casualties are from burns
4. average for protected and unprotected populace
(combined), (W = 20 KT) :
Rc/,<20 KT) = 0.8 mi
B. Assumptions :
1. 507. of population inside R-,, are killed, none outside
2. scaling is intermediate between thermal effects
<R => W
17
^) and blast and shock (R => W 1 '"") such that
R => W
- 4
therefore: R_ _ (W) =CR__ (20 KT) 1 C CW/20) 350 50
C. Population Loss :
1. lethal area (A )
:
A = tt CRr .c (W)D^
A = tt c <RC„
2
<20 kt) ) <)W/20) " 8 3 mi 2
1 50
2, population density = N per mi^
a. see Sec. II for N for various regions
P
130
3. number killed = N l
N. = 1/2 N A, people
k p 1 ^ r
4. total population loss due to strikes with U missiles
with A? MIRV's each:
N, = 1/2 N A,MUk,T p 1
5. for this case <SS-20 only):
M = 3 MIRV,J 5
W = 150 KT
.'. N, = 15.12N U peoplek,T p
1 1 . Population density at target sites
A. UK:
1. GLCh :
a. RAF Greenham Common: 40,000 (Newbury immediately
nearby)
b. RAF Molesworth: N_= 200 per km^
2. SLBM:
N = 200 per km -
P
F-lll:




a. N = 200 per km
P
Pershing II :
a. Schwabisch Gmund: N = 500 per km"
P
b. Neckarsulm: N = 500 per km^
P




a. N = 200 per km
P
Nether 1 and=;
a. N = 500 per km'
P
Italy (Sicily) :
a. N = 200 per km"
P
6. France:
a. N = 100 per km
P
III. Population Loss Projections by Region and Scenario
A. UK
1. SLCM:
a. Greenham Common Seen A Seen B
Dec S4 40, 000 40, 000
Dec 36 40,000 80 , 000
b. liolesworth
Dec 84
Dec 86 6,048 9,072
c. Subtotals
Dec 34 40,000 40,000
Dec 86 46,048 39,072
SLBM:
Dec 84 3,024 3,024
Dec 86 3,024 3,024
F-lll:
34 6,043 24,192











































6 , 048 9 , 072
-jL , OQ2' iD , / J-\D
?2,630 23,728
European Population Loss Totals <+ France) :
Dec 84 67,216 (39,896) 88,334 (117,112)
















Thermal Effects o-F One (1) 150 KT Airburst













Blast Effects (Overpressure) -From One (1) 150 KT Airburst















D$ u3 «?r m c^
spej fesop uojaneN
Immediate Radiation E-f-fects o-f One (1) 150 KT Airburst
(Height = 1,000 -Ft. )
286


















































Casualties as a Function o-F Yield (W)
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Plots a-F Blast and Thermal E-F-fects o-f One
(Height = 1,000 -ft. )
(1) 150 KT Airburst
238
FALLOUT PATTERNS (Idealized)
I. Wind -factors (prevailing winds)
January Jul
y
Southern UK NE @ 20 mph NNE © 12 mph
Low Countries ENE @ 15 mph E © 15 mph
Germany ENE © 12 mph E @ 15 mph
France ESE @ 12 mph SE @ 10 mph
Italy (Sicily) E -> ESE @ 20 mph S -> SW @ 5 mph
II. Patterns:
A. Pattern used:
"Idealized fallout distribution pattern"
— developed in Glasstone, S. and Dolan, P., The Effects
of Nuclear Weapons r Third Edition* Sec. 9.82, p. 422.
B. Device:
one (1) SS-20 RV: yield (W)= 150 KT with 507. fission
yiel d
C. Values derived from Glasstone. Table 9.93. p. 430 and
factored to incorporate prevailing winds listed above
III. Fallout pattern parameters:
Reference dose Down wind Max. width Ground Zero
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Reference dose Down wind Max. width Ground Zero











































84. 85 7.68 3.2
381.33 36.56 11.70
8. 15 0.51 ,~4 i\ ~y
76.36 6.91 3.20
343.20 32.91 10.53





3SL33 •^•6 . 5o 1 1 . 70
O.lJ 0.51 . 43
76.36 6.91 3.20
343.20 32.91 10.53
~~7 CT'-i 0.47 0.39
70.42 6.38 2.66





56 . 85 j. 1j 2. 14
255.49 24.50 7.84
190
Fallout Patterns—January (mid—winter) Attack
>91
Fallout Patterns—July (mid-summer) Attack
%MM&
January Fallout Pattern for S.E. England.
(GLCM Bases and F-lll Bases shown)
293
July Fallout Patterns -for S.E- England,
(GLCM Bases and F-lll Bases shown)
294
January Fallout Patterns -for Netherlands and Belgium.
(GLCM Bases)
?95




-for South Central West Germany,
(Pershing II Bases)
197
July Fallout Patterns for South Central West Germany,
iP&rshing II Bases)
!98
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